RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0109P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 00a0109p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
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; FORREST ZAYNE BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 98-6481 STEPHEN MICHAEL RICHMOND, CHRISTOPHER > MICHAEL CROFT, and TONY Plaintiffs, LYNN MEADOWS,
v.
Defendant-Appellee. ALAN BARGERY,
1
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Jackson. No. 98-01217—James D. Todd, District Judge.
Submitted: February 2, 2000 Decided and Filed: March 27, 2000 Before: MERRITT, SILER, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
2 Brown, et al. v. Bargery No. 98-6481
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COUNSEL ON BRIEF: Forrest Zayne Brown, Chattanooga, Tennessee, pro se.
MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which MERRITT, J., joined. SILER, J. (pp. 9-10), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
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OPINION
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KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Forrest Zayne Brown, a Tennessee prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals a district court order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claim as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Because Brown’s complaint contains factual allegations and legal theories that conceivably implicate Eighth Amendment concerns, the district court erred when it dismissed the complaint as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, we believe the error was not harmless because the district court could not have properly dismissed Brown’s complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Thus, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment, and REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND Brown and three other inmates at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility brought this § 1983 suit against their warden, Alan Bargery, seeking equitable relief on grounds that the conditions at the prison violated their Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs alleged that the sleeping bunks located in one of the prison’s housing units had been improperly installed upside down, causing the inmates to slide 10 Brown, et al. v. Bargery No. 98-6481 No. 98-6481 Brown, et al. v. Bargery 3
I have had to go to the extremes of taking an old piece of off their bunks and land onto the concrete floor. Plaintiffs sheet, ripping it into strips, and actually tying my also alleged that the anchor bolts that fasten the bunks to the mattress onto the steel bunk so that it would no longer wall improperly protruded into their sleeping area, which slide off. could potentially cause an injury. Brown initially filed a grievance with the prison’s review committee, but the Thus, his bed has been taken care of. If the cruel and unusual grievance was denied after prison officials claimed that the punishment here is allowing the mattresses to slide off the sleeping bunks had been installed in accordance with the steel bunks, then inmates can easily cure the problem by tying manufacturer’s specifications. the mattresses in the very creative way suggested by Brown, or in some other fashion. On August 26, 1998, Brown and the other inmates filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Brown was the only That leaves as an issue only the bolts which stick out of the one of the inmates who properly completed and submitted an wall and upon which inmates occasionally scratch themselves. in forma pauperis affidavit and a prison trust fund account I do not see how protruding bolts can constitute cruel and statement. On September 22, 1998, the district court unusual punishment, even if they stick out over a bunk. They “screened” the case in accordance with the Prison Litigation are not spikes and they do not seem to protrude for any great Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), dismissing it sua sponte distance, according to the diagram in the record. pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) on grounds that the Eighth Amendment claim was frivolous. The district court also The Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons.” certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §11915(a)(3) that an appeal Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). The could not be taken in good faith. Brown now appeals the “officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, district court’s decision to dismiss his complaint as frivolous. clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer, II. ANALYSIS 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27) (1984)). The district court granted Brown’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and then dismissed his complaint as frivolous The officials in the institution involved in this case may pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).2 This court has held that have been unwise or negligent, but their conduct has not risen to the level of being deliberately indifferent under the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the 1 district court. Brown may appeal the district court’s dismissal of the complaint as frivolous even though the district court certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal could not be taken in good faith. See, e.g., McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997).
