Brown v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: August 29, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00918
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 SHARNEE BROWN, 5 Case No. 2:25-cv-00918-NJK1 Plaintiff(s), 6 ORDER v. 7 [Docket No. 21] LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE 8 DEPARTMENT, et al., 9 Defendant(s). 10 Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants S.A.F.E. Management 11 of Nevada, LLC and Kevin Matsunaga (collectively, “S.A.F.E. Management”). Docket No. 21. 12 Plaintiff filed a response in opposition. Docket No. 34.2 S.A.F.E. Management filed a reply. 13 Docket No. 40. The motion is properly resolved without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the 14 reasons discussed more fully below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 As alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff was a security supervisor employed by S.A.F.E. 17 Management. See, e.g., Docket No. 8 at ¶ 1. S.A.F.E. Management provided security services for 18 Allegiant Stadium, which is operated by AEG Management Las Vegas. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 9. 19 Plaintiff alleges that he was assigned by S.A.F.E. Management to provide security at Allegiant 20 Stadium for an AC/DC concert held on April 26, 2025. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 8, 13. 21 Plaintiff alleges that there was a “crowd-control breakdown when barriers were breached 22 and an elderly patron was violently trampled” during that concert. Id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff solicited 23 assistance from nearby police officers working for Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 24 (“LVMPD”), but they allegedly rebuffed his request for assistance. See id. at ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff 25

26 1 This case is proceeding before the undersigned magistrate judge as part of the opt-out consent program. See Docket Nos. 4-5; see also Gen. Order 2023-11. 27 2 The Court liberally construes the filings of pro se litigants. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 28 89, 94 (2007). 1 alleges that matters escalated when a police officer grabbed Plaintiff from behind, slammed him 2 into the police vehicle, and then shoved him into a tree. See id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges he was 3 improperly detained. See id. at ¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges that he and his wife reported the incident to 4 LVMPD and S.A.F.E. Management. See id. at ¶¶ 20-21. 5 On May 27, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against S.A.F.E. Management, AEG 6 Management Las Vegas, and LVMPD, as well as some individual defendants, seeking relief as to 7 13 claims. See Docket No. 1-2.3 S.A.F.E. Management filed a motion to dismiss, Docket No. 21, 8 which is the matter currently before the Court. 9 II. STANDARDS 10 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a complaint 11 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is 12 essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 13 (9th Cir. 2000). A properly pled complaint must provide a short and plain statement of the claim 14 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 15 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, 16 it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 17 of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 18 286 (1986)). The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations contained in the 19 complaint, but the same requirement does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 20 Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory allegations, do 21 not suffice. Id. at 678. Moreover, where the claims in the complaint have not crossed the line 22 from conceivable to plausible, the complaint should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 23 If a court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be 24 granted unless it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. 25 DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit 26 3 Plaintiff initially applied to proceed in forma pauperis, Docket No. 1, but then paid the 27 filing fee, Docket No. 7. As a result, the Court did not screen the complaint and instructed the Clerk’s Office to file the proposed complaint that had been submitted with the mooted application 28 to proceed in forma pauperis. See Docket No. 9. 1 has a “longstanding rule that leave to amend should be granted if it appears at all possible that the 2 plaintiff can correct the defect,” which it has noted is “particularly important for the pro se litigant.” 3 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (cleaned up). 4 III. ANALYSIS 5 S.A.F.E. Management seeks dismissal of six different claims. The Court will address each 6 of those claims in turn after resolving housekeeping matters. 