Jansen, J.
This case is before this Court on remand from the Supreme Court to consider the appeal as on leave granted. Brown v Michigan Bell Telephone, Inc, 450 Mich 853 (1995). Defendant Michigan Bell Telephone, Inc., appeals from a March 24, 1994, order denying its motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). We affirm.
The facts of this case are not really in dispute. The incident occurred in the City of Flint on March 28, 1990, at approximately 9:30 P.M. Plaintiffs Tonya Brown and Anita Addison purchased some snacks at Hampton’s Party Store. The store was located on the southeast comer of the intersection of Saginaw Street and Russell Street. Defendant1 Michigan Bell Telephone owned two unenclosed, public pay telephones that were located on the northwest comer of Hampton’s Party Store. The telephones were located approximately 14½ feet from Russell Street (a residential street) and approximately 45 feet from Saginaw Street (a commercial street).
After purchasing the snacks, Tonya Brown was using one of the telephones while Anita Addison stood nearby. A car driven by Ruby Greer veered out [620]*620of control as she attempted to make a left turn from Saginaw Street onto Russell Street. The car struck both Tonya Brown and Anita Addison. Tonya lost the use of both of her legs, and her 8V2-month-old fetus (plaintiff Amber Vonetta Brown) was also lost as a result of the accident. Anita Addison suffered severe head injuries, which resulted in permanent brain damage.
Greer subsequently pleaded guilty of felonious driving. Greer had been smoking crack cocaine and drinking alcohol a few hours before the accident. Apparently, an armed robbery had occurred a few blocks north of Hampton’s Party Store. Greer, one of the robbery victims, fled the scene in a car. However, not only was Greer intoxicated at the time, but she had never driven a car before and did not have a driver’s license. Greer drove south on Saginaw Street for a few blocks at an excessive rate of speed before the car crashed into Hampton’s Party Store.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Michigan Bell and Hampton’s Party Store, asserting claims of negligence and premises liability. Michigan Bell moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), arguing that it owed no duty to plaintiffs because the accident was unforeseeable and that Greer’s criminal driving was a superseding cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that defendant had a duty to plaintiffs to safely locate the public telephones, that it was foreseeable that a car would run off the road at the intersection, and that Greer’s driving was not an intervening cause operating to extinguish any liability of defendant. .
Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court. This Court denied leave in an unpub[621]*621lished order dated August 10, 1994 (Docket No. 174257). After denying defendant’s motion for rehearing of the order in an unpublished order dated September 26, 1994, defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded the case to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. 450 Mich 853 (1995).
The trial court denied defendant’s motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8). We review de novo the trial court’s decision in this regard. Garvelink v Detroit News, 206 Mich App 604, 607; 522 NW2d 883 (1994). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is properly granted if the nonmoving party failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 654; 532 NW2d 842 (1995). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is properly granted if the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify a right of recovery. Simko, supra at 654. A motion for summary disposition is tested on the pleadings alone, and all factual allegations contained in the complaint must be accepted as true. Id.
On appeal, Michigan Bell first argues that it did not owe a duty to plaintiffs. Specifically, defendant argues that it is not reasonably foreseeable that a car will be recklessly operated, leave the roadway, and strike a public telephone adjacent to a building; that it is not reasonably foreseeable that an accident will occur where there is no allegation of a prior accident or injury to users of the public telephone; and that plaintiffs’ experts could not have provided a basis to deny summary disposition where those experts had no [622]*622prior knowledge or experience with the type of accident involved in this case.
We note from the outset that this case is being decided solely on the basis of MCR 2.116(C)(8). Therefore, we can rely only on the pleadings to determine whether plaintiffs’ complaint sets forth a claim upon which relief can be granted. Like the trial court, we examine only the pleadings without reference to any other documentary evidence, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in deciding whether defendant owed a duty to plaintiffs, specifically to have placed the telephones in a different location.
Duty is any obligation that the defendant has to the plaintiff to avoid negligent conduct. Simko, supra at 655. In negligence actions, the existence of a duty is a question of law for the court. Id. In determining whether a duty exists, courts look to different variables, including: foreseeability of the harm, existence of a relationship between the parties involved, degree of certainty of injury, closeness of connection between the conduct and the injury, moral blame attached to the conduct, policy of preventing future harm, and the burdens and consequences of imposing a duty and the resulting liability for breach. Buczkowski v McKay, 441 Mich 96, 100-101; 490 NW2d 330 (1992).
