1 WO 2 3 4 5
9 Keri Lynn Brown, No. CV-22-00011-PHX-SMB
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Keri Lynn Brown’s Application for Social Security 16 Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) 17 under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1), and an 18 Opening Brief (Doc. 17), seeking judicial review of that denial. Defendant SSA 19 Commissioner (“Commissioner”) filed an Answering Brief (Doc. 21), to which Plaintiff 20 replied (Doc. 22). The Court has reviewed the parties’ briefs, the Administrative Record, 21 (Doc. 14), and the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision, (Doc. 14-3 at 14–24) and 22 will affirm the ALJ’s for the following reasons. 24 Plaintiff filed an Application for SSDI benefits in January 2019, alleging a disability 25 beginning in August 2018. (Doc. 14-3 at 14.) Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied in April 26 2019. (Id.) A telephonic hearing was held before ALJ Michael Comisky on November 6, 27 2020. (Id.) After considering the medical evidence and opinions, the ALJ determined that 28 Plaintiff suffered from severe impairments including affective disorder, anxiety disorder, 1 attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and 2 gastrointestinal disorders. (Id. at 17.) However, the ALJ concluded that, despite these 3 impairments, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the full 4 range of light work, with occasional contract with coworkers, supervisors, and the public. 5 (Id. at 19.) The ALJ also concluded Plaintiff “should not work directly with the public as 6 a primary job duty.” (Id.) Consequently, Plaintiff’s Application was again denied by the 7 ALJ on December 2, 2020. (Id. at 24.) Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 8 Request for Review of the ALJ’s decision—making it the final decision of the SSA 9 Commissioner (the “Commissioner”)—and this appeal followed. (Id. at 2.) 11 An ALJ’s factual findings “shall be conclusive if supported by substantial 12 evidence.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019). The Court may set aside 13 the Commissioner’s disability determination only if it is not supported by substantial 14 evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 15 Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 16 to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. Generally, “[w]here the 17 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the 18 ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 19 954 (9th Cir. 2002). In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court 20 reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 21 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). 23 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed harmful error in evaluating Plaintiff’s 24 symptom testimony and in weighing the medical opinion evidence. (Doc. 17 at 13, 21.) 25 The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence and 26 free of harmful legal error. (Doc. 21 at 7.) The Court has reviewed the medical and 27 administrative records and agrees with the Commissioner for the following reasons. 28 1 A. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony 2 An ALJ performs a two-step analysis to evaluate a claimant’s testimony regarding 3 pain and symptoms. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). First, the 4 ALJ evaluates whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 5 impairment that “could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or symptoms alleged.” 6 Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. 7 Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, 8 absent evidence of malingering, an ALJ may only discount a claimant’s allegations for 9 reasons that are “specific, clear and convincing” and supported by substantial evidence. 10 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 11 “[T]he ALJ must specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible 12 and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 13 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). General findings are insufficient. Id. “Although the 14 ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive, the ALJ must provide some reasoning in order for 15 [the Court] to meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions were supported by 16 substantial evidence.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th 17 Cir. 2014). “[T]he ALJ may consider inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or 18 between the testimony and the claimant’s conduct.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112. For 19 instance, the ALJ may consider “whether the claimant engages in daily activities 20 inconsistent with the alleged symptoms.” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040). 21 Plaintiff asserts the ALJ focused only on periodic improvements in Plaintiff’s 22 mental conditions, ignoring setbacks that indicated a lack of stability. (Doc. 17 at 15–16.) 23 The Commissioner responds that the medical evidence showed Plaintiff’s symptoms were 24 positive or well managed despite periodic difficulties. (Doc. 21 at 4.) 25 Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff had impairments and “experience[d] some limitations 26 as a result,” but the evidence did not indicate that her “limitations are totally work 27 preclusive.” (Doc. 14-3 at 20.) Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff showed improvement 28 with medication and psychiatric treatment. (Id.) Plaintiff described her depression in 1 January 2020 as “poorly controlled,” and within two months, Plaintiff’s treatment records 2 show her symptoms became mild and medications were “working well.” (Docs. 17 at 8; 3 14-15 at 7.) After a hospitalization for suicidal ideation, she was discharged as “safe, 4 stable, and in no acute distress,” and she “was not experiencing any difficulties with her 5 activities of daily living.” (Doc. 14-17 at 5–6.) While she continued to report suicidal 6 thoughts with a depressed and anxious mood, Plaintiff also presented appropriate 7 appearance and behavior, and she had intact attention span, memory, and intelligence. (Id. 8 at 14–17, 37–38.) In the following months, Plaintiff self-reported that her medications 9 were working well, and she was experiencing nearly no side effects. (Doc. 14-25 at 7.) 10 Plaintiff also expressed a desire to get a job. (Id.) As to future risks of self-harm or harm 11 to others, Plaintiff’s medical provider reported Plaintiff had “no major long term risk 12 factors.” (Id. at 8.) 13 Plaintiff disputes whether her daily living activities are inconsistent with her 14 reported symptoms. (Doc.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5
9 Keri Lynn Brown, No. CV-22-00011-PHX-SMB
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Keri Lynn Brown’s Application for Social Security 16 Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) 17 under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1), and an 18 Opening Brief (Doc. 17), seeking judicial review of that denial. Defendant SSA 19 Commissioner (“Commissioner”) filed an Answering Brief (Doc. 21), to which Plaintiff 20 replied (Doc. 22). The Court has reviewed the parties’ briefs, the Administrative Record, 21 (Doc. 14), and the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision, (Doc. 14-3 at 14–24) and 22 will affirm the ALJ’s for the following reasons. 24 Plaintiff filed an Application for SSDI benefits in January 2019, alleging a disability 25 beginning in August 2018. (Doc. 14-3 at 14.) Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied in April 26 2019. (Id.) A telephonic hearing was held before ALJ Michael Comisky on November 6, 27 2020. (Id.) After considering the medical evidence and opinions, the ALJ determined that 28 Plaintiff suffered from severe impairments including affective disorder, anxiety disorder, 1 attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and 2 gastrointestinal disorders. (Id. at 17.) However, the ALJ concluded that, despite these 3 impairments, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the full 4 range of light work, with occasional contract with coworkers, supervisors, and the public. 5 (Id. at 19.) The ALJ also concluded Plaintiff “should not work directly with the public as 6 a primary job duty.” (Id.) Consequently, Plaintiff’s Application was again denied by the 7 ALJ on December 2, 2020. (Id. at 24.) Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 8 Request for Review of the ALJ’s decision—making it the final decision of the SSA 9 Commissioner (the “Commissioner”)—and this appeal followed. (Id. at 2.) 11 An ALJ’s factual findings “shall be conclusive if supported by substantial 12 evidence.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019). The Court may set aside 13 the Commissioner’s disability determination only if it is not supported by substantial 14 evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 15 Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 16 to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. Generally, “[w]here the 17 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the 18 ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 19 954 (9th Cir. 2002). In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court 20 reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 21 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). 23 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed harmful error in evaluating Plaintiff’s 24 symptom testimony and in weighing the medical opinion evidence. (Doc. 17 at 13, 21.) 25 The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence and 26 free of harmful legal error. (Doc. 21 at 7.) The Court has reviewed the medical and 27 administrative records and agrees with the Commissioner for the following reasons. 28 1 A. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony 2 An ALJ performs a two-step analysis to evaluate a claimant’s testimony regarding 3 pain and symptoms. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). First, the 4 ALJ evaluates whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 5 impairment that “could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or symptoms alleged.” 6 Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. 7 Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, 8 absent evidence of malingering, an ALJ may only discount a claimant’s allegations for 9 reasons that are “specific, clear and convincing” and supported by substantial evidence. 10 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 11 “[T]he ALJ must specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible 12 and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 13 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). General findings are insufficient. Id. “Although the 14 ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive, the ALJ must provide some reasoning in order for 15 [the Court] to meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions were supported by 16 substantial evidence.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th 17 Cir. 2014). “[T]he ALJ may consider inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or 18 between the testimony and the claimant’s conduct.