7 A. Housekeeping Matters 8 Before resolving the merits of S.A.F.E. Management’s motion to dismiss, the Court 9 addresses a few housekeeping matters. First, Defendants AEG Management Las Vegas, LLC and 10 David Avilla (collectively “AEG Management”) filed a joinder to the motion to dismiss. Docket 11 No. 27. Joinders are not permitted as a matter of right. Whether to allow a party’s joinder to 12 another party’s motion is a matter entrusted to the Court’s wide discretion. Apothio, LLC v. Kern 13 Cnty., 599 F. Supp. 3d 983, 1002 (E.D. Cal. 2022). Among other problems in this case, the joinder 14 does not explain which aspects of the multi-faceted motion to dismiss apply to AEG Management 15 nor does it articulate how or why the defendants are similarly situated such that filing an 16 independent motion would be redundant. The Court declines to entertain the joinder in the 17 circumstances of this case. Cf. Tatung Co. v. Shu Tze Hsu, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1151-52 (C.D. 18 Cal. 2016). 19 Second, S.A.F.E. Management asks that its motion be granted as unopposed given its 20 contention that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently respond to its arguments in the responsive brief. See 21 Docket No. 40 at 3-4. The Court may grant a motion as unopposed when the responding party 22 fails to address the arguments raised. See Local Rule 7-2(d). As the text of the rule makes plain, 23 granting a motion as unopposed is not mandatory and is a matter entrusted to the Court’s wide 24 discretion. See, e.g., Divine Wellness, LLC v. NFP Prop. & Cas. Servs., Inc., 2024 WL 2880285, 25 at *2 n.3 (D. Nev. May 17, 2024). In this case, Plaintiff is appearing pro se and filed a written 26 opposition to the motion. See Docket No. 34. Moreover, as discussed below, the Court has its 27 own duty to correctly articulate and apply the law, Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 28 1224 (9th Cir. 2000), which duty has been triggered based on some deficiencies in the briefing. 1 Given the circumstances, the Court will not grant the motion to dismiss as unopposed in this 2 instance. Plaintiff is cautioned moving forward, however, that he is expected to respond to all 3 arguments made in a motion with well-developed written argument provided in the response. 4 Third, Plaintiff references an entitlement to discovery. Docket No. 34 at 4. Such a 5 contention does not suffice to avoid dismissal, as “plaintiffs must satisfy the pleading requirements 6 of Rule 8 before the discovery stage, not after it.” Mujica v. AirScan, Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 593 (9th 7 Cir. 2014) ( (emphasis in original). 8 B. Retaliation Claim 9 1. Exhaustion 10 S.A.F.E. Management seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim pursuant to Rule 11 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter 12 jurisdiction given Plaintiff’s failure to allege affirmatively that he exhausted administrative 13 remedies. See Docket No. 21 at 8. 14 The Supreme Court has clarified that Title VII’s claim processing rules, while mandatory, 15 are not jurisdictional. Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 550-51 (2019). Hence, Rule 16 12(b)(1) is inapplicable to this type of challenge. See, e.g., Jass v. CherryRoad Techs., Inc., 449 17 F. Supp. 3d 923, 932 n.4 (D. Haw. 2020).4 Moreover and significantly, there appears to be case 18 law that may foreclose S.A.F.E. Management’s argument that dismissal is warranted for failing to 19 plead exhaustion. See Kraus v. Presidio Tr. Facilities Div./Residential Mgmt. Branch, 572 F.3d 20 1039, 1046 n.7 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Whether a plaintiff in a Title VII action has timely exhausted her 21 administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, [so] the defendant bears the burden of pleading 22 and proving it” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Rivera v. Peri & Sons 23 Farms, Inc., 735 F.3d 892, 902 (9th Cir. 2013) (“plaintiffs ordinarily need not plead on the subject 24 of an anticipated affirmative defense”). The papers do not address this legal authority. The Court 25 also notes that it does not appear that the timeframe for filing an administrative charge has expired 26 at this point, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (providing that the charge must be filed within 180 27 4 While neither party correctly identifies the law, the Court has an independent duty to 28 articulate and apply the law. Bateman, 231 F.3d at 1224. 1 days after the allegedly unlawful employment practice occurred), see also Docket No. 8 at ¶ 128 2 (identifying alleged retaliation in May 2025), and the papers do not explain whether this defect 3 may be cured by Plaintiff filing administrative charges now. 4 Given the circumstances, the Court declines to resolve this aspect of the motion to dismiss 5 because S.A.F.E. Management did not provide briefing framed by the governing rule and 6 addressing in meaningful fashion the pertinent case law. 7 2. Protected Activity 8 S.A.F.E. Management also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim on the ground 9 that Plaintiff failed to allege statutorily protected activity encompassed by Title VII. Docket No. 10 21 at 9-10.5 Plaintiff counters that he alleged reporting safety violations and experiencing police 11 abuse. See Docket No. 34 at 3. S.A.F.E. Management has the better argument. 