Brown v. Meador & Griffin

9 S.E. 681, 83 Ga. 406, 1889 Ga. LEXIS 85
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedMay 1, 1889
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 9 S.E. 681 (Brown v. Meador & Griffin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Meador & Griffin, 9 S.E. 681, 83 Ga. 406, 1889 Ga. LEXIS 85 (Ga. 1889).

Opinion

Judgment affirmed.

Commission ¿ cent per bu. on wheat................ 12 50 “ 5 cent bbl. “ pork................. 25 50 Total loss and commission...........................$918 75 Less amount rec’d of E. T. Brown................ 69 00 $849 75.” Brown pleaded the general issue, and special pleas to the effect following : On the 29th.day of March, 1886, he instructed plaintiffs to purchase for him 5,000 bushels of May wheat for 81 cents or lower, and funished the required amount of money for the margins to meet exigencies of the market during the continuance of said contract, but plaintiffs totally neglected and refused to carry out his instructions with regard to said wheat, but on the contrary, purchased or pretended to purchase for him 5,000 bu. of June wheat at 82J cents per bu., and this pretended purchase purports to have been made six days after instructions given, which delay was contrary to all precedents and rules governing such instructions. He admits that, in the early part of 1886, he did authorize plaintiffs to purchase pork on his account pursuant to his instructions, and said purchases being made,- he paid the margins, sustained the fluctuations of the market, and, although there seemed to be a general decline in the market, continued to back up his contract until, growing tired of constant loss and seeing no prospect of early improvement in prices, on April 24, 1886, he positively and unequivocally directed plaintiffs to close out the transactions, and that he would thereupon meet the result whether loss or gain, but that in no event would he pay up more money. But notwithstanding these instructions, plaintiffs, of their own accord, refused to close out the transactions, and on the 30th day of April, 1886, without authority, transferred the same from May to August, thus relieving him from all liability to respond to their demands. He was ready and willing to comply with all his obligations, and he avers that if his instructions had been followed, plaintiffs would not have had any demand against him. His last plea set up that the transactions were gambling contracts, or what are known as “ futures.” Griffin testified as follows: Plaintiffs advanced the whole amount of the account, and the account is correct and due. Made advancements under Brown’s instructions as broker or agent. Had understanding with Brown that plaintiffs were to keep his margins good. After the market went against Brown, I called on him for $500, and understood from him he received the letter, but he did not reply to it. About the first of May, we had a conversation with him and told him we wanted him to pay what was due on his deal, and he said he would not do it, and we sold him out, as is customary. We always made these contracts for him as authorized. We did not sell the stuff ourselves.; we just simply acted as brokers or agents. Contracts were all made through Weare Commission Co., in Chicago, Ill. Brown understood this. He commenced to deal with us in the fall of 1885. We bought him 250 bbls. of June pork on March 18, then on April 3rd we bought him 5,000 bu. of June wheat, and April 30, 250 barrels of August pork; all in the year 1886. June wheat and June pork means pork or wheat to be delivered in June. The rule is, when a man buys stuff for future delivery, a certain amount of margins have to be put up to cover fluctuations in prices of goods. Brown knew this. We lost all this suit is for; decline covered amount advanced. Witness made advance to Weare Commission Co.; deposited general sum. Had other previous transactions for Brown, and it was our custom to notify him when we had to make advances, and he would make deposits from time to time. After loss on other deals, there were $69 to his credit, which sum is credited on the deals sued for. He instructed us to buy June pork, by telegram received March 18, 1888. We always bought when he instructed us to do so. If he did not have the money, we bought just the same, putting up advances for him. We had instruction's from him to this effect, verbal and written. We bought the August pork April 30. Brown had at that time 250 barrels of May pork, and May 1st was delivery day, and we transferred it to August pork, notified Brown, and have his letters in reply. Checks mentioned in his various letters and telegrams were received and applied to his account' on these different deals as margins. The custom was, if we received instructions on a certain day to buy, we would place the order, and as soon as the market touched that point it would be executed, unless there were some extenuating circumstances. We received a telegram from Brown, on March 29, to buy 5,000 bushels of May wheat, and by mistake the telegram read 80 or under, whereas it should have been 81 or lower. We placed our order to buy at once, but could not get wheat at that price, and about three days later, received a corrected telegram, and information from Brown that this telegram read 81|. I do not know whether I could have complied with the order to buy him wheat at 81 or lower from the time I received the order up to April 3rd when the June wheat was bought. Never bought the May wheat but bought June wheat upon instructions of March 21st. Bought it under instructions in our correspondence with Brown, but in this way: we have instructions from Brown that he would rely on our discretion in the matter, and we bought June wheat from the fact that if he bought May wheat he would have to sell out or transfer in a short time. We bought June wheat as a matter of discretion on our part, all for Brown’s benefit. I was buying through the Wearo Commission Co. for Brown 5,000 bushels of wheat, and simply wired them to buy according to their judgement. We never had seen a bushel of that wheat or a pound of that pork. When we sent these instructions, we never had any understanding to have any wheat. Don’t know whether the Weare Commission Co. had wheat, or whether we expected them to have it. There were thousands of people carrying on this thing, and Brown understood this stuff was deliverable, and if he did not have it sold out he would have to pay for it. Never asked Brown for the whole amount of what the wheat and pork were worth, and did not know whether he could pay for it or not. Bought pork and wheat in name of Meador & Griffin,but they were notified that Brown was the man we were buying for. Meador & Griffin became responsible. We looked to Brown, and the Weare Commission Co. looked to us. We put up the margins for them. We did not have any instructions about closing out these deals after they were bought. On April 24th, had a conversation with Brown, and he asked if he could not pay up a stipulated amount on a deal and not lose any more than that amount if it went against him. I told him we could not do a bucket shop business. Practically we had' wheat and pork, but not actually. Wo had contracts for it, which took the place of the stuff’. We had elevator receipts which were negotiable and responsible, and we sell that way without seeing the stuff. We got 74J cents a bushel on the wheat. Spot wheat is sure enough wheat. This was not spot wheat or pork. The Weare Commission Co. just ■bought this wheat and charged the loss to Meador & Griffin. This is the usual custom in the brokers’ business. Delivery is contemplated in every transaction we make. There was no understanding that this was not a bona fide trade, or that actual delivery was not contemplated. Every member of the Chicago board of trade knows that delivery is contemplated in every transaction. He can deliver goods, and party has a right to tender when the contract expires. Contracts are made through the Weare Commission house for both spot and future delivery.

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Bluebook (online)
9 S.E. 681, 83 Ga. 406, 1889 Ga. LEXIS 85, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-meador-griffin-ga-1889.