Brown v. Gerson

782 S.W.2d 226, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 3206, 1989 WL 162796
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 15, 1989
DocketNo. 09-89-055 CV
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 782 S.W.2d 226 (Brown v. Gerson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Gerson, 782 S.W.2d 226, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 3206, 1989 WL 162796 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinions

OPINION

BROOKSHIRE, Justice.

Original petition for writ of mandamus. Mary Brown, the Relator, in her petition for said writ, complains of the Honorable Alfred S. Gerson, in his capacity as Judge of the County Court at Law No. 1 of Jefferson County, Texas. Her petition for mandamus relief, in its basic thrust, is to the effect that the trial judge failed to follow our opinion issued in a cause styled “Mary Brown (Estate of Pearl Harmon, Deceased) v. Gloria Harmon and Pearl Harmon Sandies”, our No. 09-88-071 CV — an unpublished opinion.

The prior appeal was to obtain an adjudication to determine the heirship of Pearl Harmon, Deceased. Mary Brown had pleaded for the County Court at Law No. 1 to determine and declare who are the heirs, and the only heirs, of the decedent, Pearl Harmon. Further, Mary Brown petitioned the trial court to determine and declare that the applicant (Mary Brown) had an undivided one-fourth interest in the estate of the decedent. However, after a bench proceeding, at the first trial, the trial court entered a judgment which stated:

“IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Application to Determine Heirship filed by MARY BROWN be and is in all things denied.”

In the prior appeal, Mary Brown took the position that the trial court abused its discretion in totally denying the Appellant’s Application to Determine Heirship and she argued that the trial court was obligated to determine the heirs of the decedent and their respective shares in the decedent’s estate because of the fact that the evidence was uncontroverted and clear. The Appel-[227]*227lees countered with the argument that Mary Brown had failed in her proof on the issue of “title to real estate”. The Appel-lees urged, on the prior appeal, that the judgment of the court should be affirmed, resulting in no adjudication of heirship.

Our court pointed out that TEX.PROB. CODE ANN. sec. 48(a) (Vernon 1980) provided, in relevant part, that:

“(a) When a person dies intestate owning or entitled to real or personal property ... the court ... may determine and declare in the manner hereinafter provided who are the heirs and only heirs of such decedent, and their respective shares ... in the estate of such decedent....”

Furthermore, our court cited TEX. PROB.CODE ANN. sec. 54 (Vernon 1980). Section 54 provides:

“The judgment of the court in a proceeding to declare heirship shall declare the names and places of residence of the heirs of the decedent, and their respective shares and interests in the real and personal property of such decedent. If the proof is in any respect deficient, the judgment shall so state.” (Emphasis added)

The unpublished opinion reversed and remanded with instructions to the trial court to enter a judgment declaring the heirs of the decedent and their respective shares of the decedent’s estate and, also, to affirmatively declare the deficiency of the proof of the applicant. The heirs of the decedent and their respective general shares were uncontroverted. We so noted in a footnote.

On February 7, 1989, the County Court at Law No. 1 signed a judgment declaring the heirship of Pearl Harmon, Deceased. The trial court then found that the decedent, Pearl Harmon, died intestate on December 12, 1957, in Jefferson County, Texas, and, at the time of her death, the said Pearl Harmon left surviving her four children. The four children were:

CURLEY HARMON, son
3606 Tenth Street
Port Arthur, TX 77642
MARY BROWN, daughter
1310 — 60th Street
Port Arthur, TX 77640
THELMA HARMON FRANCIS, daughter
948 Harding
Port Arthur, TX 77640
JACK HARMON, JR., son
(Deceased, having died on November 26, 1987).

The trial court further found and decreed that, on February 7, 1989, all of the decedent’s children were living save and except Jack Harmon, Jr., who died in November, 1987, and left surviving him:

GLORIA HARMON, WIFE
5717 Grant
Port Arthur, TX 77640
PEARL HARMON SANDLES, daughter
990 Cypress Station, Apt. # 109
Houston, Texas 77090.

The trial court ordered and decreed that Curley Harmon had a one-fourth share of the decedent’s estate; Mary Brown had a one-fourth share; Thelma Harmon Francis had a one-fourth share; Pearl Harmon San-dies had a one-fourth share, subject to the one-third life estate of Gloria Harmon in realty and the one-third life estate of Gloria Harmon in personalty; that Gloria Harmon had a one-third life estate in and to all realty in the share of Pearl Harmon San-dies and a one-third life estate in and to the personalty in the share of Pearl Harmon Sandies.

In the last decretal paragraph, the trial court decreed that Pearl Harmon died not owning or possessing any interest in the realty known by street address as 5717 Grant, Port-Arthur, Jefferson County, Texas, being Lot No. 9, in Block No. 1, of the OAKLAWN ADDITION to the City of Port Arthur, Jefferson County, Texas. In the same judgment declaring heirship, the trial court also stated that it further found that the applicant, Mary Brown, wholly failed to show any property owned by Pearl Harmon at the time of her death.

The record clearly shows that Mary Brown, among others, testified that Pearl Harmon died owning property, which was real property, located on Grant Street, in Port Arthur, Texas. Furthermore, a doc[228]*228ument was introduced in evidence, being a Release of a Vendor’s Lien. The document, affirmatively and unequivocally, recited that S.E. White, of Jefferson County, on September 27, 1954, by deed of even date, which was duly recorded in the Records of Deeds in Jefferson County, in Volume 950, page 46, had actually granted, sold and conveyed to Pearl Harmon, a feme sole, being a widow, the following described real property:

“Lot Number Nine (9), in Block Number One (1), of OAKLAWN ADDITION to the City of Port Arthur, Jefferson County, Texas, as the same appears upon the map or plat thereof, on file and of record in the office of the County Clerk of Jefferson County, Texas, at Beaumont....”

The instrument further recited that the original promissory note, in the amount of $6,000.00, bearing even date with the deed and payable to S.E. White, had been paid in full to S.E. White, who, at that time, was the legal and equitable owner and holder of the said note. The document recited that S.E. White, being the then legal and equitable owner and holder of the vendor’s lien note did thereby release, discharge and quitclaim unto the said Pearl Harmon, her heirs and assigns, all the right, title and interest in and to the property described, which the said S.E. White might have or may be entitled to by being the owner and holder of the vendor’s lien note.

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Bluebook (online)
782 S.W.2d 226, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 3206, 1989 WL 162796, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-gerson-texapp-1989.