12 To establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, the complaint must adequately 13 allege that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in activity protected under Title VII; (2) the plaintiff’s 14 employer subjected the plaintiff to adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link 15 between the protected activity and the employer’s adverse action. Kama v. Mayorkas, 107 F.4th 16 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 17 1986)). Protected activity for these purposes is limited to an employee’s action taken to oppose 18 what is reasonably perceived as discrimination under Title VII. Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 19 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1988) (without any allegation of opposing “discrimination based upon race, 20 color, religion, sex, or national origin,” the plaintiff’s VII claim for retaliation for opposing 21 discrimination failed). Courts “have consistently held that an employee who has reported OSHA 22 violations or complained about unsafe working conditions has not engaged in statutorily protected 23 activity.” Cloud v. Brennan, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1299 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (collecting cases); see 24 25

26 5 Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is brought under both federal law and state law. See Docket No. 8 at p. 30 (citing Title VII and N.R.S. 613.340). The motion to dismiss includes no argument 27 that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient under state law. See Docket No. 21 at 9-10. Accordingly, the Court herein addresses only the retaliation claim under Title VII and does not 28 address whether Plaintiff has stated a retaliation claim under state law. 1 also Kurdi v. Cal. Dept. of Transp., Case No. 1:22-cv-00729-JLT-EPG, 2023 WL 267538, at *6 2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2023) (collecting cases from within the Ninth Circuit). 3 Plaintiff alleges that he reported the subject incident internally to S.A.F.E. Management. 4 See Docket No. 8 at ¶ 127. The alleged reporting addressed concerns of lack of crowd safety 5 planning by S.A.F.E. Management. See id. Plaintiff does not allege that the identified activity 6 was opposing discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, so his 7 alleged reporting does not fall within Title VII’s statutorily protected activity. 8 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal retaliation claim. As it is not clear that 9 Plaintiff cannot cure the identified deficiency, he will be given leave to amend. 10 C. Civil Rights Conspiracy 11 S.A.F.E. Management seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy to violate civil 12 rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Docket No. 21 at 10-12. S.A.F.E. Management argues 13 that federal law requires specific facts be pled to support such a claim, which Plaintiff has failed 14 to do. See id.6 Plaintiff counters in general terms that his allegations are well-pled, without 15 addressing the issues specific to his conspiracy claim. See Docket No. 34. The Court agrees with 16 S.A.F.E. Management. 17 To plead a conspiracy to interfere with civil rights under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege 18 four elements: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any 19 person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities 20 under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of this conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either 21 injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United 22 States.” Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United 23

24 6 The conspiracy claim is brought under both federal law and state law. See Docket No. 8 at p. 14 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and various provisions of state law). The motion to dismiss 25 includes a single sentence as to the elements for bringing a civil conspiracy claim under state law, see Docket No. 21 at 11, but it does not address in meaningful fashion the pleading standards for 26 stating a civil conspiracy claim under state law or that this is the type of claim being alleged by Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court herein addresses only the conspiracy claim under § 1985 and 27 does not address whether Plaintiff has stated a conspiracy claim under state law. Cf. Kor Media Grp., LLC v. Green, 294 F.R.D. 579, 582 n.3 (D. Nev. 2013) (courts do not generally consider 28 arguments raised without meaningful development). 1 Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1983)). With respect 2 to the first element (i.e., the existence of a conspiracy), the plaintiff must allege “specific facts” to 3 state a claim. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 929 (9th Cir. 2004). “A mere 4 allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles 5 Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). 6 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to sufficiently allege a conspiracy. Plaintiff includes conclusory 7 allegations of “conspiracy,” “coordinated misconduct,” “orchestrat[ion],” “a meeting of the 8 minds,” and the like. See Docket No. 8 at ¶¶ 57-61. Specific facts to support the allegation of 9 conspiracy are not included, however. The complaint does not include specific factual allegations 10 as to how any defendant coordinated with any other defendant. 