Brown v. Lloyd's (In Re Brown)

219 B.R. 725, 12 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 198, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2237, 1997 WL 866982
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedOctober 3, 1997
Docket19-31098
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 219 B.R. 725 (Brown v. Lloyd's (In Re Brown)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Lloyd's (In Re Brown), 219 B.R. 725, 12 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 198, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2237, 1997 WL 866982 (Tex. 1997).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LETITIA Z. CLARK, Chief Judge.

The court has considered Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the above captioned adversary proceeding (Docket No. 7). The following are the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the court. A separate Judgment will be entered denying the motion, and a separate Expedited Pretrial Order will be entered. To the extent any of the Findings of Fact are considered Conclusions of Law, they are adopted as such. To the extent any of the Conclusions of Law are considered Findings of Fact, they are adopted as such.

BACKGROUND

Charles B. Brown and Marilyn E. Brown (“Debtors” or “Plaintiffs”) filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on May 7, 1997. On the same date, Debtors filed the instant adversary proceeding.

In the instant adversary proceeding, Debtors, who are investors in Lloyd’s a/k/a Lloyd’s of London (“Defendant”), allege that Defendant violated, prepetition, an agreement not to draw down letters of credit pending resolution of Defendant’s claim against Debtors. Debtors seek equitable and injunctive relief requiring Defendant to reinstate the letters of credit that Defendant has previously drawn down, equitable and injunc-tive relief preventing Defendant from drawing down any of Plaintiffs’ undrawn letters of credit, damages, an award of attorney’s fees and costs, and such other and further relief to which Debtors may justly be entitled.

The documents attached to the complaint portray a substantial history of events prior to the filing of this suit. Plaintiffs had been advised by Lloyd’s that they owed money as a result of certain losses sustained by Lloyd’s insureds. Plaintiffs requested an accounting, and continue to do so. None has been forthcoming. Plaintiffs were assured in writing by Lloyd’s that no letters of credit would be drawn upon until a particular representative of Lloyd’s, who was “on holiday”, had returned to address the matter with plaintiffs’ attorney. Notwithstanding this assurance, Lloyd’s drew down upon certain letters of credit without further word from the individual who had been “on holiday”.

This case may, in part, be viewed as one in a series of cases brought by the United States investors who believe they have been defrauded by Lloyd’s. The history of these cases, and a discussion of the nature of the insurance market that is Lloyd’s, is provided in detail by the Fifth Circuit in its recent decision in Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir.1997). 1 Indeed, coun *728 sel for Lloyd’s in the instant case also served as counsel for Lloyd’s in the Haynsworth case.

The question this court must address is whether the fact that the Plaintiffs here have sought protection under the United States Bankruptcy Code, enables them to survive Lloyd’s Motion to Dismiss this adversary proceeding. The court finds that at this early procedural stage dismissal is not proper.

In the instant motion, Defendant seeks dismissal on three grounds, based on a forum selection clause (the “Forum Selection Clause”) contained in the underlying documents governing Debtors’ relationship with Defendant. That clause provides:

Each party hereto, irrevocably agrees that the courts of England shall have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute and/or controversy of whatsoever nature arising out of or relating to the Member’s membership of, and/or underwriting of insurance business at, Lloyd’s and that accordingly any suit, action or proceeding together in this Clause 2 referred to as “Proceedings” arising out of or relating to such matters shall be brought in such courts of England and irrevocably waives any objection which it may have now or hereafter to (a) any Proceedings being brought in any such court as is referred to in this Clause 2 and (b) any claim that such Proceedings have been brought in an inconvenient forum and further irrevocably agrees that a judgment in any Proceeding brought in the English courts shall be conclusive and binding upon each party and may be enforced in the courts of any other jurisdiction.

(Docket No. 7,- at p. 6-7).

First, Defendant asserts that Debtors are precluded from challenging the Forum Selection Clause because they challenged the clause with respect to common law claims in another court. Second, Defendant asserts that the Forum Selection clause is enforceable against Debtors. Third, Defendant asserts that the complaint must be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

In the complaint in the instant adversary proceeding, Debtors allege that they were required by Defendant to obtain letters of credit to protect Defendant from loss if they failed to pay any amounts that they owed Defendant. Debtors allege that they obtained letters of credit from United States financial institutions, with Defendant listed as the beneficiary. Debtors allege that the letters of credit were collateralized with essentially all of Debtors’ non-exempt assets.

Debtors’ schedules in the above captioned bankruptcy case reflect non-exempt property in the amount of $51,645. This amount excludes municipal bonds held by Texas Commerce Bank as collateral for the letters of credit issued by First City National Bank. 2 Debtors list the value of these municipal bonds in their schedules to be $395,794. (Docket No. 1, Case No. 97-44809-H3-7).

On August 11, 1997, an Agreed Order was entered enjoining Defendant from taking any action to draw down an additional letter of credit prior to September 18, 1997. (Docket No. 17). That date has subsequently been extended to October 17, 1997. (Docket No. 19). The parties announced in open court at the September 17, 1997 hearing on the instant motion that the letters of credit expire by their own terms on December 31, 1997.

DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks dismissal under Bankruptcy Rule 7012. The instant motion is silent as to the question of whether Defendant requests dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction), Rule 12(b)(3) (improper venue), or Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim).

*729 The Supreme Court has not spoken to the issue of which rule governs dismissal on the grounds of a forum selection clause.- Little' consistency exists today between the Courts of Appeal, see, e.g., Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 956 (10th Cir.1992) (forum selection clauses often analyzed in context of motions to dismiss for improper venue); LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pacific Sewer Maintenance Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir.1984) (dismissals based on forum selection clauses should be founded on Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership,

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Bluebook (online)
219 B.R. 725, 12 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 198, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2237, 1997 WL 866982, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-lloyds-in-re-brown-txsb-1997.