Brower v. Schlott

68 F.2d 913, 98 A.L.R. 319, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 5024
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit·Decided January 8, 1934·No. No. 140·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinions

MANTON, Circuit Judge.

The Westchester Construction Company, a copartnership and contractors, performed public work for the State of New York in the erection of storm sewers. The sum of $26,-00.0 was claimed to be due to the bankrupts for the -work completed when the petition in bankruptcy was filed on April 29,1932. The state disputes the amount.

The appellee bank held an assignment of the money due on the contract and shortly prior to and immediately after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, some fourteen persons, firms, or corporations, claiming to have rendered services or furnished materials on this work, filed mechanics’ liens under the Lien Law of the state of New York (Consol. Laws, e. 33). When the petition in bankruptcy was filed, there was no action pending to foreclose any of the liens. The trustee moved, before the referee, for an order authorizing him to take all necessary proceedings to obtain the balance due from the state of New York and to direct that all lienors present their claims to said fund in the bankruptcy court for determination as to the validity thereof and asked for an injunction restraining the lienors from proceeding except in the bankruptcy court. The petition stated that the face amount of the claims exceeded the amount due from the State but alleged that some claims were invalid. On the return day of the order to show cause, ten lienors defaulted. The petition was resisted by two ap-pellees. Appellee Sehlott filed his lien August 19, 1932. On December 23, 1932, after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy and before this motion, he instituted a foreclosure proceeding of his mechanic’s lien in the Supreme Court of the State of New York. The referee, on motion of the appellees, dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, and this was confirmed by the District Judge. The petition does not state when the assignment to the bank was filed or when the other liens were filed, although the appellee bank asserts in its brief that the assignment was filed before the voluntary petition.

Two questions are presented by this appeal: (1) Whether the bankruptcy court obtained constructive possession of the debt due from the state when the petition in bankruptcy was filed; and (2) whether such possession in the bankruptcy court prevents the state court-from obtaining jurisdiction.

In Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734, 737, 51 S. Ct. 270, 271, 75 L. Ed. 645, the court announced that, upon adjudication, title to the bankrupt’s property vests in the trustee with actual or constructive possession and is placed in the custody of the bankruptcy court. Such possession and title of all the property of the bankrupt vests in the trustee as of the date of filing of the petition no matter where situated, within or without the district. Robertson v. Howard, 229 U. S. 254, 33 S. Ct. 854, 57 L. Ed. 1174. And as said in the Isaacs Case, supra: “It follows that the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the property of the bankrupt estate. * * * When this jurisdiction has attached, the court’s possession cannot be affected by actions brought in other courts.” So debts due the bankrupt by third parties are within the constructive ju[915] risdietion of the bankruptcy court. In re Roman, 23 F.(2d) 556 (C. C. A. 2); In re Borok, 50 F.(2d) 75, 77 (C. C. A. 2). In the latter case, this court said: “Were the trustee attempting to collect the accounts from the bankrupt’s debtors, he would have to- resort to a plenary suit; he could not claim to be in ‘possession of the property,’ for existence of the property, i. e., a valid chose in action, is tho issue in dispute. But where, as here, tho debtor is not in an adverse attitude toward the bankrupt and the dispute is he-tween the bankrupt’s trustee and the claimant of a lien upon the debt, we think the debt- or may he deemed to hold the debt for the bankrupt in the same sense that the Board of Trade held the seat for the bankrupt, and ‘possession’ of tho chose in action may be deemed to pass to the trustee in the one ease as much as in the other. So the bankruptcy court may draw to itself the summary determination of which claimant is the proper obligee of the chose in action.”

In the Isaacs Case it was said that another court may not proceed after bankruptcy if, by the petition, the bankruptcy court obtained custody of the property and here we must inquire whether the bankruptcy court obtained possession of tho debt duo from the state. The appellant claims that when tho petition was filed the debt from the state came into the possession of the bankruptcy court so far as determination of the claims of all lien-ors against the debt are concerned. This court has considered the bankruptcy court’s custody of choses in action. In re Hudson River Navigation Corp., 57 F.(2d) 175 (C. C. A. 2); In re Borok, supra. In the latter ease, the res was the bankrupt’s uncollected accounts receivable and we were called upon to determine the rights of the assignee of the accounts under an assignment before bankruptcy, which was given as security for a loan not then in default and which gave the assignor the right to collect and apply the accounts to his general purposes; the debtor not having been notified of the assignment. It was clear under that assignment that, as between the as-signee and the assignor, the bankrupt, the latter had complete dominion over the accounts at the time of bankruptcy and that dominion passed to the bankruptcy court, which thus obtained possession of the accounts as against the assignee. But the instant ease is somewhat different, for a question is presented whether the State as a debtor held the debt only for the bankrupt, at the time the petition was filed, and whether as between the appel-lees and the bankrupt the latter completely possessed and controlled the debt. As stated, tho lien of Schlott was not filed before the petition in bankruptcy, and it does not appear, except in tho statement contained in the brief, when the assignment was made to the bank.

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Brower v. Schlott, 68 F.2d 913, 98 A.L.R. 319, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 5024 (2d Cir. 1934).

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