Brown v. Berrien

District of Columbia

Brown v. Berrien

923 F. Supp. 2d 43, 2013 WL 500587, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18156

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia

DecidedFebruary 5, 2013

DocketCivil Action No. 2013-0151

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 923 F. Supp. 2d 43 (Brown v. Berrien) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Brown v. Berrien, 923 F. Supp. 2d 43, 2013 WL 500587, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18156 (D.D.C. 2013).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on review of the plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis and pro se civil complaint. The Court will grant the application, and dismiss the complaint.

Plaintiff alleges that he sustained a head injury in February 2009 which exacerbated a preexisting cognitive disability. Compl. at 1. He attributes these injuries and their effects on his judgment and motor speed, as the causes for his failure to file his charge of discrimination within the 300-day limitations period. See id. at 2. Plaintiff claims that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission erred by summarily dismissing his charge of discrimination as untimely without taking his disability into account. Id.

“Congress has not authorized, either expressly or impliedly, a cause of action against the EEOC for the EEOC’s alleged negligence or other malfeasance in processing an employment discrimination charge.” Smith v. Casellas, 119 F.3d 33, 34 (D.C.Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 958, 118 S.Ct. 386, 139 L.Ed.2d 302 (1997); McCottrell v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 726 F.2d 350, 351 (7th Cir.1984) (“It is settled law, in this and other circuits, that Title VII does not provide either an express or implied cause of action against the EEOC to challenge its investigation and processing of a charge.”); Ward v. Equal Employment *44 Opportunity Comm’n, 719 F.2d 311, 313 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S.Ct. 2159, 80 L.Ed.2d 544 (1984). Nor is there a cause of action against the Chairperson of the EEOC arising from her handling of plaintiffs charge of discrimination. See Caraveo v. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 96 Fed.Appx. 738, 740 (2d Cir.2004) (affirming dismissal of claim against EEOC and its employees sued in their official capacities for their alleged failure to adequately investigate charges of disability discrimination); Svenson v. Thomas, 607 F.Supp. 1004, 1006 (D.D.C.1985) (concluding that the EEOC’s Chairman was not amenable to suit under Title VII or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act because there is no cause of action against the EEOC arising from its investigation or processing of a charge). The Court will therefore dismiss the instant complaint for its failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on review of the plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis and pro se civil complaint. The Court will grant the application, and dismiss the complaint.

Plaintiff alleges that he sustained a head injury in February 2009 which exacerbated a preexisting cognitive disability. Compl. at 1. He attributes these injuries and their effects on his judgment and motor speed, as the causes for his failure to file his charge of discrimination within the 300-day limitations period. See id. at 2. Plaintiff claims that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission erred by summarily dismissing his charge of discrimination as untimely without taking his disability into account. Id.

“Congress has not authorized, either expressly or impliedly, a cause of action against the EEOC for the EEOC’s alleged negligence or other malfeasance in processing an employment discrimination charge.” Smith v. Casellas, 119 F.3d 33, 34 (D.C.Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 958, 118 S.Ct. 386, 139 L.Ed.2d 302 (1997); McCottrell v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 726 F.2d 350, 351 (7th Cir.1984) (“It is settled law, in this and other circuits, that Title VII does not provide either an express or implied cause of action against the EEOC to challenge its investigation and processing of a charge.”); Ward v. Equal Employment *44 Opportunity Comm’n, 719 F.2d 311, 313 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S.Ct. 2159, 80 L.Ed.2d 544 (1984). Nor is there a cause of action against the Chairperson of the EEOC arising from her handling of plaintiffs charge of discrimination. See Caraveo v. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 96 Fed.Appx. 738, 740 (2d Cir.2004) (affirming dismissal of claim against EEOC and its employees sued in their official capacities for their alleged failure to adequately investigate charges of disability discrimination); Svenson v. Thomas, 607 F.Supp. 1004, 1006 (D.D.C.1985) (concluding that the EEOC’s Chairman was not amenable to suit under Title VII or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act because there is no cause of action against the EEOC arising from its investigation or processing of a charge). The Court will therefore dismiss the instant complaint for its failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

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923 F. Supp. 2d 43, 2013 WL 500587, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18156, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-berrien-dcd-2013.

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