Brown v. Griffin

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

Brown v. Griffin

1 S.C. Eq. 32, 25 S.C.L. 32

DecidedJuly 1, 1839

StatusPublished

This text of 1 S.C. Eq. 32 (Brown v. Griffin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Brown v. Griffin, 1 S.C. Eq. 32, 25 S.C.L. 32 (S.C. Ct. App. 1839).

Pincite

Opinion

Curia, per

Richardson, J.

held that “where the grand jury have returned a true bill upon the charge made, such finding amounts to a judicial recognition that probable cause does exist. Hence arises a rule, that a plaintiff, suing for damages in such a case, must prove the absence of probable cause ; and, if he fail to do so, such judicial recognition is prima facie proof of a probable cause.”

And it was considered that, although the plaintiff’s Character might have given him a strong defence on his trial, and the staleness of the charge,' coupled with the quarrel that ultimately gave rise to it, were pregnant evidence of the defendant’s malice, (which is one of the essential grounds for this action,) yet they did not in the least tend to shew that the prosecution had not been instituted, according to C. J. Marshall’s definition, on “such circumstances as warrant suspicion.” (Locke vs. U. States; 7 Cranch, 339.)

Motion dismissed;

Evans, Earle and Butler, JJ. concurring.

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Curia, per

Richardson, J.

held that “where the grand jury have returned a true bill upon the charge made, such finding amounts to a judicial recognition that probable cause does exist. Hence arises a rule, that a plaintiff, suing for damages in such a case, must prove the absence of probable cause ; and, if he fail to do so, such judicial recognition is prima facie proof of a probable cause.”

And it was considered that, although the plaintiff’s Character might have given him a strong defence on his trial, and the staleness of the charge,' coupled with the quarrel that ultimately gave rise to it, were pregnant evidence of the defendant’s malice, (which is one of the essential grounds for this action,) yet they did not in the least tend to shew that the prosecution had not been instituted, according to C. J. Marshall’s definition, on “such circumstances as warrant suspicion.” (Locke vs. U. States; 7 Cranch, 339.)

Motion dismissed;

Evans, Earle and Butler, JJ. concurring.

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Bluebook (online)

1 S.C. Eq. 32, 25 S.C.L. 32, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-griffin-scctapp-1839.

Opinion

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