UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
DEMETRIUS JAMAL BROWN,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-921
v. Honorable Maarten Vermaat
UNKNOWN SOLORIO et al.,
Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non
directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent
of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will partially dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim as detailed below. Discussion I. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Chippewa Correctional Facility in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following IBC personnel: Correctional Officer Solorio,
Warden Matt MaCauley, and Grievance Coordinator Unknown Brooke. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). In Plaintiff’s complaint, he alleges that on May 7, 2025, at around 5:00 p.m. at IBC, Defendant Solorio “was passing out dinner food trays.”2 (Id., PageID.3.) Defendant Solorio “opened [Plaintiff’s] food slot to give [Plaintiff his] food,” and “after [Plaintiff] received [his] food, [he] kept [his] hand in the food slot requesting to speak with a sergeant.”3 (Id.) Defendant Solorio told Plaintiff “no” and was “getting mad.” (Id.) Thereafter, Defendant Solorio “slammed
[Plaintiff’s] hand in [the] food slot knowing [Plaintiff’s] hand was holding it.” (Id.) Plaintiff “yell[ed] for help to release [his] hand out [of] the slot.” (Id.) Two to three minutes later, Defendant Solorio returned to Plaintiff’s cell and opened the food slot with his keys. (Id.) Approximately an hour after this incident, Plaintiff received medical treatment. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that his “hand was bleeding and swollen/broken.” (Id.) An unnamed non-party nurse told Plaintiff to wear a splint for his broken “hand/fingers” from May 7, 2025, to May 24, 2025. (Id.) At an unspecified time after the incident, non-party Sergeant Sissell told Plaintiff that “[Plaintiff] was on bullshit”; Plaintiff claims that non-party Sergeant Sissell later reviewed “the
body cam and s[aw that Plaintiff] wasn’t.” (Id. (phrasing in original retained).) Additionally, at an unspecified time after the incident with Defendant Solorio, Plaintiff filed a grievance about the matter, and “the grievance coordinator denied [them] to cover up [the] assaults.” (Id.)
2 In this opinion, the Court corrects the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation in quotations from Plaintiff’s complaint. 3 This practice is commonly known as taking one’s food slot “hostage.” An inmate takes his food slot “hostage” by preventing it from being closed, typically by placing his hand or arm in the slot. See, e.g., Earby v. Ray, 47 F. App’x 744, 745 (6th Cir. 2002). This action violates MDOC prison rules. See Annabel v. Armstrong, No. 1:09-cv-796, 2011 WL 3878379, at *4 n.5 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2011), R & R adopted by 2011 WL 3878385 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2011). Subsequently, at an unspecified time “when the warden knew [the] ombudsman was coming to see [Plaintiff], he made the nurses and [correctional officers] take [Plaintiff’s] splint when [Plaintiff’s] hand was still hurting and swollen to cover up [Plaintiff’s] second assault.”4 (Id.) Based on the foregoing allegations, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise an
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Solorio, Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process and § 1983 civil conspiracy claims against Defendant MaCauley, and First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendant Brooke. As relief, Plaintiff “want[s] to sue and justice be served for [the] physical and mental abuse [he has] been through.” (Id., PageID.4.) II. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
4 Plaintiff does not explain what he means by a “second assault.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) However, the Court notes that Plaintiff filed a prior case in this Court, which remains pending, in which he alleged that excessive force was used against him in January of 2025 while he was incarcerated at IBC. See Brown v. Mann, No. 1:25-cv-759 (W.D. Mich.). In light of this, it is possible that Plaintiff considers the events underlying the present complaint to be the “second assault” at IBC. However, that is not at all clear from Plaintiff’s present complaint. defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994). A. Defendant Solorio Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Solorio used excessive force against him when Defendant Solorio “slammed [Plaintiff’s] hand in [Plaintiff’s] food slot . . . .” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) As relevant to excessive force claims, the Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are “totally without penological justification.” Id. However, not every shove or restraint gives rise to a constitutional violation. