Brown v. Department of Revenue ex rel. Carpenter

558 S.W.2d 635, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 854
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedNovember 18, 1977
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 558 S.W.2d 635 (Brown v. Department of Revenue ex rel. Carpenter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Department of Revenue ex rel. Carpenter, 558 S.W.2d 635, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 854 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinion

PARK, Judge.

This appeal presents a single issue: whether a shareholder’s pro rata share of the net operating loss of a subchapter S corporation may be deducted in determining the shareholder’s 1970 Kentucky income tax liability. The Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals and the Franklin Circuit Court both upheld the ruling of the Department of Revenue that no part of a corporation’s net operating loss could be deducted by a shareholder for Kentucky income tax purposes. We agree.

The facts are stipulated. During the year 1970, the appellant, John Y. Brown, was a shareholder of Athletic Enterprises, Inc., a corporation which had elected and qualified as a small business corporation (subchapter S corporation) under sections 1371-1375 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended. For its taxable year ending May 31,1970, Athletic Enterprises, Inc., sustained a net operating loss in the amount of $375,961.00. Based upon his stock ownership, Brown’s pro rata share of the corporation’s net operating loss amounted to $70,361.00 when computed in accordance with provisions of section 1374(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.

Brown and his wife timely filed a combined 1970 Kentucky Income Tax Return. On April 9,1974, Brown and his wife timely filed an amended Kentucky Income Tax Return for the taxable year 1970 showing a “loss” in the amount of $70,361.00 attributable to Brown’s stock ownership in Athletic Enterprises, Inc. Brown claimed a refund of Kentucky income taxes in the amount of $4,220.00. From a final ruling of the Department of Revenue issued June 30, 1975, Brown appealed to the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals. On June 4, 1976, the board affirmed the department’s ruling denying the claim for refund. A further appeal was prosecuted to the Franklin Circuit Court. On February 21, 1977, the circuit court entered a judgment affirming the order of the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals.

Brown relies upon the provisions of subsections (9), (10) and (11) of KRS 141.010 as they were in effect in 1970. Under subsection (9), “gross income” of Kentucky individual taxpayers meant “gross income” as defined in section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code with certain adjustments.1 Under subsection (10), “adjusted gross income” meant gross income as defined in subsection (9) “minus the deductions allowed individuals by section 62 of the internal revenue code” with certain adjustments and exceptions.2 With respect to individual taxpay[637]*637ers not electing to take the standard deduction, subsection (11) provided that “net income” means adjusted gross income as defined in subsection (10) “minus all the deductions allowed individuals by chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code” with certain exceptions and adjustments.3

Under section 1374(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, each shareholder of an “electing” subchapter S corporation is allowed as a deduction from gross income an amount equal to his pro rata share of the corporation’s net operating loss. Under subsection (d)(1), this deduction is considered as a deduction attributable to “a trade or business carried on by the taxpayer.”4 Under section 62(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, adjusted gross income is determined by subtracting trade and business deductions from gross income.5 Brown contends that he is entitled to deduct his pro rata share of the net operating loss of Athletic Enterprises, Inc., when the provisions of sections 62(1) and 1374 of the Internal Revenue Code are considered in conjunction with subsections (9), (10) and (11) of KRS 141.010.

Brown recognizes, that for Kentucky income tax purposes, subparagraph (c) of KRS 141.010(9) excluded from the definition of gross income undistributed taxable income of a subchapter S corporation taxable to shareholders under section 1373 of the Internal Revenue Code. Brown argues that net operating losses of a subchapter S corporation are not a part of undistributed taxable income of such corporations. Hence, it is argued that the deductability of the shareholder’s pro rata share of net operating loss is not affected by the exclusion of undistributed income of a subchapter S corporation from the definition of gross income. Brown also points out that KRS 141.010(9) has been amended to exclude both “undistributed income” and “any losses” attributed to shareholders of a subchap-ter S corporation. 1974 Ky.Acts ch. 163, § 2. Brown claims that the legislature would not have enacted the 1974 amendment if a shareholder’s pro rata share of a small business corporation’s net operating loss had not previously been deductible. Brown cites Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S.W. 487, 489 (1916). The Department of Revenue counters this rule of statutory construction with the claim that the [638]*6381974 amendment was intended to clarify, rather than change, the law. The Department cites 1A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 27.03 (4th Sands Ed., 1972).

Brown also cites KRS 141.050(1) for the rule that computations of gross income and deductions for Kentucky purposes shall be as nearly identical as practicable to those required for federal income tax purposes.6 The Department of Revenue answers by stating that federal laws on computations must be applied only if not inconsistent with state laws and regulations. Koehler v. Commonwealth ex rel. Luckett, Ky., 432 5.W.2d 397, 398 (1968).

The Department relies on administrative interpretation of the statutes, but Brown asserts that the incidence of a tax is determined by the legislature rather than the Department, citing Commonwealth ex rel. Ross v. Lee’s Ford Dock, Ky., 551 S.W.2d 236, 238 (1977).

This case cannot be decided solely on the basis of the rules of construction cited by the parties. When questions of statutory construction are presented, opposing rules of construction can be found on almost every point. K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition — Deciding Appeals 371-75, 521-35 .(I960). The statutes involved here must not be considered in isolation but as a part of the larger body of income tax law. In that way, the court can construe the statutes in light of the policy and purpose behind the law.

Subchapter S of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted to provide shareholders of small business corporations with a means of avoiding double taxation. In the absence of an election under subchapter S, income would be taxed at the corporate level and then a second time when distribution was made to the shareholders. The keystone of subchapter S is section 1372 of the Internal Revenue Code.7 Under subsection (a), a subchapter S corporation may elect not to be subject to the income tax imposed by chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code. If an election is made, subsection (b) provides that there are two consequences.

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Bluebook (online)
558 S.W.2d 635, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 854, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-department-of-revenue-ex-rel-carpenter-kyctapp-1977.