11 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy to violate civil rights 12 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985. As it is not clear that Plaintiff cannot cure the identified deficiency, 13 he will be given leave to amend. 14 D. Negligent Hiring, Training, and Retention 15 S.A.F.E. Management seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for negligent hiring, training, 16 and retention for failure to plead sufficient factual allegations. Docket No. 21 at 12-13. Plaintiff 17 counters in general terms that his allegations are well-pled, without addressing the issues specific 18 to these particular claims. See Docket No. 34. 19 The papers lump together negligent “hiring, training, and retention.” “Nevada courts 20 recognize two separate torts—one for negligent hiring and another for negligent training, 21 supervision, and retention—but not one that merges them together.” Scheumann v. City of Las 22 Vegas, Case No. 2:21-cv-01405-JAD-BNW, 2024 WL 870826, at *9 (D. Nev. Feb. 29, 2024); 23 accord Bielicki v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 2:23-cv-01362-CDS-EJY, 2024 WL 3104576, *6 24 (D. Nev. June 24, 2024). “The tort of negligent hiring imposes a general duty on the employer to 25 conduct a reasonable background check on a potential employee to ensure that the employee is fit 26 for the position.” Hall v. SSF, Inc., 930 P.2d 94, 98 (Nev. 1996) (quoting Burnett v. C.B.A. Sec. 27 Serv., 820 P.2d 750, 752 (Nev. 1991)). “An employer breaches this duty when it hires an employee 28 even though the employer knew, or should have known, of that employee’s dangerous 1 propensities.” Id. (quoting Kelly v. Baker Protective Servs., Inc., 401 S.E.2d 585, 586 (Ga. Ct. 2 App. 1991)). On the other hand, successfully bringing “a claim for relief alleging negligent 3 training, retention, and/or supervision requires meeting four elements: (1) a general duty on the 4 employer to use reasonable care in the training and/or supervision of employees to ensure that they 5 are fit for their positions; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) causation.” Lambey v. Nevada ex rel. 6 Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., Case No. 2:07-cv-01268-RLH-PAL, 2008 WL 2704191, *4 (D. 7 Nev. July 3, 2008). Pleading this type of claim also requires that the employer knew or should 8 have known of the unfitness of the employees. See Mitchell v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 359 P.3d 9 1096, 1104 (Nev. 2015) (explaining that this is an “element” of negligent hiring and negligent 10 supervision claims). 11 Particularly in the context of a pro se litigant, the Court does not find particularly 12 persuasive S.A.F.E. Management’s overarching argument that the allegations in the complaint are 13 conclusory and formulaic recitations of the elements of these causes of action. See Docket No. 8 14 at ¶¶ 69-74. Nonetheless, the Court does agree that the complaint fails to allege, specifically, that 15 S.A.F.E. Management knew or should have known of the unfitness of the employees. On that 16 ground, the Court finds that the claims are subject to dismissal.7 17 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claim for negligent hiring and claim for 18 negligent training and retention. As it is not clear that Plaintiff cannot cure the identified 19 deficiency, he will be given leave to amend. 20 E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 21 S.A.F.E. Management seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of 22 emotional distress. Docket No. 21 at 13-14. The motion argues that it is unclear whether this 23 claim is meant to be brought against S.A.F.E. Management and, that if it is meant to be, no 24 allegations are made against it. See id. Plaintiff did not respond to this argument. The allegations 25

26 7 Plaintiff’s response references duties imposed by N.R.S. 41.130. See Docket No. 34 at 3. If this contention is being made with respect to the claim for negligent hiring and claim for 27 negligent training and retention, Plaintiff has not explained in sufficiently meaningful fashion how or why that statutory provision alters the requirements to proceed with these claims as articulated 28 by the Nevada Supreme Court. 1 in this section of the complaint are specific to LVMPD police officers, see Docket No. 8 at ¶¶ 76- 2 80, and the claim does not appear to be meant to include S.A.F.E. Management. If Plaintiff did 3 intend to bring this claim against S.A.F.E. Management, the complaint does not provide factual 4 allegations regarding S.A.F.E. Management as to this claim. The claim is subject to dismissal on 5 that ground. See, e.g., Arikat v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 430 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1020-21 (N.D. 6 Cal. 2006) (rejecting as insufficient allegations lumping together different “defendants” and 7 explaining that the plaintiff must provide allegations specific to the different defendants). 