Brown v. George

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Brown v. George

138 A.D.3d 466, 29 N.Y.S.3d 309

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 7, 2016

Docket767 300279/12

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 138 A.D.3d 466 (Brown v. George) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Brown v. George, 138 A.D.3d 466, 29 N.Y.S.3d 309 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2016).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lucindo Suarez, J.), entered October 20, 2014, which, insofar as appealed from, denied the motion of defendant Wilbert George for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims as against him, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Defendant George established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in this action where plaintiff cable service technician was injured when he fell from a ladder while working at defendant’s home. Defendant submitted, inter alia, plaintiff’s deposition testimony wherein he described his fall from the ladder he had leaned against defendant’s house. The testimony *467 “established] that there was no dangerous condition on the premises which caused the accident, but rather that it was caused by the manner in which” plaintiff performed his work (Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY2d 290, 295 [1992]). Defendant cannot be held liable for plaintiff’s injuries resulting from the means or methods of his work, since it is undisputed that defendant did not exercise supervisory control over the work (see id.).

The court erred in finding that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the accident was not caused by a defective condition on the premises. The conclusory allegation in plaintiff’s bill of particulars, that defendant created or had notice of a defective condition on the exterior of the house, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (compare Sanchez v National R.R. Passenger Corp., 21 NY3d 890 [2013]). Indeed, plaintiff testified that he was unaware of any condition of the building that caused his fall, and he tacitly conceded that the accident was not caused by a premises defect by making no such argument in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment (see Cullen v Naples, 31 NY2d 818, 820 [1972]).

Concur — Acosta, J.P., Renwick, Manzanet-Daniels, Kapnick and Webber, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lucindo Suarez, J.), entered October 20, 2014, which, insofar as appealed from, denied the motion of defendant Wilbert George for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims as against him, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Defendant George established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in this action where plaintiff cable service technician was injured when he fell from a ladder while working at defendant’s home. Defendant submitted, inter alia, plaintiff’s deposition testimony wherein he described his fall from the ladder he had leaned against defendant’s house. The testimony *467 “established] that there was no dangerous condition on the premises which caused the accident, but rather that it was caused by the manner in which” plaintiff performed his work (Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY2d 290, 295 [1992]). Defendant cannot be held liable for plaintiff’s injuries resulting from the means or methods of his work, since it is undisputed that defendant did not exercise supervisory control over the work (see id.).

The court erred in finding that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the accident was not caused by a defective condition on the premises. The conclusory allegation in plaintiff’s bill of particulars, that defendant created or had notice of a defective condition on the exterior of the house, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (compare Sanchez v National R.R. Passenger Corp., 21 NY3d 890 [2013]). Indeed, plaintiff testified that he was unaware of any condition of the building that caused his fall, and he tacitly conceded that the accident was not caused by a premises defect by making no such argument in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment (see Cullen v Naples, 31 NY2d 818, 820 [1972]).

Concur — Acosta, J.P., Renwick, Manzanet-Daniels, Kapnick and Webber, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

138 A.D.3d 466, 29 N.Y.S.3d 309, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-george-nyappdiv-2016.

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