Brown Jordan International Inc v. Dale Boles

375 F. App'x 700

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 13, 2010
• Docket: 09-55259, 09-55498
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Dale Boles appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for attorney’s fees. The district court determined that the motion was not timely. We affirm.

Boles’ request for fees followed the district court’s order denying a motion to reopen that had been filed by Brown Jordan International, Inc. (“BJI”). Review of that order makes it plain that it was a final determination of the motion. It fully adjudicated the issues and evidenced the district court’s ‘“intention that it be the court’s final act.’ ” Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1258 (9th Cir.2004); see also Ford v. MCI Commc’ns Corp. Health & Welfare Plan, 399 F.3d 1076, 1079-80 (9th Cir.2005); Beaudry Motor Co. v. Abko Props., Inc., 780 F.2d 751, 754-55 (9th Cir.1986). In fact, Boles’ motion for fees made it plain that he understood that the order was final. 1

Boles had fourteen days to file his motion for attorney’s fees, 2 but he did not file his motion until twenty-seven days after entry of the order. He, however, argues that the time to file his motion had not yet begun to run because no separate document setting forth the denial of the motion to reopen had been filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). In that Boles errs because the order was a denial of a motion for relief from a final order 3 for which no separate document was required. 4 It does not matter that B JI did not mention Rule 60 in its motion to reopen because the label on a motion has little or no significance. See Harvest v. Castro, 581 F.3d 737, 745-46 (9th Cir.2008); Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 879 F.2d 632, 635-36 (9th Cir.1989); Munden v. Ultra-Alaska Assocs., 849 F.2d 383, 386 (9th Cir.1988). What BJI sought here was a reopening so that it could demonstrate that Boles had repeatedly breached the prior settlement agreement and pursue further claims against him. That could be characterized as a motion for relief from a final judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); Keeling v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local Union 162, 937 F.2d 408, 410-11 (9th Cir.1991); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1017 (9th Cir.1998). The district court so characterized the motion to reopen, and, despite Boles’ later jeremiads, the terms of the order made it perfectly clear that the district court was deciding a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Thus, the time to request fees began to run when the order itself was entered, and Boles’ motion for fees was not timely. 5

AFFIRMED.

** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

1 . Boles alludes to other possible arguments regarding finality, but he has not developed those on appeal. We will not consider them. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929-30 (9th Cir.2003).

2 . See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i); see also C.D. Cal. R. 54-12.

3 . See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).

4 . See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a)(5).

5 . Because the district court did not err in deciding the issue, it did not abuse its discretion when it declined to reconsider. See Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1131-32 (9th Cir.2009).