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “On occasion, ‘[t]he maintenance of prison security and discipline may require that inmates be subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under common law.’” Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2002)). Prison officials nonetheless violate the Eighth Amendment when their “offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995)); Bailey v. Golladay, 421 F. App’x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2011). There is an objective component and a subjective component to Eighth Amendment claims. Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001)). First, “[t]he subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison officials.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383. Courts ask “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Second, “[t]he objective component requires the pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The objective
component requires a “contextual” investigation that is “responsive to ‘contemporary standards of decency.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). Although the extent of a prisoner’s injury may help determine the amount of force used by the prison official, it is not dispositive of whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). “When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . [w]hether or not significant injury is evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. In this action, Plaintiff alleges that on May 7, 2025, while Defendant Solorio was passing out food trays, Plaintiff “kept [his] hand in the food slot requesting to speak with a sergeant.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Solorio told Plaintiff “no” and was “getting mad.” (Id.) Defendant Solorio then “slammed [Plaintiff’s] hand in [the] food slot knowing [Plaintiff’s] hand was holding it.” (Id.) Subsequently, an unnamed non-party nurse told Plaintiff to wear a splint for his broken “hand/fingers” from May 7, 2025, to May 24, 2025. (Id.) At this stage of the proceedings, the Court must take Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true
and in the light most favorable to him. Although Plaintiff has by no means proven his claims, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Solorio at this time. See, e.g., Nelson v. Sharp, No. 96-2149, 1999 WL 520751, at *2 (6th Cir. July 14, 1999) (discussing that “the question of the degree of force used by the prison guard is analytically distinct from the question of whether [the prisoner] violated prison rules by keeping his hand in the food slot,” and concluding that a prisoner-plaintiff may be able to “prove that [a correctional officer] violated his Eighth Amendment rights by slamming the food slot door on his hand in such a manner as to inflict unnecessary pain in a wanton manner, not justified by prison necessity or the degree of violation”).
B. Defendant MaCauley Plaintiff alleges that at an unspecified time “when the warden knew [the] ombudsman was coming to see [Plaintiff], he made the nurses and [correctional officers] take [Plaintiff’s] splint when [Plaintiff’s] hand was still hurting and swollen to cover up [Plaintiff’s] . . . assault.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff does not discuss Defendant MaCauley by name in the body of his complaint; however, Plaintiff identifies Defendant MaCauley as the warden at IBC. (See id., PageID.2, 3.) The Court generously construes Plaintiff’s reference to “the warden” to be a reference to Defendant MaCauley, and the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim and a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim against Defendant MaCauley. As to any intended substantive due process claims, “[s]ubstantive due process . . . serves the goal of preventing governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used.” Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir. 1996)). Specifically, “[s]ubstantive due process ‘prevents the government from engaging in
conduct that shocks the conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). “Conduct shocks the conscience if it ‘violates the decencies of civilized conduct.’” Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 589 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998)). Here, although Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory manner that “when the warden knew [the] ombudsman was coming to see [Plaintiff], he made the nurses and [correctional officers] take [Plaintiff’s] splint when [Plaintiff’s] hand was still hurting,” Plaintiff alleges insufficient facts to support this conclusory assertion and to show that this was the reason he did not have his splint.
