Brown v. Miller

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 19, 2026
• Docket: 24-2521
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALICE HELEN BROWN, No. 24-2521 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:18-cv-07826-VC v. MEMORANDUM* Police Officer ETHAN MILLER,

Defendant - Appellee,

and

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF DEL NORTE, CITY OF CRESCENT CITY, Crescent City Manager ERIC WIER, CRESCENT CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Chief of Police IVAN MINSAL, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Vince Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 19, 2026**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: O’SCANNLAIN, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Alice Helen Brown appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

following a jury trial on her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that a traffic stop

violated the Fourth Amendment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1291. We review the exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion, Duran v. City

of Maywood, 221 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), and affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Brown’s evidence

regarding race, including Brown’s driver’s license and prior encounters with other

unrelated law enforcement, from the liability phase of the trial. The evidence was

not relevant to the Fourth Amendment claim, which depended on whether there

was an objectively reasonable basis for the traffic stop, not on any subjective

motivation the officer is alleged to have had. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.

806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops” under the

Fourth Amendment does not “depend[] on the actual motivations of the individual

officers involved.”).

Brown waived her challenge to the bill of costs by not raising the issue in

district court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1). See Walker v.

California, 200 F.3d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (failure to object to a

bill of costs before the district court waives the right to challenge the award on

appeal).

2 24-2521 We decline to consider other issues not properly raised in the opening brief

or in district court. Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).1

AFFIRMED.

1 We do not consider Brown’s dissatisfaction with her own trial attorney’s performance in district court.

3 24-2521