Brown v. Hotard

428 So. 2d 505, 1983 La. App. LEXIS 7967
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 7, 1983
DocketNo. 82-CA-19
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 428 So. 2d 505 (Brown v. Hotard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Hotard, 428 So. 2d 505, 1983 La. App. LEXIS 7967 (La. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinion

BOUTALL, Judge.

This appeal arises from a suit for reduction of purchase price and liquidated damages on an agreement to repair a residence. From a judgment in favor of the sellers-builders, the purchasers have taken this appeal.

Mr. and Mrs. Brown purchased a year-old residence from Louis J. Hotard and Dewey Johnson for $82,000.00 on October 1, 1979. The house was a prefabricated building, manufactured by Kingsberry Homes, and was erected and finished as a joint venture by Hotard and Johnson, building contractors. The Browns moved into the house two months prior to the act of sale and discovered a number of defects, major and minor, during that period. In order to show their good intentions to correct the problems complained of by the Browns, Hotard and Johnson entered into a written agreement with the purchasers, dated September 28, 1979, providing that repairs to the roof would be completed by April 1, 1980 and that all other “punch list” items would be corrected by December 1,1979. The sellers deposited $7,000.00 into escrow with their attorneys, to be forfeited to Mr. and Mrs. Brown in the event the sellers failed to make the repairs within the above time limits. The agreement further provided a one year warranty on materials and workmanship from date of act of sale plus a five year factory warranty on major components of the air conditioning-heating system. On November 13, 1980, the Browns, feeling that the work had not been done to their satisfaction, filed suit, asking for a reduction in price of $15,000.00, damages for mental anguish and inconvenience in the amount of $10,000.00, and attorney’s fees of $5,000.00 plus the $7,000.00 stipulated in the agreement of September 28, 1979. Trial was held before a judge on December 1 and 2, 1981. The trial judge determined that the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof and found in favor of Hotard and Johnson, dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit. This appeal followed.

The issues before this court are: whether the sellers breached the agreement to repair and should forfeit the $7,000.00 escrow money; whether the court erred in inquiring as to the sufficiency of the amount in escrow to remedy the defects; and whether the court should have awarded the plaintiffs the amount their experts estimated as the cost of repairing or replacing the defects.

We consider together the first two issues raised by the plaintiffs, regarding the agreement to repair and the $7,000.00 escrow fund, and find them to have no merit.

[507]*507To begin with, the plaintiffs failed to follow the terms of their own agreement, when they felt the sellers had failed to live up to the agreement. The second paragraph of the document details the procedure to be followed:

“The aforementioned repairs and/or replacements are listed below and must be completed in a workmanlike fashion and accepted by owner, said acceptance not to be unreasonably withheld. If there be any disagreement as to the completion of said repairs, an inspector will be brought in to make a final inspection of said residence, said inspector is to be agreed upon by owner and other parties involved.”

No mutually agreeable outside inspector was called in. Odey Brown testified that after the due date had passed, he called on the agent holding the $7,000.00 escrow to request its release. When Hotard and Johnson refused to let the agent release the money, Brown then asked his attorney to write a demand letter. The petition and testimony indicate that where the Browns expected the entire $7,000.00 if any item was not performed by the due date, Hotard and Johnson believed that the money need not be forfeited if they had completed some or most of the work and had made an effort to do the rest. Plaintiffs’ own brief, while citing authorities for the principles of freedom to contract and a contract’s effectiveness as law between the parties, also cites authority for the judge’s right to interpret the contract, as stated in Bown v. Austral Oil Company, Incorporated, 322 So.2d 866 (La.App. 3d Cir.1975), at 870:

“The intention of the parties is of paramount importance and must be determined in accordance with the plain, ordinary and popular sense of the language used in the agreement and by giving consideration on a practical, reasonable and fair basis to the instrument in its entirety-
LSA-C.C. Article 1945 provides that agreements have the effect of law between the parties, who alone can abrogate or modify them, and that the courts are bound to give effect to all contracts according to the true intent of the parties when the language is clear and leads to no absurd consequences.”

An interpretation of the contract according to the Browns’ position could lead to the absurd consequence of a $7,000.00 forfeit for an uncompleted repair costing $50.00. The judge acted within his authority in refusing to award the $7,000.00 in liquidated damages and in attempting to determine the intent of the defendants by inquiring into the repair costs the escrow amount was to cover.

In considering the third issue, whether the court should have awarded the plaintiffs the amounts estimated by their experts, we must look to the requirements for an award of quanti minoris, the theory under which plaintiffs sued.

In an action for quanti minoris, where a defect is not sufficient to make an object useless to the purchaser, the rules and limitations for an action in redhibition apply. LSA-C.C. 2544. The buyer must prove the existence of the problem before the sale. LSA-C.C. 2530. The burden is on the buyer to prove not only the existence of the defect but the amount of reduction in price that is appropriate, and in the case of construction defects the cost to repair such defects. Palmer v. Asaff, 297 So.2d 487 (La.App. 2d Cir.1974); Johnson v. H.W. Parson Motors, Inc., 231 So.2d 73 (La.App. 1st Cir.1970); Hanna Investments, Inc. v. Stovall, 171 So.2d 678 (La.App. 2d Cir.1965).

The contract listed the following items as needing repair or replacement:

“1. Roof-repairs satisfactorily;
2. All thermal pane windows to be replaced;
3. Fill dirt-deliver upon roof completion, 6 yds.-l load;
4. House-paint outside, one coat;
5. Tile in utility room/kitchen-repair or replace;
6. Master bedroom tub to be repaired like new;
7. Master bathroom tub to be repaired like new;
8. Dishwasher defective or improperly installed;
[508]*5089. Counter top corner by oven unfinished.”

Plaintiffs’ petition added to the list leaking of the air-conditioning unit and improperly mounted sliding glass doors.

At the time of trial Mr. and Mrs. Brown testified that although several items had been repaired to their satisfaction, the following items had not: the roof, the thermal windows, the molding of the door frame, the air-conditioning system, and the sliding glass doors. The defendants, Hotard and Johnson, admitted that the windows had not been installed and the molding had not been placed on the door frame. As far as they were concerned, the roof and air-conditioner had been satisfactorily repaired.

We shall now discuss the five complaints in the order given above.

Roof.

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Related

Brown v. Johnson
433 So. 2d 182 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1983)

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Bluebook (online)
428 So. 2d 505, 1983 La. App. LEXIS 7967, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-hotard-lactapp-1983.