Brown v. Multnomah County Assessor

• Court: Oregon Tax Court
• Decided: July 29, 2025
• Docket: TC-MD 240566R
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT MAGISTRATE DIVISION Property Tax

DENNIS BROWN, ) and CATHERIN BROWN, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) TC-MD 240566R ) v. ) ) MULTNOMAH COUNTY ASSESSOR, ) ) Defendant. ) DECISION

Plaintiffs appealed Defendant’s notice of disqualification from exclusive farm use (EFU)

special assessment, dated June 28, 2024, for the property identified as tax account R342190

(subject property) for the 2024-25 tax year. The parties submitted a Joint Statement of Stipulated

Facts along with cross motions for summary judgment. The matter is ready for a decision.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiffs Dennis and Catherin Brown own real property identified as tax account number

R342190. (Stip Facts at 1, ¶ 1.) Prior to June 14, 2024, approximately 9.24 acres of the subject

property qualified for EFU special assessment under ORS 308A.062,1 and 1.00 acre qualified for

special assessment for a homesite used in conjunction with EFU. (Id. at 1, ¶ 2.)

In January 2024, Defendant mailed a survey titled “2024/25 Farm Rent Study (EFU)” to

Plaintiffs. (Id. at 1, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff Catherin Brown completed the survey, indicating the number

of acres currently farmed as “0,” and the number of acres in a woodlot as “4.” (Id. at 1-2, ¶ 3.)

She identified the type of farming activity as “Firewood.” (Id.) Defendant received the

completed survey on February 22, 2024. (Id. at 2, ¶ 3.)

1 Unless otherwise noted, the court’s references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to 2023.

DECISION TC-MD 240566R 1 On June 12, 2024, Defendant unsuccessfully attempted to contact Plaintiffs by phone and

left a voicemail asking Plaintiffs to discuss the survey and any farm use taking place on the

property. (Id. at 2, ¶ 4). On June 13, 2024, Catherin Brown returned the call and relayed to

Defendant that (1) Plaintiffs were growing timber and selling firewood; (2) Plaintiffs believed

firewood to be a farm product; and (3) Plaintiffs had previously sold hay, leased out the property

for pastureland, and sold berries and other row crops, but not in 2024. (Id. at 2, ¶ 5).

Based on the information from the phone call and the returned survey, Defendant

determined the land was not currently employed in farm use. (Id. at 2, ¶ 6.) At the end of the

phone call, Defendant informed Plaintiffs that, because firewood does not qualify as a farm

product for the purposes of the exemption, the property would be disqualified from special

assessment and be assessed for additional taxes not to exceed ten years pursuant to ORS

308A.700-733. (Id.) Defendant kept notes of the phone call directly on the returned survey. (Id.

at 2, ¶ 7; Joint Ex 1 at 1.)

On June 28, 2024, Defendant notified Plaintiffs by letter that 9.24 acres of the property

were disqualified from EFU special assessment because the farmland was no longer in qualifying

use and that 1.00 acre of the property was disqualified because the homesite was no longer used

in conjunction with EFU property. (Id. at 2-3, ¶ 8.)

Prior to disqualifying the property, Defendant did not attempt to schedule an in-person

site inspection of the property, conduct a site inspection, or keep record of any site inspection.

(Id. at 3, ¶ 9.) On September 10, 2024, Plaintiffs appealed Defendant’s disqualification of the

property to this court. (Id. at 3, ¶ 10.)

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DECISION TC-MD 240566R 2 II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard And Legal Issue

The issue in this case is whether Defendant’s failure to comply with the procedural

requirements of Oregon Administrative Rule (OAR) 150-308-1100(1) invalidates its

disqualification of Plaintiffs’ property from EFU special assessment.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tax Court Rule-Magistrate

Division (TCR-MD) 13; Tax Court Rule (TCR) 47 C; Tektronix, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 354 Or

531, 533, 316 P3d 276 (2013). Because the facts are undisputed and the issue is one of law, this

matter is appropriate for summary judgment.

B. EFU Qualification Requirements Under ORS 308A

Generally, all real property is presumed to be taxable, and exemption is the exception.

