Brown Root v. Hausenfluck

293 S.W. 842, 1927 Tex. App. LEXIS 171
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 23, 1927
DocketNo. 7094.
StatusPublished

This text of 293 S.W. 842 (Brown Root v. Hausenfluck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown Root v. Hausenfluck, 293 S.W. 842, 1927 Tex. App. LEXIS 171 (Tex. Ct. App. 1927).

Opinion

Appellants had a contract with Williamson county to construct in that county a portion of highway No. 74 between Florence and Georgetown, including the concrete bridges and culverts. They employed appellee, Hausenfluck, to supply on the ground the sand and gravel needed for the concrete structures. The work was completed and accepted and this suit is for a balance claimed by appellee for loading and hauling the sand and gravel accepted and used by appellants. Appellee sought to recover under contract, or, in the alternative, on quantum meruit, for labor and services performed. The case was submitted to a jury on special issues and judgment rendered on their findings in favor of appellee.

There is no dispute over the terms of the original contract. When it was made, all parties contemplated that the gravel would be obtained in a creek bed about half a mile distant from the section of road to be constructed, and that the sand would be obtained from the San Gabriel river near Georgetown, some 15 miles distant from the portion of the road to be constructed. Under the contract, appellee was to receive 50 cents per cubic yard for loading and washing said gravel and 6 cents per quarter mile per cubic yard for hauling same to the points needed, and 20 cents per cubic yard for loading and 6 cents per quarter mile for hauling *Page 843 the sand needed. The quantites of each hauled were to be arrived at on the basis of one cubic yard of gravel and one-half cubic yard of sand to each cubic yard of the completed concrete structures, plus 15 per cent. added thereto for wastage. It is also undisputed that the gravel originally intended to be used was rejected by the engineers as unfit. Thereupon search was made and suitable gravel located about 17 miles from the places where it was to be delivered. This gravel did not have to be washed, but contained, already mixed in its natural state, about one-half yard of sand to each yard of gravel. Consequently, it was not necessary to haul additional sand separately as originally contemplated by the parties.

Appellants pleaded, and one of them testified, that, when the gravel originally contemplated was rejected by the engineers, an agreed change was made in the original contract, under which appellee was to receive 20 cents for loading each cubic yard of the mixed sand and gravel and 6 cents per quarter mile for hauling same, on the basis of one cubic yard of the mixture to each cubic yard of concrete structure built, plus 15 per cent. additional for wastage. Appellee expressly denied any such change, and, in answer to special issues 1 and 2, the jury found that no such change was made. Their finding concludes that matter in this court.

It is of question 3 submitted to the jury that appellants make their chief complaint. This question was as follows:

"Was the gravel and sand hauled by the plaintiff all hauled under that portion of the terms and conditions of the contract of the parties that has been set out in the main charge which provides that the amount of gravel and sand hauled shall be determined by the amount of concrete work done on the basis of one cubic yard of gravel and one-half cubic yard of sand, plus 15 per cent. for wastage to each cubic yard of concrete work done?"

The jury answered it in the affirmative.

In his charge the trial court stated the terms of the original contract between the parties as set out above and that the gravel contemplated was rejected. In their first proposition appellants contend that this portion of the charge was upon the weight of the evidence and was calculated to mislead and confuse the jury. There is no merit in this. Appellants themselves admitted that the original contract was as stated. They did plead a change, as stated above, and this alleged change was submitted to the jury in almost the identical language of their pleadings. The contract of employment was admitted by appellants. And it is practically without dispute that for a cubic yard of concrete approximately one cubic yard of gravel and half as much sand was required. Hence there could be no occasion for changing the portion of the original contract relative to computing the quantity of materials hauled. Appellants admit that, regardless of controversies otherwise, appellee was to be allowed 15 per cent. additional to what was required, for wastage. And even if the contract had not provided the formula for ascertaining the quantities of sand and gravel hauled, under the undisputed evidence, in the absence of actual measurement while hauling same, the most accurate method of computation would have been on the basis stated. Hence, even if erroneous, no harm could have resulted to appellants from the jury's finding under question 3. This applies with equal force to issue No. 5 on the same subject.

The prices per yard for loading and hauling the sand and gravel originally contemplated could not apply to that actually hauled, for the reason that those prices included not only loading, but washing, the gravel, and hauling sand separately, all of which was rejected. The new materials then located required handling under entirely different conditions. The jury having found, under conflicting testimony, that no new price for loading and hauling was agreed upon after such rejection, only one issue remained; i. e., what was the reasonable value of appellee's services for hauling the sand and gravel accepted and used?

There were 1,062.89 cubic yards of concrete structure. Adding to this the 15 per cent. allowed for wastage, it amounts to 1,222.32 cubic yards. To construct this, appellee must have delivered approximately 1,222.32 yards of gravel and 611.16 yards of sand. If each cubic yard had been hauled separately, it would have required 1,833 loads. A cubic yard in volume of the mixture hauled by appellee in fact contained approximately one yard of gravel and a half yard of sand; the sand merely filling the voids in the gravel, and adding no extra volume. Appellants contend then that, if appellee hauled a yard of the mixture in each load, no labor was required to load it, and no more space required to haul it than if same had been pure gravel — in other words, that by hauling a cubic yard in a load only 1,222 loads would have been required to haul all the material — that the amount claimed by appellee is unreasonable; and that he should be paid for the volume yardage of the mixture hauled. His contention on this score was submitted to the jury in issue No. 7, and the claim of appellee was submitted in issue No. 8. These issues were as follows:

"Question No. 7: Was 20 cents per cubic yard for loading and 6 cents per quarter mile per cubic yard for hauling mixed gravel and sand from the pit on Rocky to the places of construction a reasonable price for loading and hauling each cubic yard of such mixed sand and gravel, the number of cubic yards of such mixed gravel and sand to be the number of cubic yards of concrete construction, plus 15 per cent?" *Page 844

"Question No. 8: Was 20 cents per cubic yard for loading and 6 cents per cubic yard for each quarter of a mile hauled, on the basis of one yard of gravel and one-half yard of sand, plus 15 per cent. for waste to each one yard of concrete work done, a reasonable cost for loading and hauling such sand and gravel where such sand and gravel was mixed when hauled, and afterwards screened on the job?"

The jury answered No. 7, "No," and No. 8. "Yes." No objection was made to the form or subject-matter of either question.

Appellants insist that the jury's answer to question No. 8 is without evidence to support it. We cannot agree with them. Witness Welborn, supervising engineer on that job testified as follows:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
293 S.W. 842, 1927 Tex. App. LEXIS 171, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-root-v-hausenfluck-texapp-1927.