Our Supreme Court has held that utility companies are charged with a duty to protect against foreseeable harm. Groncki v Detroit Edison Co, 453 Mich 644, 654; 557 NW2d 289 (1996) (Brickley, C.J.), citing Schultz v Consumers Power Co, 443 Mich 445, 452; 506 [623]*623NW2d 175 (1993).2 In McMillan v State Hwy Comm, 426 Mich 46, 58; 393 NW2d 332 (1986), our Supreme Court specifically rejected a rule that a private utility company owes no duty to the occupants of a vehicle that leaves the traveled portion of the road. In McMillan, the plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile, was injured when the automobile left the traveled portion of the road and struck a utility pole owned by The Detroit Edison Company. The pole was located in the median approximately three feet from the traveled portion of the road. The Supreme Court stated:
[W]e are persuaded that the plaintiff should not be precluded, as a matter of law, from presenting her case to the jury. The question whether a duty exists, and the question whether the cause (here, the placement of the poles) was so significant and important to be regarded as a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s loss, depends “in part on foreseeability — whether it is foreseeable that the actor’s conduct may create a risk of harm to the victim, and whether the result of that conduct and intervening causes were foreseeable.” [Id. at 61-62, quoting Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 439; 254 NW2d 759 (1977).]
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Jansen, J.
This case is before this Court on remand from the Supreme Court to consider the appeal as on leave granted. Brown v Michigan Bell Telephone, Inc, 450 Mich 853 (1995). Defendant Michigan Bell Telephone, Inc., appeals from a March 24, 1994, order denying its motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). We affirm.
The facts of this case are not really in dispute. The incident occurred in the City of Flint on March 28, 1990, at approximately 9:30 P.M. Plaintiffs Tonya Brown and Anita Addison purchased some snacks at Hampton’s Party Store. The store was located on the southeast comer of the intersection of Saginaw Street and Russell Street. Defendant1 Michigan Bell Telephone owned two unenclosed, public pay telephones that were located on the northwest comer of Hampton’s Party Store. The telephones were located approximately 14½ feet from Russell Street (a residential street) and approximately 45 feet from Saginaw Street (a commercial street).
After purchasing the snacks, Tonya Brown was using one of the telephones while Anita Addison stood nearby. A car driven by Ruby Greer veered out [620]*620of control as she attempted to make a left turn from Saginaw Street onto Russell Street. The car struck both Tonya Brown and Anita Addison. Tonya lost the use of both of her legs, and her 8V2-month-old fetus (plaintiff Amber Vonetta Brown) was also lost as a result of the accident. Anita Addison suffered severe head injuries, which resulted in permanent brain damage.
Greer subsequently pleaded guilty of felonious driving. Greer had been smoking crack cocaine and drinking alcohol a few hours before the accident. Apparently, an armed robbery had occurred a few blocks north of Hampton’s Party Store. Greer, one of the robbery victims, fled the scene in a car. However, not only was Greer intoxicated at the time, but she had never driven a car before and did not have a driver’s license. Greer drove south on Saginaw Street for a few blocks at an excessive rate of speed before the car crashed into Hampton’s Party Store.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Michigan Bell and Hampton’s Party Store, asserting claims of negligence and premises liability. Michigan Bell moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), arguing that it owed no duty to plaintiffs because the accident was unforeseeable and that Greer’s criminal driving was a superseding cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that defendant had a duty to plaintiffs to safely locate the public telephones, that it was foreseeable that a car would run off the road at the intersection, and that Greer’s driving was not an intervening cause operating to extinguish any liability of defendant. .
Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court. This Court denied leave in an unpub[621]*621lished order dated August 10, 1994 (Docket No. 174257). After denying defendant’s motion for rehearing of the order in an unpublished order dated September 26, 1994, defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded the case to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. 450 Mich 853 (1995).
The trial court denied defendant’s motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8). We review de novo the trial court’s decision in this regard. Garvelink v Detroit News, 206 Mich App 604, 607; 522 NW2d 883 (1994). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is properly granted if the nonmoving party failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 654; 532 NW2d 842 (1995). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is properly granted if the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify a right of recovery. Simko, supra at 654. A motion for summary disposition is tested on the pleadings alone, and all factual allegations contained in the complaint must be accepted as true. Id.
On appeal, Michigan Bell first argues that it did not owe a duty to plaintiffs. Specifically, defendant argues that it is not reasonably foreseeable that a car will be recklessly operated, leave the roadway, and strike a public telephone adjacent to a building; that it is not reasonably foreseeable that an accident will occur where there is no allegation of a prior accident or injury to users of the public telephone; and that plaintiffs’ experts could not have provided a basis to deny summary disposition where those experts had no [622]*622prior knowledge or experience with the type of accident involved in this case.
We note from the outset that this case is being decided solely on the basis of MCR 2.116(C)(8). Therefore, we can rely only on the pleadings to determine whether plaintiffs’ complaint sets forth a claim upon which relief can be granted. Like the trial court, we examine only the pleadings without reference to any other documentary evidence, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in deciding whether defendant owed a duty to plaintiffs, specifically to have placed the telephones in a different location.
Duty is any obligation that the defendant has to the plaintiff to avoid negligent conduct. Simko, supra at 655. In negligence actions, the existence of a duty is a question of law for the court. Id. In determining whether a duty exists, courts look to different variables, including: foreseeability of the harm, existence of a relationship between the parties involved, degree of certainty of injury, closeness of connection between the conduct and the injury, moral blame attached to the conduct, policy of preventing future harm, and the burdens and consequences of imposing a duty and the resulting liability for breach. Buczkowski v McKay, 441 Mich 96, 100-101; 490 NW2d 330 (1992).
