Brown v. Georgia Cotton Growers Co-operative Ass'n

139 S.E. 417, 164 Ga. 712, 1927 Ga. LEXIS 262
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedSeptember 9, 1927
DocketNo. 5615
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 139 S.E. 417 (Brown v. Georgia Cotton Growers Co-operative Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Georgia Cotton Growers Co-operative Ass'n, 139 S.E. 417, 164 Ga. 712, 1927 Ga. LEXIS 262 (Ga. 1927).

Opinion

Atkinson, J.

The Georgia Cotton Growers Co-operative Association instituted an action against G. W. Brown, for specific performance of an alleged contract calling for future delivery of cotton, for injunction to prevent the sale of the cotton to others, and for attorney’s fees as provided in the contract. The defendant filed a demurrer and an answer. The plaintiff filed a demurrer to the answer. The judge overruled the demurrer to the petition, and sustained demurrers to certain portions of the answer. The trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for “three bales of cotton and fifty dollars as attorney’s fees.” The defendant’s motion for a new trial was overruled, and he excepted. Error was also assigned on exceptions pendente lite to the above-mentioned rul-' ings on demurrer.

[713]*713In contracts of sale of cotton to be produced in the future, tbe stipulated purchase-price “must either be definite, or an agreement made by which it can be made certain; if its ascertainment becomes impossible, there is no sale.” Civil Code (1910), § 4128; Deadwyler v. Karow, 131 Ga. 227 (62 S. E. 172, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 197); Elberton Hardware Co. v. Hawes, 122 Ga. 858 (50 S. E. 964); Overland Southern Motor Car Co. v. Hill, 145 Ga. 785 (89 S. E. 833). The petition in this case alleged that the plaintiff was a non-profit-making co-operative cotton marketing association composed of growers of cotton, and organized for the exclusive benefit of its members with whom it had separate similar contracts; and that the defendant became a member of- the association and in September, 1923, entered into a written contract binding himself to “sell and deliver” to plaintiff “all of the cotton produced by or for him or acquired by him as landlord or lessor during the years of 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925, and 1926.” A copy of the contract was set out as an exhibit. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the petition were as follows: “6. The association agrees to resell such cotton, together with cotton of like variety, grade, and staple delivered by other growers under similar contracts, at the best prices obtainable by it under market conditions; and to pay over the net amount received therefrom (less freight, insurance, and interest), as payment in full to the grower and growers named in contracts similar hereto, according to the cotton delivered by each of them, after deducting therefrom, wjthin the discretion of the association, the cost of handling, grading, and marketing such cotton, and of reserves for credits and other general purposes (said reserves not to exceed two per cent, of the gross resale price). The annual surplus from such deductions must be prorated among the growers delivering cotton in that year, on the basis of delivery. 7. The grower agrees that- the association may handle, in its discretion, some of the cotton in one way and some in another; but the net proceeds of all cotton of like quality, grade, and staple, less charge, costs, and advances shall be divided ratably among the growers in proportion to their deliveries to each pool, payments to be made from time to time until all the accounts of each pool are settled.”

These provisions of the contract must be construed together. Construing them together, it is apparent that the clause, “within [714]*714tlie discretion of the association,” is not intended to allow the association to exercise a discretion as to the deduction of the costs of handling, grading, and marketing such cotton; but the discretion referred to is in regard to the power given the association to “handle . . some of the cotton in one way and'some in another.” If the provision in the clause just quoted from paragraph 6 allowed the association a discretion as to whether it would deduct the “cost of handling, grading, and marketing cotton,” it would make the contract indefinite relating to the price to be paid; but it is expressly provided in section 7 that “the net proceeds of all cotton of like quality, grade, and staple, less charge, costs, and advances, shall be divided ratably among the growers in proportion to their deliveries to each pool.” Construing both sections together, the association was not allowed a discretion as to whether it would deduct the cost of handling, grading, and marketing cotton. Pursuing the plan specified, the contract price was ascertainable, and the mere use of the language “within the discretion of the association,” as employed in paragraph 6, did not render the contract void on the ground that the price to be paid or the consideration was indefinite.

In section 15 of the agricultural co-operative marketing act (Acts 1921, pp. 139, 149) it is provided: “The by-laws and the marketing contract may fix, as liquidated damages, specified sums to be paid by the member or stockholder to the association upon tlie breach by him of any provision of the marketing contract regarding the sale or delivery or withholding of products; and may further provide that the member will pay all costs, premiums for bonds, expenses and fees, in case any action is brought upon the contract by the association; and any such provisions shall be valid and enforceable in the courts of this State.” This provision of the statute relates to a particular class of subject-matter, and, properly construed, authorizes parties contracting in pursuance of the statute to provide for payment of attorney’s fees by the member to the association, in the circumstances therein stated. The statute makes no reference to the giving of notice to a member prior to the filing of an intended suit, as a condition upon which attorney’s fees may be recovered, and no such prior notice is requisite to a recovery of attorney’s fees in a suit for such breach of the contract. The statute differs from the Civil Code (1910), § 4252, which denounces [715]*715obligations “to pay attorney’s fees upon any note or other evidence of indebtedness,” and the provisions of that section are inapplicable to this ease.

The rulings announced in the preceding notes dispose of the only questions argued in the brief of the attorney for the plaintiff in error, relating to the assignments of error upon the judgment overruling the demurrer to the original petition.

In paragraph. 7 of the answer it was alleged “that plaintiff is making no effort whatever to enforce its alleged contracts with many of the members of plaintiff’s organization, but is seeking to enforce said contracts only against a few of its members.” This part of the answer was stricken on special demurrer complaining that it “was immaterial and irrelevant, and sets up no matter in defense of the contract.” The court here committed error. The plaintiff sought specific performance of the contract and injunctive relief predicated in part upon allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the petition, as follows: “Failure to perform said agreement on the part of growers and producers, and failure to deliver cotton to plaintiff in accordance to the terms of said agreement, will defeat and destroy the purposes for which plaintiff was formed. It is necessary, in order to carry out said purposes, for plaintiff to control the cotton of all signers of said agreement, and without such control plaintiff can not attain any of the objects for which it was organized. Under the terms of said co-operative marketing act and agreement, no person except a grower of cotton, or such landlord, tenant, lessor, or lessee can become a member of plaintiff; .and plaintiff is not permitted by law or by the terms of said agreement to handle the cotton of any person not a member of plaintiff, or to purchase cotton upon the open market.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
139 S.E. 417, 164 Ga. 712, 1927 Ga. LEXIS 262, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-georgia-cotton-growers-co-operative-assn-ga-1927.