Brown v. Brown

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Brown v. Brown

263 A.D.2d 455, 691 N.Y.S.2d 907, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7804

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 6, 1999

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 263 A.D.2d 455 (Brown v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Brown v. Brown, 263 A.D.2d 455, 691 N.Y.S.2d 907, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7804 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

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Opinion

—Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to prohibit the respondents from retrying the petitioner under Queens County Indictment No. 176/98 on the ground that retrial would violate his right not to be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, and application for leave to prosecute the proceeding as a poor person.

Ordered that the application is granted; and it is further,

Adjudged that the petition is denied and the proceeding is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.

The declaration of a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury is a matter of discretion for the trial court, which is in the best position to determine whether a mistrial is required under the circumstances of the case, and its decision must be accorded great deference (see, Matter of Plummer v Rothwax, 63 NY2d 243). The trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in declaring a mistrial, as the jury appeared to be genuinely deadlocked and it would have served no purpose to order them to continue to deliberate. Accordingly, there is no bar to a retrial (see, Matter of Plummer v Rothwax, supra; Matter of Martin v Hynes, 259 AD2d 547; Matter of Spivack v Brown, 259 AD2d 488).

The petitioner’s remaining contention is without merit. Joy, J. P., Krausman, H. Miller and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

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—Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to prohibit the respondents from retrying the petitioner under Queens County Indictment No. 176/98 on the ground that retrial would violate his right not to be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, and application for leave to prosecute the proceeding as a poor person.

Ordered that the application is granted; and it is further,

Adjudged that the petition is denied and the proceeding is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.

The declaration of a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury is a matter of discretion for the trial court, which is in the best position to determine whether a mistrial is required under the circumstances of the case, and its decision must be accorded great deference (see, Matter of Plummer v Rothwax, 63 NY2d 243). The trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in declaring a mistrial, as the jury appeared to be genuinely deadlocked and it would have served no purpose to order them to continue to deliberate. Accordingly, there is no bar to a retrial (see, Matter of Plummer v Rothwax, supra; Matter of Martin v Hynes, 259 AD2d 547; Matter of Spivack v Brown, 259 AD2d 488).

The petitioner’s remaining contention is without merit. Joy, J. P., Krausman, H. Miller and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

263 A.D.2d 455, 691 N.Y.S.2d 907, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7804, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-brown-nyappdiv-1999.

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