Brown v. Conner

63 F. Supp. 315, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1642
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedMay 7, 1943
DocketCivil Action No. 868
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 63 F. Supp. 315 (Brown v. Conner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Conner, 63 F. Supp. 315, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1642 (S.D. Tex. 1943).

Opinion

KEMMERLY, District Judge.

This is a suit under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 901 et seq., by the Price Administrator (for brevity called Plaintiff), against G. G. Conner, trading as the Houston Hide Company and the Houston Hide & Fur Company (for brevity called Defendant), a dealer in hides, seeking to enjoin him from violating such Act and Price Schedule 9, etc. promulgated under such Act.

In the original complaint, filed September 29, 1942, Plaintiff, as a basis for injunction against Defendant, says:

“Since February 21, 1942, defendant has bought and sold, received and delivered, hides, kips and calfskins at prices in excess of the maximum prices set forth in said Price Schedule No. 9.
“Under invoice dated April 3, 1942, defendant sold and delivered to Beggs & Cobb, Inc., Boston, Massachusetts and Winchester, Massachusetts, a carload of hides, kips, and calfskins, which carload of hides, kips, and calfskins was delivered on or about April 15, 1942, for a total sum of $12,242.15. That such price was in excess of the maximum price set forth in said Schedule No. 9.”

In passing on Plaintiff’s application for preliminary injunction, I said with respect to Defendant’s activities:

“Since the effective date of such Act, he has, according to the evidence, shipped under such Act from Houston, Texas, to such Eastern markets car loads of hides on these dates :-
“(a) One car load on April 3, 1942.
“(b) Two car loads on August 9, 1942.
“(c) One car load or perhaps two car loads on September 29, 1942.
“Differences arose between Defendant and the Administrator with respect to the car shipped April 3, 1942, and while the grading and classification of hides is largely a matter of opinion, the weight of the evidence indicates that Defendant was at fault (but not willfully so) in his grading and classification of the hides in that car. There has been no complaint, however, with respect to the two cars shipped August 9, 1942, and up to the time of hearing, no complaint as to the car or cars shipped about September 29, 1942.
“In shipping the cars on and since August 9, 1942, a different method of grading and classification was used by Defendant, which appears satisfactory to Plaintiff. Defendant indicates in his Answer and Affidavits that he expects to continue doing business as he has been doing since August 9, 1942.
“There is no dependable evidence of any violation of the Act by Defendant other than the above shipment of April 3, 1942.”

On February 6, 1943, Plaintiff filed amended complaint, and as the basis for injunction against Defendant sets forth that [316]*316Defendant has since February 21, 1942, violated the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and Price Schedule No. 9 issued thereunder, and specifically alleges that Defendant has shipped to the Eastern Markets and sold carloads of hides, the prices of which violated such Act and such Schedule, on the following dates:

February 27, 1942.

March 6, 1942.

March 17, 1942.

April 3, 1942.

April 24, 1942.

October 28, 1942.

Plaintiff also complains of Defendant’s bookkeeping methods, and asks that he be enjoined, etc.

While at the trial only three witnesses testified, there were by Stipulation numerous and voluminous affidavits or copies of affidavits offered. Also numerous Exhibits. From the testimony of the witnesses, the affidavits, and the exhibits, I find the following facts:

(a) Apparently for some months after the date of the approval of the Emergency Price Control Act and the promulgation of Schedules thereunder, there was much confusion among hide men and shippers of hides as to the proper classification, price, etc., of hides, and I am unable to find in this record any evidence of a willful violation by Defendant of the Act or the Price Schedules. Defendant made some errors of judgment, but probably any man with Defendant’s background and training would have made them.

Defendant has made, since the effective date of the Act, perhaps 12 or 15 carload shipments and sales of hides. As herein-before stated, Plaintiff complains here of six shipments. The first shipment complained of was made February 27, 1942, and the last one complained of was made October 28, 1942. The Regional Hide Price Specialist for the Office of Price Administration (Braum) testifies as follows as to the shipment of February 27, 1942:

“A. That is February 27. The tannery report indicates that 1,141 kips invoiced as packers were countries, according to 1,-314.12, Paragraph D, Revised Price Schedule No. 9, making a difference on that car on the kip alone of $1,149.68. That was on the kips.
“Q. Yes, sir. A. On the hides, the tannery report indicates that there were 70 per cent No. 2’s and 3’s in with No. l’s and No. 2’s, native packer hides. The invoice shows that, of the total of the hides shipped, nearly 26t/3 per cent billed were No. 2’s. If we figure that on the basis of Section 1,314.12, Paragraph D of Revised Price Schedule No. 9, we have a difference there of $36.50.
“The Court: A difference which way?' A. That the shipper received over and above the ceiling.
“Mr. Dyer: How much did that whole car cost ? A. I haven’t got the total amount.
“Mr. Dyer: Several thousand dollars,, wasn’t it? A. Oh, yes, I imagine the amount usually ran eight, nine, ten thousand dollars.
“Now on the No. 1 packer hides, the tannery reports that they should have all been sold as No. 2 hides, making a total over and' above the price ceiling of $1,389.18. A claim was made by the tanner on this shipment of $600.00.
“Mr. Dyer: That was paid, wasn’t it?' A. I am not sure.”

The same witness testifies as to the shipment of October 28, 1942, as follows:

“Q. Now on the shipment of October 28, ,1942, car N.Y.C., No. 52568. A. I don’t think I have my affidavit on that.
“Q. Get your affidavit on that. Did you in connection with your official duties malee an inspection of that car? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Tell us what you found as a result of your inspection, Mr. Braum. .
“Mr. Dyer: Let me ask him this, in order to get this before the Court: This is the only car that you are claiming a violation on that you didn’t claim before this temporary injunction matter was passed qn, isn’t that correct, Mr. Braum? A. I think so.
“Mr. Odem: That is right. Mr. Dyer. The record will so reflect that.
“Mr. Dyer: I just wanted the Court to understand that. A. I examined 71 hides which were sold on a flat basis. I will explain that. It means that the No. l’s and No. 2’s were not separated and sold separately but were sold on a basis allowed by the schedule for selling them just as hides, without determining how many No. 2’s are contained in the load with the No. l’s.
“Q. How are the others sold? A. On the selected basis, where the No.

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Bluebook (online)
63 F. Supp. 315, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1642, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-conner-txsd-1943.