8 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional 9 distress. As it is not clear that Plaintiff cannot cure the identified deficiency, he will be given leave 10 to amend. 11 F. Safety Violations 12 S.A.F.E. Management seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s state and federal claims for violations 13 of safety regulations on the ground that they do not create a private cause of action. Docket No. 14 21 at 14. Plaintiff did not respond to this argument in direct fashion. The Court agrees with 15 S.A.F.E. Management that neither the state nor federal safety regulations create a private cause of 16 action. See, e.g., Crane v. Conoco, Inc., 41 F.3d 547, 553 (9th Cir. 1994) (“OSHA violations do 17 not themselves constitute a private cause of action for breach”); Frith v. Harrah S. Shore Corp., 18 552 P.2d 337, 340 (Nev. 1976) (“the [Nevada] legislature did not intend to create any private civil 19 remedy through the [Nevada] Occupational Safety and Health Act”). Accordingly, the Court 20 dismisses this claim without leave to amend. 21 G. Spoliation 22 S.A.F.E. Management seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law claim for spoliation on the 23 ground that Nevada does not recognize that cause of action. Docket No. 21 at 14-15. Plaintiff 24 does not provide argument on this issue. The Nevada Supreme Court has “decline[d] to recognize 25 an independent tort for spoliation of evidence.” Timber Tech Engineered Bldg. Prods. v. The 26 27 28 1 Home Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 952, 954 (Nev. 2002).8 Accordingly, the Court dismisses this claim 2 without leave to amend.9 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS S.A.F.E. Management’s motion to 5 dismiss. The Court dismisses with prejudice and without leave to amend Plaintiff’s claims for 6 safety violations and for spoliation.10 The Court dismisses with leave to amend Plaintiff’s federal 7 retaliation claim, federal claim for conspiracy to violate his civil rights, claim for negligent hiring, 8 claim for negligent training and retention, and claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 9 as brought against S.A.F.E. Management and Kevin Matsunaga. 10 If Plaintiff believes he can cure the deficiencies identified as to the latter group of claims 11 being dismissed with leave to amend, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint by September 16, 12 2025. If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot refer 13 to a prior pleading (i.e., the original complaint) in order to make the amended complaint complete. 14 This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Local 15 Rule 15-1(a) requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any 16 prior pleading. Once a plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original complaint no longer 17 8 The Court also notes that the complaint does not actually allege that evidence has been 18 lost or destroyed, but rather that Defendants have not disclosed information to Plaintiff that he has sought. See Docket No. 8 at ¶¶ 119-26. 19 9 S.A.F.E. Management also argues that the Court may require Plaintiff to provide a more 20 definite statement. Docket No. 21 at 15-16. “A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading . . . which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a 21 response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Such relief is warranted when the responding party cannot ascertain the substance of the asserted claims. Underwood v. O’Reilly Auto Parts, Inc., 671 F. 22 Supp. 3d 1180, 1187 (D. Nev. 2023). “Rule 12(e) motions are disfavored and rarely granted.” Id.; see also, e.g., Jones v. Gillmore, Civil Action No. 19-397, 2020 WL 6730821, at *8 (W.D. Penn. 23 July 14, 2020) (noting disfavored nature particularly in light of liberal pleading standards for pro se litigants), adopted 2020 WL 4462501 (W.D. Penn. Aug. 4, 2020). S.A.F.E. Management 24 provides generalized argument as to confusion and a failure to comply with Rule 8 pleading standards. Docket No. 21 at 15-16. S.A.F.E. Management has not shown that it is unable to 25 reasonably prepare a response to the complaint and, indeed, this argument is presented following the presentation of S.A.F.E. Management’s contentions why numerous aspects of the complaint 26 fail to state a claim. Similarly, the other defendants were in fact able to develop a response to the complaint. See Docket Nos. 11, 18 (answers). Having reviewed the allegations in the complaint, 27 the Court is not persuaded that Rule 12(e) relief is warranted. 10 Given that the claims are not legally cognizable, these claims are dismissed as to all 28 defendants. See Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988). 1} serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each Defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 3 If Plaintiff chooses not to amend the complaint, then the case will proceed on the claims remaining in the original complaint. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: August 29, 2025 .

8 Unite SOR, citrate Judge 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1]