Brown v. Flyman

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedMay 30, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-00184
StatusUnknown

This text of Brown v. Flyman (Brown v. Flyman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Flyman, (D. Nev. 2024).

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 MARLON LORENZO BROWN, Case No. 3:24-cv-00184-MMD-CLB

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 MICHAEL FLYMAN, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 I. SUMMARY 12 Pro se Plaintiff Marlon Lorenzo Brown, who is an inmate in the custody of the 13 Nevada Department of Corrections, filed a petition for removal of his state court action to 14 this Court. (ECF No. 1-1.) Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of 15 United States Magistrate Judge Carla L. Baldwin (ECF No. 6), recommending the Court 16 grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 1), deny the 17 petition for removal (ECF No. 1-1 at 1-5), and dismiss the complaint (id. at 7-17). Plaintiff 18 filed an objection to the R&R (ECF No. 8), as well as a motion for leave to amend the 19 complaint (ECF No. 7). Because the Court agrees with Judge Baldwin’s analysis and 20 separately finds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action under the 21 Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court will adopt the R&R, grant the IFP application, deny 22 the petition for removal, dismiss the complaint, and deny the motion for leave to amend 23 as moot. 24 II. DISCUSSION 25 “[D]e novo review of the magistrate judges’ findings and recommendations is 26 required if, but only if, one or both parties file objections to the findings and 27 recommendations.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2003). 28 Because Plaintiff does not object to Judge Baldwin’s recommendation to grant the IFP 2 recommendation. Because Plaintiff objects to Judge Baldwin’s recommendation to deny 3 the petition for removal, the Court conducts a de novo review of that analysis. 4 Judge Baldwin recommends denying the petition for removal because an action in 5 state court may be removed to federal court by a defendant, but not a plaintiff, like Brown 6 here. (ECF No. 6 at 3.) The Court agrees and will adopt the recommendation, as 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1441(a) plainly states that a state court action “may be removed by the defendant or the 8 defendants,” and 28 U.S.C. §1446(a) refers to “[a] defendant or defendants desiring to 9 remove” a state court action. In his Objection, Plaintiff argues that the R&R does not 10 address Plaintiff’s reason for seeking removal—that the state court erroneously refused to 11 award him damages for his loss of liberty because of the judge’s bias, that the Nevada 12 Supreme Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument of bias and affirmed the state court ruling, 13 and that Plaintiff now seeks federal intervention for the state court judge’s decision and 14 conduct. (ECF No. 8 at 2-3.) The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument because his reason for 15 removal does not change the fact that removal is only proper by a defendant. Moreover, 16 Plaintiff’s stated reason for removal makes clear that the Court lacks subject matter 17 jurisdiction over this action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Scholastic Ent., Inc. 18 v. Fox Ent. Grp., Inc., 336 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a court may dismiss claims 19 sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without violating due process). 20 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine states that federal district courts may not exercise 21 subject matter jurisdiction over a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.1 See Rooker 22 v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-17 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals, et al. v. Feldman, 460 23 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). The doctrine applies when “a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal 24 wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from the state 25 court judgment based on that decision.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). 26 27 1State court litigants may only achieve federal review of state court judgments by 28 filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals, et al. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). 2 refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue 3 resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.” Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th 4 Cir. 2005) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158). To determine if an action operates as a de 5 facto appeal, the court “pay[s] close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court 6 plaintiff.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bianchi v. 7 Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 990 (9th Cir. 2003)). Where the form of relief would constitute 8 a reversal or “undoing of the prior state-court judgment,” Rooker-Feldman dictates that the 9 lower federal courts lack jurisdiction. Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 900 (internal quotations and 10 citations omitted). 11 Here, Plaintiff asks the Court to address arguments that were already presented to 12 and rejected by the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada and the Nevada Supreme 13 Court and to essentially reverse their rulings on Plaintiff’s damages. (ECF No. 8 at 2-3.) 14 This requested relief constitutes a forbidden de facto appeal of multiple state court orders. 15 See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163 (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman 16 when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed 17 by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.”). To provide Plaintiff 18 with the relief he seeks would require this Court to analyze the state courts’ alleged legal 19 errors and undo the original order and the appeal, which is squarely barred by Rooker- 20 Feldman. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff seeks other related relief, the Court may not 21 review any issues “inextricably intertwined” with issues addressed by the state court. See 22 Doe, 415 F.3d at 1042-43. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives the Court 23 of subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, so the Court will deny the petition for 24 removal, dismiss the complaint, and deny as moot the motion for leave to amend the 25 complaint.2 26 27 2Aside from its mootness, in any event, Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint 28 would likely fail for other reasons, such as being barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine for similar reasons as discussed above. 2 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several cases 3 not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and determines 4 that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the issues before 5 the Court. 6 It is therefore ordered that Judge Baldwin’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 7 6) is adopted. 8 It is further ordered that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 9 No. 1) is granted. 10 It is further ordered that Plaintiff is not required to pay an initial installment fee. 11 Nevertheless, the full filing fee is still due, even if this action is dismissed or is otherwise 12 unsuccessful, under U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

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Related

McDowell v. Peyton
23 U.S. 454 (Supreme Court, 1825)
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.
263 U.S. 413 (Supreme Court, 1924)
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman
460 U.S. 462 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Doe v. Mann
415 F.3d 1038 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Kevin Cooper v. Michael Ramos
704 F.3d 772 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam
334 F.3d 895 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)

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Brown v. Flyman, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-flyman-nvd-2024.