Under these circumstances, the facts alleged in the complaint fall short of showing the sort of egregious conduct that would support a substantive due process claim. Cf. Cale v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 943, 950 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that framing an inmate by planting evidence may violate substantive due process where a defendant’s conduct shocks the conscience and constitutes an “egregious abuse of governmental power”), overruled in other part by Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Accordingly, any intended Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim against Defendant MaCauley will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Further, to the extent that Plaintiff intended to raise a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim against Defendant MaCauley, as explained below, Plaintiff fails to state such a claim. A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is “an agreement between two or more persons to injure another by unlawful action.” See Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943–44 (6th Cir. 1985)). The plaintiff must show the existence of a single plan, that the
alleged coconspirator shared in the general conspiratorial objective to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right, and that an overt action committed in furtherance of the conspiracy caused an injury to the plaintiff. Id.; Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011). Moreover, a plaintiff must plead a conspiracy with particularity, as vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 (recognizing that allegations of conspiracy must be supported by allegations of fact that support a “plausible suggestion of conspiracy,” not merely a “possible” one); Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir. 2008); Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 2003); Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that any “agreement” or “plan” existed. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy are wholly conclusory. Plaintiff has a subjective belief that Defendant MaCauley and unnamed non-parties took actions against him; however, Plaintiff alleges no facts that indicate the existence of a plan, much less that any Defendant shared a conspiratorial objective. Plaintiff’s subjective belief and personal interpretation of the events, without supporting facts, are insufficient to show that Defendant MaCauley engaged in a conspiracy. As the United States Supreme Court has held, such allegations, while hinting at a sheer “possibility” of conspiracy, do not contain “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57. Instead, the Supreme Court has recognized that although parallel conduct may be consistent with an unlawful agreement, it is insufficient to state a claim where that conduct “was not only compatible with, but indeed was more likely explained by, lawful, unchoreographed . . . behavior.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567). Accordingly, because Plaintiff does not allege facts to show an
agreement among Defendant MaCauley and the unnamed non-parties, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible § 1983 civil conspiracy claim. Accordingly, for these reasons, all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant MaCauley will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. C. Defendant Brooke Plaintiff identifies Defendant Brooke as the grievance coordinator at IBC. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff does not discuss Defendant Brooke by name in the body of complaint; however, Plaintiff alleges that at an unspecified time after the incident with Defendant Solorio, Plaintiff filed a grievance about matter, and “the grievance coordinator denied [them] to cover up [the] assaults.” (Id., PageID.3.) The Court generously construes Plaintiff’s reference to
“the grievance coordinator” to be a reference to Defendant Brooke, and the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendant Brooke regarding Plaintiff’s use of the grievance procedure at IBC. Various courts have repeatedly held that there exists no constitutionally protected due process right to an effective prison grievance procedure. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003); Young v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x 568, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). And, Michigan law does not create a liberty interest in the grievance procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Keenan v. Marker, 23 F. App’x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2001); Wynn v. Wolf, No. 93-2411, 1994 WL 105907, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 1994). Thus, because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in the grievance process, any response, or lack thereof, to Plaintiff’s grievances did not deprive Plaintiff of due process. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff intended to allege that his right to petition the
government was violated by any interference with the grievance process, this right is not violated by a failure to process or act on his grievances. The First Amendment “right to petition the government does not guarantee a response to the petition or the right to compel government officials to act on or adopt a citizen’s views.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (holding the right to petition protects only the right to address government; the government may refuse to listen or respond). Defendant Brooke’s actions also did not bar Plaintiff from seeking a remedy for his grievances. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972). “A prisoner’s constitutional right to assert grievances typically is not violated when prison officials prohibit only ‘one of several ways in
which inmates may voice their complaints to, and seek relief, from prison officials’ while leaving a formal grievance procedure intact.” Griffin v. Berghuis, 563 F. App’x 411, 415–16 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 130 n.6 (1977)). Indeed, Plaintiff’s ability to seek redress is underscored by his pro se invocation of the judicial process. See Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Even if Plaintiff had been improperly prevented from filing a grievance, his right of access to the courts to petition for redress of his grievances (i.e., by filing a lawsuit) cannot be compromised by his inability to file institutional grievances. Cf. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 640–44 (2016) (reiterating that, if the prisoner is barred from pursuing a remedy by policy or by the interference of officials, the grievance process is not available, and exhaustion is not required). Accordingly, Defendant Brooke and any intended claims against Defendant Brooke will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Conclusion
The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Defendants MaCauley and Brooke will be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Solorio remains in the case. An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: September 4, 2025 /s/Maarten Vermaat Maarten Vermaat United States Magistrate Judge