Brown v. City of Shreveport
Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-30971 Summary Calendar
HERSCHEL BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF SHREVEPORT; ROBERT W. WILLIAMS, Mayor, City of Shreveport; JERALD JONES, City Attorney for the City of Shreveport; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JANET RENO, U.S. Attorney General; MICHAEL D. SKINNER, U.S. Attorney,
Defendants-Appellees.
- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 96-CV-2343 - - - - - - - - - - August 31, 1998
Before DAVIS, DUHE’, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Herschel Brown appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
Voting Rights Act action. He argues that the district court
erred in dismissing his action against the United States, Janet
Reno, and Michael D. Skinner for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The district court for the District of Columbia
has exclusive jurisdiction over actions against federal officers
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. No. 97-30971 -2-
or employees challenging the enforcement of the Voting Rights
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(b); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 331 (1966). The district court did not err in
dismissing Brown’s action against the United States, Janet Reno,
and Michael Skinner for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Brown argues that the district court erred in dismissing his
action against the City of Shreveport and the city officials for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because Brown failed to
allege sufficient facts to meet the three threshold requirements
to establish a claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
the district court did not err in dismissing Brown’s Section 2
claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30, 48-51 (1986). Because Brown acknowledges that the City
submitted the redistricting plan to the United States Attorney
General for preclearance and that the Attorney General did not
object to the plan, the district court did not err in dismissing
Brown’s claim under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See 42
U.S.C. § 1973c. Brown has not alleged sufficient facts to state
a claim under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments that the
City’s redistricting plan was enacted with the purpose of
intentional discrimination against the black minority registered
voters or that an actual discriminatory effect resulted. See
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127-134 (1986); City of Mobile,
Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980). Further, Brown has
failed to allege sufficient facts to show that the City was
unresponsive to black registered voters. See Lodge v. Buxton, No. 97-30971 -3-
639 F.2d 1358, 1375 (5th Cir. Unit B. 1981), aff’d, 458 U.S. 613
(1982). Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing
Brown’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
AFFIRMED.
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