2
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) provides:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that– (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal– (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 4 Brown, et al. v. Bargery No. 98-6481 No. 98-6481 Brown, et al. v. Bargery 9
a district court should only use § 1915(e)(2) to screen a ______________ prisoner complaint in those instances where a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis. See Benson v.O’Brian, 179 DISSENT F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). Because Brown has requested ______________ leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court properly applied the screening requirements set forth in § 1915(e)(2) SILER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Although I agree that the to the allegations in this case.3 district court might have erroneously dismissed the case as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), I feel that we should We review de novo a judgment dismissing a suit as nevertheless affirm the decision of the district court because frivolous pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). McGore, Forrest Zayne Brown, the plaintiff, failed to state a claim 114 F.3d at 604. The Supreme Court has explained that a upon which relief may be granted under either 28 U.S.C. complaint should be dismissed as frivolous only if it lacks an § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) or 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law The Eighth Amendment only arises in prison conditions or fact if it contains factual allegations that are “fantastic or when an official is deliberately indifferent “to a substantial delusional” or if it is based on legal theories that are risk of serious harm to an inmate.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 indisputably meritless. Id. at 327-28; see also Lawler v. U.S. 825, 828 (1994). Even considering the evidence in the Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1199 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Examples of light most favorable to Brown, as we must in a motion to legal claims which are frivolous under Neitzke would be a dismiss, I do not see that there was a substantial risk of state prisoner’s assertion of an eighth amendment claim serious harm to Brown. The conditions of which he stemming from the actions of a state corrections officer complains are that the bunks are improperly installed in some against the United States Attorney General or a prisoner’s of the areas, including his cell in the prison, resulting in his assertion of a right to have a steak dinner once a week.”). falling out of bed and skin abrasions from the bolts which protrude from the wall near his bunk.
In Nietzke, the Supreme Court considered a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim I do not question the subjective test which the majority on grounds that the claim was frivolous. The plaintiff in states is required, because Brown has apparently brought the Nietzke, an inmate in the custody of the Indiana Department defective conditions to the attention of prison authorities. of Corrections, alleged that his Eighth Amendment rights had However, the objective test set out in Farmer is the one been violated by prison officials who repeatedly denied his which fails in this case. This is a simple case of alleged negligence. According to the district court, the plaintiffs could file a claim against the state on a negligence theory under Tennessee law, but a negligence claim is not actionable (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, from such relief. 298 (1991). Admittedly, the failure of the bunk as presently 3 installed without the lip on the upper side to retain the The district court should also have applied the screening mattress might cause mattresses to slip, when the inmate rolls requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), which are virtually identical to the screening requirements set forth in § 1915(e)(2). McGore about in his bed. However, Brown’s original complaint v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Section 1915A provided an excellent solution which any inmate who rolls applies in the present case because Brown is a prisoner who seeks redress about in his bed could effect. In his complaint, he states: from a government employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
8 Brown, et al. v. Bargery No. 98-6481 No. 98-6481 Brown, et al. v. Bargery 5
we must assume, for present purposes, that the beds in the requests for medical treatment. The district4 court screened specified housing units were improperly installed upside the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), dismissing the down, which would pose an unreasonable risk of future injury complaint as frivolous after it determined that these by causing inmates to fall from their bunks while asleep and allegations merely “described a constitutionally by subjecting inmates to the hazards of rolling into sharp noncognizable instance of medical malpractice.” Nietzke, 490 protruding mounting bolt studs. Pls.’ Compl. at 2. Moreover, U.S. at 321-22. In dismissing the complaint, the district court we must assume – based on Brown’s allegations concerning equated the standard for frivolousness with the standard for a his repeated attempts to notify prison officials about the dismissal for the failure to state a claim upon which relief conditions in his cell – that the warden knew about and may be granted. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the deliberately disregarded the risk to Brown’s health and safety. district court’s determination that the complaint was See Pls.’ Compl. at 2-5. Thus, we hold that the district court’s frivolous, and a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Brown’s complaint as frivolous was not harmless Seventh Circuit’s decision. The Court explained that “[w]hen because the district court could not have properly screened a complaint raises an arguable question of law which the this case under § 1915(e)(2) even if the district court had district court ultimately finds is correctly resolved against the articulated as its theory for dismissing the complaint the plaintiff, dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds is appropriate, rationale of failure to state a claim on which relief may be but dismissal on the basis of frivolousness is not.” Id. at 328. granted.
