Brown v. Bank of America

Fifth Circuit

Brown v. Bank of America

331 F. App'x 284

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedAugust 4, 2009

Docket08-11214

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 331 F. App'x 284 (Brown v. Bank of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Brown v. Bank of America, 331 F. App'x 284 (5th Cir. 2009).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM: *

Bryceson William Brown appeals the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of the Defendants. The district court found that Brown’s suit was time-barred because he failed to file suit within the required 90 days of receiving his “right to sue” letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). We AFFIRM.

*285 This Court reviews a summary judgment dismissal de novo. In a de novo review, an appeals court applies the same standards as the district court. See Williams v. Wynne, 533 F.3d 360, 365 (5th Cir.2008).

Title VII provides that claimants have ninety days to file a civil action after receipt of a notice of a right to sue from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(f)(1); Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir.2002). Brown stated in his deposition that he received his notice from the EEOC in the first week of September, which would have been no later than September 8, 2007. He filed his lawsuit on January 4, 2008, outside the 90-day window required by Title VII to bring a claim. The requirement to file a suit within 90 days of receiving the “right to sue” letter is strictly construed. Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379. Brown presented no evidence to refute his statement in his deposition. While Brown attempted to explain away the time conflict in his amended answer, “concluso-ry allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss,” Id. at 378. With no evidence to contradict Brown’s own assertions of the date of receipt of the letter, summary judgment in favor of the defendants is warranted. Because the suit is time-barred, we need not address the other issues raised by Brown on appeal. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 m Cut R. 47.5.4.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM: *

Bryceson William Brown appeals the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of the Defendants. The district court found that Brown’s suit was time-barred because he failed to file suit within the required 90 days of receiving his “right to sue” letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). We AFFIRM.

*285 This Court reviews a summary judgment dismissal de novo. In a de novo review, an appeals court applies the same standards as the district court. See Williams v. Wynne, 533 F.3d 360, 365 (5th Cir.2008).

Title VII provides that claimants have ninety days to file a civil action after receipt of a notice of a right to sue from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(f)(1); Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir.2002). Brown stated in his deposition that he received his notice from the EEOC in the first week of September, which would have been no later than September 8, 2007. He filed his lawsuit on January 4, 2008, outside the 90-day window required by Title VII to bring a claim. The requirement to file a suit within 90 days of receiving the “right to sue” letter is strictly construed. Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379. Brown presented no evidence to refute his statement in his deposition. While Brown attempted to explain away the time conflict in his amended answer, “concluso-ry allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss,” Id. at 378. With no evidence to contradict Brown’s own assertions of the date of receipt of the letter, summary judgment in favor of the defendants is warranted. Because the suit is time-barred, we need not address the other issues raised by Brown on appeal. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 m Cut R. 47.5.4.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

331 F. App'x 284, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-bank-of-america-ca5-2009.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack