Brown v. LaVoie

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedAugust 4, 2021
Docket2:20-cv-00319
StatusUnknown

This text of Brown v. LaVoie (Brown v. LaVoie) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. LaVoie, (E.D. Wis. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

VICTOR ROBERT BROWN, Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 20-C-319

DANIEL L LAVOIE, et al., Defendants.

ORDER Pro se plaintiff Victor Robert Brown, a Wisconsin state prisoner, filed this civil rights case alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. The plaintiff is proceeding on Eighth Amendment claims based on allegations that (1) defendant Dr. Daniel LaVoie acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs when he tried to remove a screw from the plaintiff’s arm without anesthesia and subsequently ordered that the plaintiff not receive treatment for his wound; (2) defendants Jay VanLanen, Justin Maher, Joshua Gomm, Tristan Retzlaff, Drew Weycker, Alex Bonis, Colin Frudbrodt, Michael Neveu, Miles Arne, David Yang, and Jason Gibbs held the plaintiff down or stood by while Dr. LaVoie was working on the plaintiff’s arm; and (3) defendant Officer Wisniewski did not allow hospital staff to use stitches on the plaintiff’s arm wound. ECF No. 17 at 4. The defendants have filed a motion for partial summary judgment in which they contend that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his claim against Officer Wisniewski. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The events giving rise to the plaintiff’s claims took place on August 21, 2019. On September 22, 2019, the plaintiff submitted an inmate complaint, GBCI-2019-16714, alleging that Officer Wisniewski ordered staff at a hospital not to use stitches on his arm. The plaintiff stated in his inmate complaint that he submitted it late because, “One complaint per week limit – I prioritized as best as I could and this was the soonest I could write this complaint, and file it.” ECF No. 28-2 at 9.

The institution complaint examiner rejected GBCI-2019-16714 because it was filed beyond the fourteen-day calendar limit set forth in Wis. Admin. Code. § DOC 310.07(2), the plaintiff made no claim for acceptance of the untimely filed complaint for good cause, and the plaintiff offered no evidence that would show that he was denied the use of or inhibited in any way from using the Inmate Complaint Review System since the date of the occurrence. ECF No. 28-2 at 2. The institution complaint examiner’s rejection comment also states that the plaintiff had filed six inmate complaints since the August 21, 2109 date of incident and that the plaintiff noted in his inmate complaint that he filed complaints based on what he felt were priority. Id. In his appeal of the rejection of GBCI-2019-16714, the plaintiff said, “I stated my

good cause reasons for this late complaint at the end of my DOC 400B [inmate complaint].” ECF No. 28-2 at 10. The reviewing authority determined that the institution complaint examiner appropriately rejected GBCI-2019-16714 in accordance with DOC 310.10(6). ECF No. 28-2 at 5. II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Ames v. Home Depot U.S.A., 2 Inc., 629 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2011). “Material facts” are those under the applicable substantive law that “might affect the outcome of the suit.” See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute over “material fact” is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION The defendants contend that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his claim against Wisniewski because he submitted an untimely inmate complaint that was rejected as untimely and not considered on the merits. The plaintiff contends that he provided good cause for submitting GBCI-2019-16714 more than fourteen days after the date of incident because under Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.07(5), each inmate complaint may contain only one clearly identified issue and he was therefore required to submit four different inmate complaints regarding the August 21, 2019 incident. According to the plaintiff, because Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.07(7) states that inmates may not file more than one complaint per calendar week, he prioritized

as best he could and submitted GBCI-2019-16714 as soon as he could. The plaintiff also contends that, even though the one complaint per week rule does not apply to inmate complaints that involve the inmate’s health, personal safety, or PREA allegations, the institution complaint examiners “never exclude personal safety complaints from the one complaint per week limit[.]” ECF No. 30 at 1. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that an inmate cannot assert a cause of action under federal law “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006) (holding that the PLRA requires proper exhaustion of administrative remedies). 3 Exhaustion requires that an inmate comply with the rules applicable to the grievance process at the inmate’s institution. Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). This requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or

some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The objective of § 1997e(a) is to permit the institution’s “administrative process to run its course before litigation begins.” Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Cannon v. Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 2005)); see also Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit applies a “strict compliance approach to exhaustion” and expects inmates to adhere to “the specific procedures and deadlines” established by the institution’s policy. Dole, 438 F.3d at 809; see also Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Because exhaustion is an affirmative defense, the defendants bear the burden of proving that the plaintiff failed to exhaust. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-41 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.

199, 216 (2007)). Inmates must exhaust all administrative remedies that the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) has promulgated by rule before commencing a civil action against an officer, employee, or agent of the DOC. Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.05. To fully exhaust administrative remedies in Wisconsin, the inmate must file a complaint with the institution complaint examiner within fourteen calendar days of the incident. Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.07(2).

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Porter v. Nussle
534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Jones v. Bock
549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ames v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.
629 F.3d 665 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Pavey v. Conley
544 F.3d 739 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Hernandez v. Dart
814 F.3d 836 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)

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Bluebook (online)
Brown v. LaVoie, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-lavoie-wied-2021.