Brown v. Kennedy

Supreme Court

Brown v. Kennedy

82 U.S. 591, 21 L. Ed. 193, 15 Wall. 591, 1872 U.S. LEXIS 1290

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedMarch 10, 1873

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 82 U.S. 591 (Brown v. Kennedy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Brown v. Kennedy, 82 U.S. 591, 21 L. Ed. 193, 15 Wall. 591, 1872 U.S. LEXIS 1290 (1873).

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Opinions

Mr. Justice STRONG

delivered the opinion of the court.

The bill was for the. foreclosure of a mortgage, and the principal defence set up is that the mortgage and the debt secured by it had been confiscated under the act of Congress of July 17th, 1862. If it had been, the complainant was not entitled to a decree of foreclosure, and his bill was properly dismissed.

We are unable to perceive why the record of the proceeding in the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, on which the defendant chiefly relied, does not show an effective confiscation of the debt, and its forfeiture to the United States, as well as satisfaction thereof by the mortgagors. Doubtless it is true that the court had no authority to decree confiscation of anything which had not by seizure of the marshal been brought within its jurisdiction. Seizure is essential to confer jurisdiction. But the marshal’s return that he had attached the bond, mortgage, and credit, conclusively establish that a seizure was made, and that the subjects of the seizure were within the jurisdiction of the court. In this collateral proceeding the complainant is not at liberty to traverse the marshal’s return. An attempt was made to traverse it, in part at least, as appears from the agreed statement of facts. It is recited therein, that from June, 1860, to September, 1865, continuously, Edward S. Brown had in his possession at bis home in the State of Virginia the bond and mortgage, and that during this whole' period they were not in the District of Kansas. From this we are expected to infer that the marshal could not have seized them. We can, however, make no such inference against the marshal’s return, without disregard of the established rule that such a return is conclusive of the facts stated by it.

The next position taken by the appellant is that, at most, only the bond and mortgage were confiscated, leaving the debt, of which the bond and mortgage'were mere evidences, still due. In support of this we are referred to Pelham v. [598]*598Rose,

* and Pelham v. Way, more recently decided.† If this were so, it would not be easy to see how the appellant could make use of the mortgage to collect the debt, when his title to the mortgage no longer exists — when it has been adjudged forfeited to the United States. But Pelham v. Rose and Pelham v. Way furnish no support to the position that the debt due from the mortgagors was not confiscated as well as the instruments which the parties had adopted as the evidences of the debt. In those cases the information was against a promissory note, and nothing else. So was the warrant or monition. The marshal returned that he had arrested the property mentioned in the warrant, and the court decreed condemnation of “ the note.” The nature of the proceeding is clearly shown in the opinion of Mr. Justice Field in Pelham v. Rose, where he said: “In the ease at bar, a visible thing, capable of physical possession, is the subject of the libel. It is the promissory note of Pelham which constitutes the res against which the proceeding is instituted, and not a credit or debt, which the note is supposed by the defendant’s counsel to represent. . . . The object of the present libel is to reach the note itself. This appears at every stage of the proceedings; in the information; in the monition to the marshal; in his return; in the decree of the court, and in the sale made.” It was for this reason it was ruled in Pelham v. Way that the debt was not confiscated.

But the present case, as is apparent from the record, is very different. Not only were the bond and mortgage given to Brown informed against, ordered to be attached, seized, and condemned, but so, also, was the credit. We have seen that the marshal was commanded to attach the bond and mortgage and the estate, properly, claim, credits, and rights thereto and therein belonging to the said Edward S. Brown. What is the credit in a bond and mortgage, if it is not the debt secured or evidenced by them? What are rights in a mortgage, as well as to it, if they are not the rights of the [599]*599mortgagee to claim and receive the money secured by the mortgage ? The ownership of the written instrument is a distinct thing from ownership of the right or credit of which the instrument is the evidence. The word “credit” does not describe ownership of a mortgage, nor do the words “rights therein.” The warrant was therefore directed against the debt, as well as against the w’ritten evidence of it. The marshal returned that he had attached the bond, mortgage, and credit, and the decree condemned expressly the bond, mortgage, and credit. That the debt was attachable in confiscation proceedings was held by this court in Miller v. The United States,* and it was ruled that attachment or seizure could be made without manual caption of the visible evidences of the credit. To the doctrines laid down in that case we adhere; and, as the marshal’s return conclusively establishes that the credit was seized, and was therefore within the jurisdiction of the court, we must hold that the decree of condemnation was warranted, and that the debt was effectively confiscated.

It is, perhaps, not necessary to say more. Yet it may be added that the appellant seems to have acquiesced in the decree of condemnation, and in the subsequent payment of the debt by the mortgagors to the officers of the court. The agreed statement of facts exhibits that in 1868, after he had obtained a pardon, on his application the District Court ordered that all the money that had been collected under the confiscation decree by the officers of the court should be paid to him, after deducting therefrom some unpaid legal costs. And subsequently he caused to be filed in the confiscation proceedings a petition praying for judgment in his favor against those officers for the money. Whether, after this, he could assert that the proceedings by which the money was collected were a nullity we will not determine. It is enough that, in our opinion, the debt due originally to him from the mortgagors was confiscated before his bill was filed.

Decree affirmed.

9 Wallace, 103.

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Mr. Justice STRONG

delivered the opinion of the court.

The bill was for the. foreclosure of a mortgage, and the principal defence set up is that the mortgage and the debt secured by it had been confiscated under the act of Congress of July 17th, 1862. If it had been, the complainant was not entitled to a decree of foreclosure, and his bill was properly dismissed.

We are unable to perceive why the record of the proceeding in the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, on which the defendant chiefly relied, does not show an effective confiscation of the debt, and its forfeiture to the United States, as well as satisfaction thereof by the mortgagors. Doubtless it is true that the court had no authority to decree confiscation of anything which had not by seizure of the marshal been brought within its jurisdiction. Seizure is essential to confer jurisdiction. But the marshal’s return that he had attached the bond, mortgage, and credit, conclusively establish that a seizure was made, and that the subjects of the seizure were within the jurisdiction of the court. In this collateral proceeding the complainant is not at liberty to traverse the marshal’s return. An attempt was made to traverse it, in part at least, as appears from the agreed statement of facts. It is recited therein, that from June, 1860, to September, 1865, continuously, Edward S. Brown had in his possession at bis home in the State of Virginia the bond and mortgage, and that during this whole' period they were not in the District of Kansas. From this we are expected to infer that the marshal could not have seized them. We can, however, make no such inference against the marshal’s return, without disregard of the established rule that such a return is conclusive of the facts stated by it.

The next position taken by the appellant is that, at most, only the bond and mortgage were confiscated, leaving the debt, of which the bond and mortgage'were mere evidences, still due. In support of this we are referred to Pelham v. [598]*598Rose,

* and Pelham v. Way, more recently decided.† If this were so, it would not be easy to see how the appellant could make use of the mortgage to collect the debt, when his title to the mortgage no longer exists — when it has been adjudged forfeited to the United States. But Pelham v. Rose and Pelham v. Way furnish no support to the position that the debt due from the mortgagors was not confiscated as well as the instruments which the parties had adopted as the evidences of the debt. In those cases the information was against a promissory note, and nothing else. So was the warrant or monition. The marshal returned that he had arrested the property mentioned in the warrant, and the court decreed condemnation of “ the note.” The nature of the proceeding is clearly shown in the opinion of Mr. Justice Field in Pelham v. Rose, where he said: “In the ease at bar, a visible thing, capable of physical possession, is the subject of the libel. It is the promissory note of Pelham which constitutes the res against which the proceeding is instituted, and not a credit or debt, which the note is supposed by the defendant’s counsel to represent. . . . The object of the present libel is to reach the note itself. This appears at every stage of the proceedings; in the information; in the monition to the marshal; in his return; in the decree of the court, and in the sale made.” It was for this reason it was ruled in Pelham v. Way that the debt was not confiscated.

But the present case, as is apparent from the record, is very different. Not only were the bond and mortgage given to Brown informed against, ordered to be attached, seized, and condemned, but so, also, was the credit. We have seen that the marshal was commanded to attach the bond and mortgage and the estate, properly, claim, credits, and rights thereto and therein belonging to the said Edward S. Brown. What is the credit in a bond and mortgage, if it is not the debt secured or evidenced by them? What are rights in a mortgage, as well as to it, if they are not the rights of the [599]*599mortgagee to claim and receive the money secured by the mortgage ? The ownership of the written instrument is a distinct thing from ownership of the right or credit of which the instrument is the evidence. The word “credit” does not describe ownership of a mortgage, nor do the words “rights therein.” The warrant was therefore directed against the debt, as well as against the w’ritten evidence of it. The marshal returned that he had attached the bond, mortgage, and credit, and the decree condemned expressly the bond, mortgage, and credit. That the debt was attachable in confiscation proceedings was held by this court in Miller v. The United States,* and it was ruled that attachment or seizure could be made without manual caption of the visible evidences of the credit. To the doctrines laid down in that case we adhere; and, as the marshal’s return conclusively establishes that the credit was seized, and was therefore within the jurisdiction of the court, we must hold that the decree of condemnation was warranted, and that the debt was effectively confiscated.

It is, perhaps, not necessary to say more. Yet it may be added that the appellant seems to have acquiesced in the decree of condemnation, and in the subsequent payment of the debt by the mortgagors to the officers of the court. The agreed statement of facts exhibits that in 1868, after he had obtained a pardon, on his application the District Court ordered that all the money that had been collected under the confiscation decree by the officers of the court should be paid to him, after deducting therefrom some unpaid legal costs. And subsequently he caused to be filed in the confiscation proceedings a petition praying for judgment in his favor against those officers for the money. Whether, after this, he could assert that the proceedings by which the money was collected were a nullity we will not determine. It is enough that, in our opinion, the debt due originally to him from the mortgagors was confiscated before his bill was filed.

Decree affirmed.

9 Wallace, 103.

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82 U.S. 591, 21 L. Ed. 193, 15 Wall. 591, 1872 U.S. LEXIS 1290, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-kennedy-scotus-1873.

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