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112. For 19 instance, the ALJ may consider “whether the claimant engages in daily activities 20 inconsistent with the alleged symptoms.” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040). 21 Plaintiff asserts the ALJ focused only on periodic improvements in Plaintiff’s 22 mental conditions, ignoring setbacks that indicated a lack of stability. (Doc. 17 at 15–16.) 23 The Commissioner responds that the medical evidence showed Plaintiff’s symptoms were 24 positive or well managed despite periodic difficulties. (Doc. 21 at 4.) 25 Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff had impairments and “experience[d] some limitations 26 as a result,” but the evidence did not indicate that her “limitations are totally work 27 preclusive.” (Doc. 14-3 at 20.) Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff showed improvement 28 with medication and psychiatric treatment. (Id.) Plaintiff described her depression in 1 January 2020 as “poorly controlled,” and within two months, Plaintiff’s treatment records 2 show her symptoms became mild and medications were “working well.” (Docs. 17 at 8; 3 14-15 at 7.) After a hospitalization for suicidal ideation, she was discharged as “safe, 4 stable, and in no acute distress,” and she “was not experiencing any difficulties with her 5 activities of daily living.” (Doc. 14-17 at 5–6.) While she continued to report suicidal 6 thoughts with a depressed and anxious mood, Plaintiff also presented appropriate 7 appearance and behavior, and she had intact attention span, memory, and intelligence. (Id. 8 at 14–17, 37–38.) In the following months, Plaintiff self-reported that her medications 9 were working well, and she was experiencing nearly no side effects. (Doc. 14-25 at 7.) 10 Plaintiff also expressed a desire to get a job. (Id.) As to future risks of self-harm or harm 11 to others, Plaintiff’s medical provider reported Plaintiff had “no major long term risk 12 factors.” (Id. at 8.) 13 Plaintiff disputes whether her daily living activities are inconsistent with her 14 reported symptoms. (Doc. 17 at 17–18.) Plaintiff stated she went to the gym, hiked, left 15 the house, attended church, went out with friends, and researched graduate school 16 programs, but that the ALJ did not specify how these activities were inconsistent with 17 specific symptoms. (Id.) However, the ALJ did explain that Plaintiff alleged her mental 18 impairments would “prevent her from performing basic work-related activities.” (Doc. 14- 19 3 at 20.) The ALJ then found that Plaintiff’s “alleged disabling impairments” were not 20 consistent with her activities, in part because her activities showed she was capable of 21 living independently. (Id. at 20–21.) 22 The Court agrees with the Commissioner that the record contains substantial 23 evidence to support the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Plaintiff’s 24 treatment records show that despite considerable mental impairments, Plaintiff responded 25 well to treatment and medications. And the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s daily living 26 activities are inconsistent with her general assertion that she is unable to perform basic 27 work. 28 1 B. Evaluation of Medical Testimony 2 Claims, such as Plaintiff’s, that are filed on or after March 27, 2017, are subject to 3 amended regulations for evaluating medical evidence. See Revisions to Rules Regarding 4 Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017) (codified at 20 5 C.F.R. pts. 404 & 416). Plaintiff filed her claim in August 2017. Applying these new 6 regulations, the Ninth Circuit held that an ALJ “must ‘articulate . . . how persuasive’ it 7 finds ‘all of the medical opinions’ from each doctor or other source, and ‘explain how it 8 considered the supportability and consistency factors’ in reaching these findings.” See 9 Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up) (citing 20 C.F.R. 10 § 404.1520c(b)(2)). 11 Plaintiff argues the ALJ committed harmful error by relying on opinions from state 12 agency physicians who reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records but never examined her. (Doc. 13 17 at 21.) Plaintiff recognizes that the ALJ found those physicians’ opinions persuasive 14 and describes the ALJ’s analysis as a “mere endorsement of the nonexamining reviewers’ 15 opinions.” (Id. at 22.) The Court notes that Plaintiff concedes that the state agency 16 physicians provided the only medical opinions in this case. (Id.) (“[T]he state agency 17 reviewers’ opinions stand alone as the medical evaluation of the evidence.”). Plaintiff’s 18 dispute lies with the timing of the most recent opinion, which was provided in August 19 2019—before Plaintiff’s hospitalizations. (Id.) Plaintiff points to no medical evidence to 20 discredit these medical opinions as unsupported by or inconsistent with the record. See, 32 21 F.4th at 792. In the absence of a factual or legal basis to discount the state agency 22 physicians’ opinions, the Court finds no error. 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 2 Therefore, 3 IT IS ORDERED affirming the December 2, 2020 decision of the ALJ, as upheld 4|| by the Appeals Council. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 6 || consistent with this Order and close this case. 7 Dated this 22nd day of March, 2023. 8 ———> 9 ~~ — fe 10 > fonorable Susan M, Brovich 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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