Brown v. Commissioner

1997 T.C. Memo. 520, 74 T.C.M. 1241, 1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 598
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Brown v. Commissioner. Read the opinion of the Court — 71 T.C.M. 2301
United States Tax Court·Decided November 18, 1997·No. Tax Ct. Dkt. No. 15161-96·Unpublished

Opinion

GEORGE P. BROWN, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Brown v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. Dkt. No. 15161-96
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1997-520; 1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 598; 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1241;
November 18, 1997, Filed

*598 Decision will be entered for respondent.

George P. Brown, pro se.
Reginald R. Corlew, for respondent.
DINAN, SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE.

DINAN

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DINAN, SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7443A(b)(3) and Rules 180, 181, and 182. 1*599

Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax for 1992 in the amount of $2,040.

The issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioner is entitled to claim head of household filing status; and (2) whether petitioner is entitled to a casualty loss deduction.*600

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulations of fact and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in Miami, Florida, on the date the petition was filed in this case.

Petitioner works as a bus driver for the Metropolitan*601 Dade County Transit Agency. During 1992, petitioner rented a house in the Miami area. He lived there with his wife and his two children, Tawana and Xavier, until September 1992 when he and his wife separated.

The house that petitioner rented was destroyed when hurricane Andrew struck the Miami area in 1992. He sustained a loss of nearly all of his personal property. Petitioner did not have renter's insurance coverage at the time of the loss.

The first issue for decision is whether petitioner is entitled to claim head of household filing status for 1992. In the statutory notice of deficiency, respondent determined that petitioner's proper filing status for 1992 is married filing separate.

Respondent's determinations in the statutory notice of deficiency are presumed to be correct, and petitioner bears the burden of proving otherwise. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).

In pertinent part, an individual may be considered a head of a household if, and only if, such individual is not married at the close of his taxable year. Sec. 2(b)(1). An individual who is legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance*602 shall not be considered as married. Secs. 2(b)(2)(B) , 7703(a)(2). In pertinent part, an individual is treated as not married at the close of the taxable year if such individual's spouse was not a member of such individual's household during the last 6 months of the taxable year. Secs. 2(c), 7703(b)(3).

Petitioner testified that he and his wife were never legally separated but that they lived apart from September 1992 until 1996. Since he was not legally separated and his wife was a member of his household during July and August 1992, we find that petitioner was married at the close of his 1992 taxable year. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is not entitled to claim head of household filing status for 1992. Respondent's determination on this issue is sustained.

The second issue for decision is whether petitioner is entitled to a casualty loss deduction. Petitioner claimed a casualty loss in the amount of $33,321 on his 1992 amended return. After accounting for certain limitations, petitioner claimed a casualty loss deduction in the amount of $28,099.

Respondent disallowed the claimed deduction in the statutory notice of deficiency. Deductions are strictly a matter of *603 legislative grace, and petitioner bears the burden of proving his entitlement to any deductions claimed. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Petitioner's burden includes the requirement that he substantiate any deductions claimed. Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976).

Section 165(a) allows as a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise. In the case of an individual's nonbusiness property, the deduction is limited to losses that "arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft." Sec. 165(c)(3).

Section 165(h)(1) provides that any casualty loss deduction of an individual is allowed only to the extent that the amount of the loss arising from each casualty exceeds $100. Section 165(h)(2) further limits the deduction to the amount that the aggregate of the losses for the taxable year, in excess of the section 165(h)(1) limitation of $100 per casualty, *604

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Brown v. Commissioner, 1997 T.C. Memo. 520, 74 T.C.M. 1241, 1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 598 (tax 1997).

1997 T.C. Memo. 520 (Brown v. Commissioner) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Welch v. Helvering
290 U.S. 111 (Supreme Court, 1933)
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering
292 U.S. 435 (Supreme Court, 1934)
Helvering v. Owens
305 U.S. 468 (Supreme Court, 1939)
Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner
503 U.S. 79 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Cohan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
39 F.2d 540 (Second Circuit, 1930)
Hradesky v. Commissioner
65 T.C. 87 (U.S. Tax Court, 1975)
Lamphere v. Commissioner
70 T.C. 391 (U.S. Tax Court, 1978)
Vanicek v. Commissioner
85 T.C. No. 43 (U.S. Tax Court, 1985)