Brown v. Mount Sinai W.
This text of 2024 NY Slip Op 31069(U) (Brown v. Mount Sinai W.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court, New York County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Brown v Mount Sinai W. 2024 NY Slip Op 31069(U) March 29, 2024 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 805247/2023 Judge: John J. Kelley Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. INDEX NO. 805247/2023 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 15 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/29/2024
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. JOHN J. KELLEY PART 56M Justice ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 805247/2023 PAULETTE BROWN, as proposed Administrator of the Estate of KEVIN BROWN, MOTION DATE 11/08/2023
Plaintiff, MOTION SEQ. NO. 001
-v- MOUNT SINAI WEST, PARK TERRACE CARE CENTER, DECISION + ORDER ON INC., doing business as PARK TERRACE CARE CENTER, JOHN DOE 1, and JOHN DOE 2, MOTION
Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 were read on this motion to/for DISMISSAL/3211(a)(3) .
In this action to recover damages, inter alia, for medical malpractice and statutory
nursing home negligence, the defendant Mount Sinai West moves pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3)
to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it, based on the plaintiff’s lack of capacity to
prosecute the action. The plaintiff opposes the motion. The motion is granted, and the
complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against Mount Sinai West, albeit without prejudice to
commencement of a new action against it for the same relief pursuant to CPLR 205(a) by a duly
authorized representative of the estate of the plaintiff’s decedent, Kevin Brown.
The plaintiff’s proposed decedent died on January 13, 2022. The plaintiff commenced
this action on April 28, 2023. As of that date, the plaintiff had not been issued letters of
administration or letters testamentary by the Surrogate’s Court pursuant to SCPA articles 10 or
14, respectively. The defendant made the instant motion on June 20, 2023 (see CPLR 2211).
In an affirmation dated September 26, 2023, the plaintiff’s attorney asserted that the plaintiff had
been issued letters of voluntary administration with respect to the decedent’s estate on
September 1, 2023, and attached a copy of the relevant certificate of voluntary administration. 805247/2023 BROWN, PAULETTE vs. MOUNT SINAI WEST ET AL Page 1 of 4 Motion No. 001
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In her summons and complaint, the plaintiff characterized herself as the “proposed
administrator” of the decedent’s estate.
“A personal representative who has received letters of administration of a decedent's estate [or letters testamentary] is the only party who is authorized to commence a survival action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the decedent or a wrongful death action to recover damages sustained by the decedent’s distributees on account of his or her death”
(Shelley v South Shore Healthcare, 123 AD3d 797, 797 [2d Dept 2014]; see Gulledge v
Jefferson County, 172 AD3d 1666, 1667 [3d Dept 2019]; Jordan v Metropolitan Jewish Hospice,
122 AD3d 682, 683 [2d Dept 2014]; Mingone v State of New York, 100 AD2d 897, 899 [2d Dept
1984]; EPTL 1-2.13, 5-4.1 [1]; 11-3.2 [b]). Hence, a “proposed administrator” lacks capacity to
prosecute either a personal injury “survival” action or a wrongful death action on behalf of the
estate of a decedent (see Rodriguez v River Val. Care Ctr., Inc., 175 AD3d 432, 433 [1st Dept
2019]; Richards v Lourdes Hosp., 58 AD3d 927, 927-928 [3d Dept 2009]; Mendez v Kyung Yoo,
23 AD3d 354, 355 [2d Dept 2005]; Duran v Isabella Geriatric Ctr., Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op
30500[U], *9, 2023 NY Misc LEXIS 669, *12-13 [Sup Ct, N.Y. County, Feb. 15, 2023] [Kelley,
J.]; Castro v Fraser, 2022 NY Slip Op 30903[U], *5, 2022 NY Misc LEXIS 1368, *7 [Sup Ct, N.Y.
County, Mar. 15, 2022] [Kelley, J.]; Stroble v Townhouse Operating Co., 2019 NY Misc LEXIS
18865 [Sup Ct, Nassau County, Dec. 16, 2019]; Fleisher v Ballon Stoll Bader & Nadler, P.C.,
2015 NY Slip Op 31855[U], *5, 2015 NY Misc LEXIS 3625, *6 [Sup Ct, N.Y. County, Oct. 5,
2015]).
A “voluntary administrator” also lacks capacity to prosecute either a personal injury
“survival” action or a wrongful death action on behalf of the estate of a decedent. The SCPA
allows for the appointment of a voluntary administrator of a small estate, defined as an estate
“having a gross value of $50,000 or less exclusive of property required to be set off under EPTL
5-3.1(a)” (SCPA 1301[1]), and defines a “voluntary administrator” as “a person who qualifies
and undertakes to settle the estate of the decedent without the formality of court administration
as hereinafter provided” (SCPA 1301[2]). Crucially, however, “[t]he voluntary administrator shall 805247/2023 BROWN, PAULETTE vs. MOUNT SINAI WEST ET AL Page 2 of 4 Motion No. 001
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have no power to enforce a claim for the wrongful death of or a claim for personal injuries to the
decedent” (SCPA 1306[3]). Consequently a “voluntary administrator” has no capacity to
prosecute a personal injury “survival” action or a wrongful death action on behalf of the estate of
a decedent (see Carrick v Central Gen. Hosp., 51 NY2d 242, 246 [1980]; Rodriguez v River Val.
Care Ctr., Inc., 175 AD3d at 433; Richards v Lourdes Hosp., 58 AD3d at 927-928; Ramos v
Kalsow, 2023 NY Slip Op 32954[U], *3, 2023 NY Misc LEXIS 4648, *4 [Sup Ct, N.Y. County,
Aug. 24, 2023] [Kelley, J.]; Castro v Fraser, 2022 NY Slip Op 30903[U], *5, 2022 NY Misc
LEXIS 1368, *7 [Sup Ct, N.Y. County, Mar. 15, 2022] [Kelley, J.]).
The complaint thus must be dismissed insofar as asserted against Mount Sinai West.
The dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the commencement of a new action
against that defendant for the same relief, under a new Index Number, in accordance with
CPLR 205(a), within six months of the termination of the claims against the defendant Mount
Sinai West, after the plaintiff is appointed as the executor or administrator the decedent’s estate
by the Surrogate’s Court pursuant to SCPA article 10. As relevant here, CPLR 205(a) provides
that,
“If an action is timely commenced and is terminated in any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the plaintiff . . . may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences within six months after the termination provided that the new action would have been timely commenced at the time of commencement of the prior action and that service upon defendant is effected within such six-month period.”
A “disposition based solely upon the absence of a duly appointed administrator does not
preclude reprosecution of the underlying claim through the mechanism of CPLR 205 (subd [a])
once a qualified administrator has been appointed” (Carrick v Central Gen. Hosp., 51 NY2d at
252; see Rodriguez v River Val. Care Ctr., Inc., 175 AD3d at 433; Snodgrass v Professional
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2024 NY Slip Op 31069(U), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-mount-sinai-w-nysupctnewyork-2024.