Brown v. Moore

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Brown v. Moore

800 So. 2d 329, 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 16257, 2001 WL 1448558

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedNovember 16, 2001

DocketNo. 1D00-4621

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 800 So. 2d 329 (Brown v. Moore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Brown v. Moore, 800 So. 2d 329, 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 16257, 2001 WL 1448558 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001).

Pincite

Opinion

BARFIELD, J.

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the lower tribunal departed from the essential requirements of law in denying his petition for writ of mandamus seeking gain time credit under the statute in effect at the time he began the conspiracy of which he was convicted, instead of under the statute in effect at the time the conspiracy ended. A crime spanning a change in the gain time statute invokes the provisions of the latter statute. See, Jenkins v. State, 444 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). See also, Leyvas v. United States, 371 F.2d 714 (9th Cir.1967). The law deems an offender who persists in the commission of a continuing crime, in the face of a change in a statute affecting the punishment or gain time with regard to that crime, to have fully anticipated the application of the latter law.

[330]*330The petition for writ of certiorari is DENIED.

VAN NORTWICK and POLSTON, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

BARFIELD, J.

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the lower tribunal departed from the essential requirements of law in denying his petition for writ of mandamus seeking gain time credit under the statute in effect at the time he began the conspiracy of which he was convicted, instead of under the statute in effect at the time the conspiracy ended. A crime spanning a change in the gain time statute invokes the provisions of the latter statute. See, Jenkins v. State, 444 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). See also, Leyvas v. United States, 371 F.2d 714 (9th Cir.1967). The law deems an offender who persists in the commission of a continuing crime, in the face of a change in a statute affecting the punishment or gain time with regard to that crime, to have fully anticipated the application of the latter law.

[330]*330The petition for writ of certiorari is DENIED.

VAN NORTWICK and POLSTON, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

800 So. 2d 329, 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 16257, 2001 WL 1448558, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-moore-fladistctapp-2001.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack