Brown v. Jeffreys

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided February 18, 2020·No. 3:19-cv-01032·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JEFFREY BROWN, #N38256, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 19−cv–001032−SMY ) ROB JEFFREYS, ) WAYNE DUNN, ) TRAVIS BAYLOR, ) CHRISTOPHER HEDGEPETH, and ) CINDY LUTZ, ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER YANDLE, District Judge: Plaintiff Jeffrey Brown, formerly an inmate at Vienna Correctional Center (“Vienna”), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to proper credit being given for time served on parole and denial of due process regarding his parole revocation. Plaintiff requests monetary damages. (Doc. 1, p. 6) Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of a Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se Complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The Complaint Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint: Plaintiff was released from Vienna on February 8, 2019. (Doc. 1, p. 7). On April 30, 2019, Hedgepeth issued a parole violation report that included false factual statements regarding Plaintiff’s housing situation and,

as a result, Plaintiff was taken back into custody. (Id., pp. 5, 23). On July 2, 2019, the Prisoner Review Board (including Dunn) found that Plaintiff had violated the conditions of his release. (Id., pp. 5, 14-15). He was declared a violator as of the date of his release and denied credit for the time he served on electronic monitoring. (Id., p. 15). At the revocation hearing, he was not read his rights, nor did he receive an attorney. (Id., p. 5). Plaintiff filed several grievances regarding the revocation and Prison Review Board actions, which were denied and subsequently returned by the Administrative Review Board. (Id., pp. 20, 26 and 28). The Court finds it appropriate to designate the following claim in this pro se action: Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against Hedgepeth, Dunn and Baylor for revocation

The parties and the Court will use this designation in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading standard.1 Preliminary Dismissals Plaintiff lists Rob Jeffreys as a defendant in the case caption but fails to mention him in the statement of his claim. Jeffreys does not appear anywhere in the documents Plaintiff attached to

1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). the Complaint. Merely invoking the name of a potential defendant in the caption is not sufficient to state a claim against that individual. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998). Similarly, Plaintiff fails to state any claims against Lutz. The only mention Plaintiff makes of Lutz is in a grievance where he alleges that she approved his new host site. (Doc. 1, p. 30). In

the absence of any allegation that Lutz herself did something wrong, she is not a proper defendant. As such, Jeffreys and Lutz will be dismissed without prejudice. Discussion Dunn is immune from claims arising from the conduct of the revocation hearing because Prison Review Board members are accorded absolute immunity for their decisions. See Wilson v. Kelkhoff, 86 F.3d 1438, 1445 (7th Cir. 1996). “Absolute immunity protects board members not only for the decision to revoke ... supervised release, but [also for] the board members' actions that are ‘part and parcel’ of the decision-making process” including failures to follow procedural due process during revocation hearings. Id. (quoting Walrath v. United States, 35 F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir.1994)). This would also include the decision to date Plaintiff’s violation from his original

release date. Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against Baylor. It appears that Baylor’s only involvement was denying Plaintiff’s appeals of grievances. The mishandling or denying of grievances by those not personally involved in the underlying constitutional violation does not state a claim. See, Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007). Further, there is no protected due process right in the grievance process. Owens, 635 F.3d at 953-54; George, 507 F.3d at 609. Without some allegation that Baylor did more than wrongfully deny grievances, no claim is stated against him. Finally, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Hedgepeth. Plaintiff alleges that his release was revoked based on incorrect statements by Hedgepeth, his parole officer. Such a claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) (barring any suit under Section 1983 where “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction”);

See also, Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot proceed with a claim that the allegations which caused his revocation were false without first showing that his parole revocation has been overturned or otherwise been favorably terminated. Motion for Recruitment of Counsel Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3), which is DENIED.2 Plaintiff did not provide sufficient information for the Court to determine if he has made a reasonable effort to obtain counsel on his own- he only states that he has written letters to several attorneys. With respect to his ability to pursue this action pro se, Plaintiff indicates that he has a grade school education, no federal legal experience and has been diagnosed as bipolar with Post- Traumatic Stress Disorder. Nonetheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff is capable of proceeding pro se, at least for now. Plaintiff’s pleadings demonstrate an ability to construct coherent sentences

and relay information to the Court, and there is no indication that Plaintiff’s mental health issues are preventing him from communicating with the Court. Therefore, the recruitment of counsel is not warranted at this time, and the motion is denied.

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Related

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Wilkinson v. Dotson
544 U.S. 74 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
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Owens v. Hinsley
635 F.3d 950 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Pruitt v. Mote
503 F.3d 647 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service
577 F.3d 816 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
George v. Smith
507 F.3d 605 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Walrath v. United States
35 F.3d 277 (Seventh Circuit, 1994)
Wilson v. Kelkhoff
86 F.3d 1438 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)