In the present case, the district court determined that III. CONCLUSION Brown’s personal safety claims were legally frivolous because his complaint did not satisfy the objective and subjective Because Brown’s complaint contains factual allegations components of an Eighth Amendment violation. Like the and legal theories that conceivably implicate Eighth district court in Nietzke, the district court in this case has Amendment concerns, the district court erred when it confused a dismissal on grounds that a complaint is frivolous dismissed the complaint as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). with a dismissal for the failure to state a claim upon which Furthermore, we believe the district court could not have relief may be granted. Indeed, it is important to remember properly dismissed Brown’s complaint pursuant to that Brown’s complaint is frivolous only if the legal theories § 1915(e)(2) even on the basis of failure to state a claim on raised in the complaint are indisputably meritless or if the which relief may be granted. Thus, we REVERSE the factual contentions are fantastic or delusional. Here, Brown’s district court’s judgment, and REMAND the case to the claims regarding the improperly installed sleeping bunks district court for further proceedings consistent with this could conceivably implicate Eighth Amendment concerns. opinion. See, e.g., Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 402-03 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment on inmate’s Eighth Amendment
4
Congress revised § 1915(d) and renumbered it as § 1915(e)(2) when it enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Although Congress has made several substantive changes to § 1915 since the Supreme Court’s decision in Nietzke, see, e.g., Benson, 179 F.3d at 1016, these changes do not affect the Court’s analysis so far as the decision attempts to clarify what is meant by the term “frivolous.”
6 Brown, et al. v. Bargery No. 98-6481 No. 98-6481 Brown, et al. v. Bargery 7
claims challenging the conditions of his confinement). Thus, inmate must show that prison officials had “a sufficiently we conclude that the district court erred when it dismissed culpable state of mind.” Id. (citations omitted). “In prison- Brown’s complaint as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). conditions cases that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id. (citations Furthermore, we believe that the district court’s decision to omitted). Although the deliberate indifference standard dismiss Brown’s complaint as frivolous does not amount to “describes a state of mind more blameworthy than a harmless error because the district court could not have negligence,” this standard is satisfied if “the official knows of properly dismissed Brown’s complaint pursuant to and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the § 1915(e)(2) even if it had articulated as its theory that official must both be aware of facts from which the inference Brown’s complaint failed to state a claim on which relief may could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, be granted. We review de novo a judgment dismissing a suit and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 835, 837. for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), viewing all the facts Here, Brown’s allegations regarding the improperly alleged in the complaint, as well as any inferences reasonably installed sleeping bunks deal primarily with a single problem drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the at the prison: the unsafe sleeping environment in which the plaintiff. McGore, 114 F.3d at 604. Dismissal of a complaint improperly installed bunks caused inmates to slide off their for the failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted bunks and land on the concrete cell floor and subjected is appropriate only if it appears beyond a doubt that the inmates to the hazzards of rolling into protruding anchor bolt plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that studs. Pls.’ Compl. at 2. These allegations are analogous to would entitle him to relief. See Sistrunk v. City of those made in Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 28 (1993), Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996) (“A motion to a case in which an inmate brought a § 1983 claim against dismiss may be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) ‘only if prison officials, alleging that these officials had violated his it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts Eighth Amendment rights by forcing him to share a cell with that could be proved consistent with the allegations.’”) another inmate who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day. (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)), The Supreme Court concluded that the inmate had sufficiently cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1251 (1997). alleged an Eighth Amendment claim because the Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from exhibiting Brown has sufficiently stated an Eighth Amendment claim deliberate indifference toward future health problems that an if he has alleged facts that, if proven, would show that prison inmate may develop as a result of current prison conditions. officials acted with “deliberate indifference” towards Id. at 35. As the Court explained, “[A plaintiff] states a cause conditions at the prison that created a substantial risk of of action under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); [defendants] have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him see also Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir. to levels of [Environmental Tobacco Smoke] that pose an 1997). This test involves both an objective and subjective unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health.” Id. component. The objective component requires an inmate to show that the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious.” Like the inmate in Helling, the plaintiffs in the present case Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citations omitted). As the Supreme have alleged facts that could conceivably show that the Court explained in Farmer, “[T]he inmate must show that he warden acted with deliberate indifference towards future is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of health problems that the inmates may develop as a result of serious harm.” Id. To satisfy the subjective component, an the unsafe sleeping conditions in their housing cells. Indeed,