Our Supreme Court has held that utility companies are charged with a duty to protect against foreseeable harm. Groncki v Detroit Edison Co, 453 Mich 644, 654; 557 NW2d 289 (1996) (Brickley, C.J.), citing Schultz v Consumers Power Co, 443 Mich 445, 452; 506 [623]*623NW2d 175 (1993).2 In McMillan v State Hwy Comm, 426 Mich 46, 58; 393 NW2d 332 (1986), our Supreme Court specifically rejected a rule that a private utility company owes no duty to the occupants of a vehicle that leaves the traveled portion of the road. In McMillan, the plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile, was injured when the automobile left the traveled portion of the road and struck a utility pole owned by The Detroit Edison Company. The pole was located in the median approximately three feet from the traveled portion of the road. The Supreme Court stated:
[W]e are persuaded that the plaintiff should not be precluded, as a matter of law, from presenting her case to the jury. The question whether a duty exists, and the question whether the cause (here, the placement of the poles) was so significant and important to be regarded as a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s loss, depends “in part on foreseeability — whether it is foreseeable that the actor’s conduct may create a risk of harm to the victim, and whether the result of that conduct and intervening causes were foreseeable.” [Id. at 61-62, quoting Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 439; 254 NW2d 759 (1977).]
The Supreme Court went on to hold that when reasonable minds may differ regarding the application of the reasonableness of the risk of harm, the question is best left to the jury. Id. at 63.
Thus, under certain circumstances, a defendant can be liable for the placement of a utility pole (or, as here, a telephone booth) next to a roadway. The Supreme Court set forth factors a trial court should [624]*624consider in determining whether the risk of harm was unreasonable:
[T]he trial court may consider such factors as the location of the pole, its proximity to the roadway, the configuration of the roadway, whether the utility company had notice of previous accidents at that Ideation, and whether alternative, less dangerous locations for the pole existed. After considering these factors and any other factor which may be probative of the issue, the trial court, upon finding that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the defendant acted negligently in the placement of the pole, should place the issue before the jury to decide. [Id. at 64.]
We find that plaintiffs’ complaint is sufficient to establish that Michigan Bell owed a duty to them. Plaintiffs averred that a number of substantially similar accidents had occurred at or near the intersection by the party store and specifically listed eight such accidents. They averred that Michigan Bell knew or should have known of the frequency of the accidents at the intersection involving fixed objects. The complaint also contained the geometric set-up of the location of the telephones to demonstrate why they were placed in an unsafe location. The complaint set forth a location that would have been safer. As the trial court concluded, and we agree, it was foreseeable that an automobile could run off the road and hit the telephones. See, e.g., McMillan, supra at 62-64. Thus, taking all factual allegations supporting the claim as true, plaintiffs established that Michigan Bell owed them a duty of care.
The present case is distinguishable from this Court’s decision in Etter v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 179 Mich App 551; 446 NW2d 500 (1989), where, under facts very similar to the facts in this case, this [625]*625Court held that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff. Specifically, this Court found that the plaintiff presented no evidence that there had been any similar accidents at the telephone booth, that there were no practical alternative or less dangerous locations for the telephone, booth, and that placing the telephone booth away from the roadway would have made it less accessible to the public. In the present case, plaintiffs have set forth facts in the complaint alleging that there were previous accidents at the telephone booths and that defendant knew or should have known of the frequency of the accidents. Plaintiffs also alleged that the telephones could have been placed at a safer location, further away from the intersection, with no impracticality of accessibility. Plaintiffs also stated in their complaint the proximity of the telephones to the roadway and the configuration of the intersection. Thus, unlike Etter, plaintiffs in this case have set forth facts showing that, under the factors set forth in McMillan, defendant owed them a duty.
Defendant also argues that the unforeseeable criminal driving of the driver was a superseding, intervening cause that relieves it of any duty it may have had. A superseding cause is one that intervenes to prevent a defendant from being liable for harm to a plaintiff that the defendant’s antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about. Hickey v Zezulka (On Resubmission), 439 Mich 408, 436; 487 NW2d 106 (1992) (Brickley, J.). In order to be a superseding cause, thereby relieving a negligent defendant from liability, an intervening force must not have been reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 437. Regardless of the conduct of the driver, it is foreseeable that an automobile [626]*626will leave the road for a variety of reasons. Thus, there was no intervening, superseding act that relieved defendant of liability. Moreover, the question with respect to Michigan Bell is whether its placement of the telephone booths was reasonable.
Defendant also argues that it did not owe a duty to Anita Addison because she was a bystander, and therefore, an unforeseeable plaintiff. Because defendant did not raise this issue in its motion for summary disposition before the trial court, it has not been preserved for appellate review. Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Lozanis, 215 Mich App 415, 421; 546 NW2d 648 (1996).
Defendant also argues that the danger associated with the location of the telephone was open and obvious, thereby relieving it of any duty to plaintiffs. Because defendant did not raise this issue in its motion for summary disposition before the trial court, it has not been preserved for appellate review. Id.
Affirmed.
Neff, J., concurred.