Brown v. Crandal
This text of 23 Iowa 112 (Brown v. Crandal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
[114]*114In the absence of this seal, or any other affirmative-statement or evidence that the deputy was acting for the, collector in the particular case, it may be questioned whether it would be safe to act upon the presumption that the deputy was so specially authorized to act in the premises, more particularly when it is done without any leave or permission of the court first had and obtained. In this case no such leave was asked or granted. If it had been, we might, perhaps, presume in favor of the regularity of the deputy’s acts, as we did do in the case of Deskin v. Graham (19 Iowa, 553). Nevertheless, we are not entirely satisfied with the rule there laid down.
Tested by this rule, rather than the one laid down in the case of Deskin v. Graham (supra) (but which is distinguishable, to be sure, from this in the matter above indicated), we think the ruling of the court below upon the motion was erroneous, and that the motion should have been sustained, and the appeal dismissed.
Reversed.
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23 Iowa 112, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-crandal-iowa-1867.