Dove Lewis Mem Emer. Vet. Clinic v. Dept. of Rev., 301 Or 423, 426-27, 723 P2d 320 (1986).

The legislature has recognized the significant contribution of agriculture and related land uses to

Oregon’s character and economy. To promote the continuation of prosperity for all residents

who benefit from the agricultural use of land in Oregon, the legislature has reduced taxes for

properties that employ qualified farm use. ORS 308A.050. “Any land that is within an

exclusive farm use zone and that is used exclusively for farm use shall qualify for farm use

special assessment under ORS 308A.050 to 308A.128, unless disqualified under other provisions

of law.” ORS 308A.062(1).

The parties agree that Plaintiffs only used the property to grow and sell firewood, which

is not a qualifying farm activity as defined in ORS 308A.056. With that factual issue resolved,

the case turns solely on whether Defendant’s failure to follow the rule’s required procedures

DECISION TC-MD 240566R 3 invalidates the disqualification.

C. Procedural Preconditions To Disqualification

Once an assessor determines that property may no longer qualify for farmland special

assessment, they are required by OAR 150-308-1100(1)(a), to do three things before

disqualification: “(A) [m]ake a reasonable effort to contact the owner, owner’s agent or person

using the land; (B) [m]ake a site inspection of the property; and (C) [r]equest the recent history

of the property’s use.” In addition, OAR 150-308-1100(1)(b) requires the assessor to maintain a

record of the inspection, the contact with the property owner, and property conditions for at least

three years. These requirements are not optional; they serve to ensure that disqualification is

based on verifiable, documented evidence.

Defendant acknowledges that it did not conduct a site inspection of the property and did

not create or retain a record of any such inspection. Defendant argues that a site visit would have

been futile because Plaintiff admitted to a non-qualifying use of the property. Defendant asserts

that information of non-qualifying use alone, directly from Plaintiffs, was sufficient to justify

disqualification and that it substantially complied with the applicable rule.

Plaintiffs argue that the rule requires actual compliance with each step, regardless of

whether disqualification appears justified. Because Defendant did not follow the required

procedures for disqualifying a property from EFU from special assessment, Plaintiffs contend the

disqualification was invalid.

D. Judicial Interpretation Of OAR 150-308-1100(1)

In Evergreen Agr. Enterprises, Inc. v. Yamhill County Assessor, TC-MD 101181B, 2011

WL 6338839 (Or Tax M Div, Dec. 16, 2011), this court stated that the county “was required to

comply with all three requirements in OAR 150-308A.113(1)(a)(A)-(C) prior to disqualifying the

DECISION TC-MD 240566R 4 subject property from farm use special assessment.” 2 Id. at *5. Further, the court held that the

county “was also required to comply with the record-making and record-keeping requirements of

OAR 150-308A.113(1)(b)[.]” Id. at *6. The assessor in that case had failed to conduct a site

inspection and did not keep adequate records. Thus, the court concluded that the disqualification

was invalid because of the procedural failure.

Other cases confirm the interpretation in Evergreen. In Phillips v. Deschutes County

Assessor, TC-MD 160344R, 2018 WL 514610 (Or Tax M Div, January 23, 2018), the court

invalidated a disqualification because the county failed to make and retain a record of a site

inspection. Id. at *7. Similarly, in Exit 282A Development Company, LLC v. Clackamas County

Assessor, TC-MD 120764C, 2013 WL 3948638 (Or Tax M Div, July 30, 2013), the court found

that visual inspections five years prior to disqualification did not satisfy the requirements of the

administrative rule. There, the court also refused to recognize four additional visual inspections

of the property done subsequently as site inspections because they lacked the proper supporting

records or documentation. Id. at *6. The court found that visual inspection without proper

documentation did not satisfy the rule’s requirements, thus invalidating the disqualification. Id.

