Brown v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Brown v. City of New York

246 A.D.2d 568, 667 N.Y.S.2d 286, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 455

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 20, 1998

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 246 A.D.2d 568 (Brown v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Brown v. City of New York, 246 A.D.2d 568, 667 N.Y.S.2d 286, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 455 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

Pincite

Opinion

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, (1) the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.), entered March 20, 1997, as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and (2) the plaintiffs cross-appeal from so much of the same order as denied their motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiffs were injured when they dove off the Steeplechase Pier on Coney Island into the ocean. They allege that the defendants City of New York and New York City Department of Parks and Recreation (hereinafter the City) are liable for their injuries because they failed to take reasonable steps to warn the public that the water around the pier was not deep enough for diving.

The City moved for summary judgment on the ground that, inter alia, any alleged negligence on its part was not a proximate cause of the accident. The plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The Supreme Court denied both motions. We affirm.

The City did not establish that the plaintiffs actually knew the depth of the water into which they dove, nor did it produce evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that, as a matter of law, a reasonable person in the plaintiffs’ position should have known the depth of the water at that location. The plaintiffs failed to establish as a matter of law that any negligence on the part of the City was a proximate cause of their accident. Under these circumstances, summary judgment is not warranted (see, Amatulli v Delhi Constr. Corp., 77 NY2d 525; Ziecker v Town of Orchard Park, 75 NY2d 761; Denkensohn v Davenport, 75 NY2d 25; Johnson v Cherry Grove Is. Mgt., 175 AD2d 827). Thompson, J. P., Joy, Florio and Luciano, JJ., concur.

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In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, (1) the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.), entered March 20, 1997, as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and (2) the plaintiffs cross-appeal from so much of the same order as denied their motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiffs were injured when they dove off the Steeplechase Pier on Coney Island into the ocean. They allege that the defendants City of New York and New York City Department of Parks and Recreation (hereinafter the City) are liable for their injuries because they failed to take reasonable steps to warn the public that the water around the pier was not deep enough for diving.

The City moved for summary judgment on the ground that, inter alia, any alleged negligence on its part was not a proximate cause of the accident. The plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The Supreme Court denied both motions. We affirm.

The City did not establish that the plaintiffs actually knew the depth of the water into which they dove, nor did it produce evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that, as a matter of law, a reasonable person in the plaintiffs’ position should have known the depth of the water at that location. The plaintiffs failed to establish as a matter of law that any negligence on the part of the City was a proximate cause of their accident. Under these circumstances, summary judgment is not warranted (see, Amatulli v Delhi Constr. Corp., 77 NY2d 525; Ziecker v Town of Orchard Park, 75 NY2d 761; Denkensohn v Davenport, 75 NY2d 25; Johnson v Cherry Grove Is. Mgt., 175 AD2d 827). Thompson, J. P., Joy, Florio and Luciano, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

246 A.D.2d 568, 667 N.Y.S.2d 286, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 455, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-1998.

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