BROWN v. COLUMBUS POLICE DEPARTMENT

M.D. Georgia

BROWN v. COLUMBUS POLICE DEPARTMENT

DecidedMay 16, 2022

Docket4:21-cv-00162

StatusUnknown

This text of BROWN v. COLUMBUS POLICE DEPARTMENT (BROWN v. COLUMBUS POLICE DEPARTMENT) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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BROWN v. COLUMBUS POLICE DEPARTMENT, (M.D. Ga. 2022).

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Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA COLUMBUS DIVISION

MICHAEL B. BROWN, *

Plaintiff, *

vs. * CASE NO. 4:21-CV-162 (CDL) COLUMBUS POLICE DEPARTMENT, et * al., * Defendant. *

O R D E R Pro se plaintiff Michael Brown filed this action asserting twenty counts against nearly three dozen defendants. Brown filed a complaint, plus at least six amended complaints/addenda to the complaints (ECF Nos. 1, 2, 8, 21, 77, 77-1, 78). Based on the Court’s careful review of the filings, Brown alleges that he was injured in a bicycle accident on October 15, 2020 and received medical treatment, that his elderly mother was forcibly removed from her home around the same time and was sent to a hospital, and that his mother later died in April 2021. Brown brought claims against various police officers and medical providers. Twenty- three of the defendants filed motions to dismiss. As discussed below, their motions to dismiss are all granted. The following Defendants did not file motions to dismiss the claims against them: Columbus Consolidated Government, Columbus Police Department, Columbus Fire Department, Officer Robert Hooks, Officer Kertavious Coppins, Officer Aaron Guillaume, Officer Rachel Blanks, Officer Seth Cole, and Kimberley Myhand. The claims against these Defendants remain pending. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD “To survive a motion to dismiss” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The complaint must include sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In other words, the factual allegations must “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 556. But “Rule 12(b)(6) does not permit dismissal of a well-pleaded complaint simply because ‘it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.’” Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556). FACTUAL BACKGROUND Brown’s filings are short on specific facts but long on arguments that are difficult to understand because of the lack of factual context. Brown’s “complaint” spans at least seven separate filings: the original complaint (ECF No. 1); the first amended complaint (ECF No. 2), which appears substantively identical to the original complaint and raises no new counts; the second amended complaint (ECF No. 8), which contains the names of several new defendants, with no additional factual allegations; the third amended complaint (ECF No. 21), which contains the names of several

new defendants, with no additional factual allegations; the fourth amended complaint, which was filed with leave of the Court (ECF No. 77); an attachment to the fourth amended complaint labeled summary conclusion (ECF No. 77-1); and the supplement to the fourth amended complaint (ECF No. 78). The original complaint begins with a short, vague introduction and then launches into twenty “counts.” A careful review of the original complaint allows the reader to conclude that Brown is asserting claims against Columbus Consolidated Government and specified police officers based on injuries suffered by Britton. Though the original complaint does not present the facts in a logical or clear manner, it is possible to

tell that Brown alleges that specified officers went to Britton’s house for a welfare check, that they forcibly removed Britton from her home, that Britton was injured, and that Britton later died of the injuries she sustained during the forcible removal. These allegations arguably give rise to Fourth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As Britton’s child, Brown may pursue a wrongful death action based on Britton’s death. O.C.G.A. § 51-4-2(a). The rest of the original complaint is much less clear, and the non-CCG Defendants filed motions to dismiss it, mainly because only a handful of the Defendants are even mentioned outside the caption of the original complaint. After several Defendants filed motions to dismiss Brown’s original complaint (and the first three

amendments), Brown sought and received leave to file a fourth amended complaint to clarify his claims. The Court advised Plaintiff that his “amended complaint should clearly and succinctly set forth the factual basis for his claims—including what happened, when it happened, where it happened, and which specific defendants did which acts.” Order 1 (Jan. 26, 2022), ECF No. 66. The Court emphasized that the “amended complaint should comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that’ Plaintiff ‘is entitled to relief,’ as well as ‘a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction’ and ‘a demand for the relief sought.’” Id. at 1. The Court also stated that the “amended

complaint should comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a), which requires a party to state his claims ‘in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances’ and states that if it would ‘promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count or defense.’” Id. at 1-2. The Court warned that the amended complaint would be Brown’s “last chance to comply with the rules for pleading claims in a civil action” and that failure “to comply with these requirements will result in dismissal of [his] complaint.” Id. at 2. Brown filed his fourth amended complaint (ECF No. 77), the summary conclusion (ECF No. 77-1), and the supplement (ECF No.

78). Defendants were permitted to supplement their motions to dismiss to address the amendments, and they contend that the complaint as amended still fails to state a claim. The Court addresses each motion in turn. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Brown’s complaints/addenda appear to assert three basic claim categories: (1) claims based on allegedly tortious conduct directed at him, (2) a wrongful death claim based on the death of his mother, Clara Virginia Britton, and (3) a survival action for Britton’s pre- death injuries. A survival action for Briton’s pre-death pain and suffering, however, must be brought by a personal representative of Britton’s estate. O.C.G.A. § 51-4-5(b); O.C.G.A. § 9-2-41.

Brown initially asserted claims on behalf of Britton’s estate, but he later filed an “amendment” dismissing claims he asserted on behalf of the estate (which the clerk docketed as a “motion” because it was combined with Brown’s motion to perfect service on another defendant). See Mot. at 2, ECF No. 83.

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