Defendant primarily relies on Boardman Tree Farm v. Morrow County Assessor, 20 OTR

361 (2011), where the court accepted a series of informal drive-by inspections, together with

substantial negotiation with the taxpayer, as satisfying the site inspection requirement. In

Boardman the court undertook an analysis of the term “site inspection” used in the

administrative rule. Id. at 367-68. After concluding that the plain meaning of the text and

context did not resolve all ambiguities, the court turned to the rulemaking record. Id. at 368.

From this, the court concluded that there were two purposes in adopting the inspection

2 OAR 150-308-1100 was previously numbered OAR 150-308A.113.

DECISION TC-MD 240566R 5 requirement, “(1) to ensure that a given property is, in fact, no longer entitled to EFU special

assessment and (2) to ensure that a disqualification will be upheld should a taxpayer choose to

challenge it.” Id. This is to ensure that any disqualifications pursuant to any “discoveries” that

the land is no longer being used as farmland will be “based at least in part upon the reasonable

observations of an assessor or an employee of the assessor.” Id.

The assessor in Boardman made 36 informal observations and kept partial records. The

issue in that case was whether information observations were enough to constitute site

inspections. Id. at 371. The court concluded they could, because they demonstrated some form

of direct and contemporaneous evaluation of the property.

Unlike in Boardman, the assessor here made no observations at all. There is no evidence

that Defendant visited the property for any reason. Boardman does not support Defendant’s

argument that a site inspection can be skipped entirely. It only clarifies what form an inspection

may take. The minimum requirement remains that some form of site inspection must occur and

that a record of that inspection must be kept.

E. Application of Law To Facts

Defendant argues that the dual purpose of the site inspection requirements, (1) to ensure

that a given property is, in fact, no longer entitled to EFU special assessment and (2) to ensure

that a disqualification will be upheld should a taxpayer choose to challenge it, were satisfied.

Defendant reaches this conclusion based on two facts. First, that there is no dispute that the

property no longer qualified for special assessment at the time of disqualification. Second,

Defendant made this determination based solely on information provided by Plaintiffs.

Defendant’s position is that so long as the assessor has reason to believe that a site inspection

would be futile, based on information provided by the taxpayer, then the inspection is not

DECISION TC-MD 240566R 6 required. However, the court in Evergreen rejected this exact reasoning. The rule exists to

ensure that disqualification decisions are based on documented, first-hand observations by the

assessor. If the assessor’s belief alone were enough to bypass the procedures, the rule would

serve no purpose. The discovery that disqualifying conditions may exist is what triggers the

need for site inspection and recordkeeping. It does not excuse compliance.

In Earth Science Products Corp., v. Clackamas County Assessor, TC-MD 160012N,

2016 WL 7177518 (Or Tax M Div, Dec 9, 2016), the court upheld a disqualification based on a

single site inspection conducted from outside the property’s fence. The court held that this was

the “bare minimum necessary to satisfy the rule.” Id. at *6. Here there was a complete absence

of an inspection or record. Defendant did not present a single case which has upheld a

disqualification where there was no site inspection and no record at all.

III. CONCLUSION

Decisions of this court have shown flexibility as to the manner in which a site inspection

is performed and the kind of record that is required, but it has always required some form of site

inspection and record. Here, Defendant failed to conduct a site inspection and did not maintain

the record required by OAR 150-308-1100(1). The administrative rule mandates compliance

with these steps before disqualification. Because these procedures were not followed, the

disqualification of Plaintiffs’ property from EFU special assessment was procedurally invalid.

Now, therefore,

DECISION TC-MD 240566R 7 IT IS THE DECISION OF THIS COURT that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment

is granted, and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

IT IS FURTHER DECIDED. The subject property, identified as tax account R342190,

qualifies for farm use special assessment for the 2024-25 tax year.

If you want to appeal this Decision, file a complaint in the Regular Division of the Oregon Tax Court, by mailing to: 1163 State Street, Salem, OR 97301-2563; or by hand delivery to: Fourth Floor, 1241 State Street, Salem, OR.

Your complaint must be submitted within 60 days after the date of this Decision or this Decision cannot be changed. TCR-MD 19 B.

This Decision was signed by Magistrate Richard D. Davis and entered on July 29, 2025.

DECISION TC-MD 240566R 8