Brower v. Mayor of New-York

3 Barb. 254
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJune 8, 1848
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 3 Barb. 254 (Brower v. Mayor of New-York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brower v. Mayor of New-York, 3 Barb. 254 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1848).

Opinion

Huexbut, J.

The premises known as the north battery, are owned by the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the city of New-York, and while as such owners, they enjoy, in respect to this property, all the rights to which private persons would be entitled, they are subject also to the same duties and obligations in respect to others owning adjacent lands, that the law imposes upon private persons owning real estate.

That the premises in question are held as a public trust, and that no private gain or profit is to be derived from their possession, does not in the least diminish, or vary, the duties and obligations of the common council, in respect to adjacent owners, whose rights may be injuriously affected by a particular mode of using this property. The great injunction of the law, addressed to all proprietors of real estate is, “ so use your own, as not to injure anotherand a municipal corporation owning lands is as much bound to the observation of this precept, as a private person.

The citizen, and the municipal body, in respect to their several possessions of real estate, stand upon a footing of equality; neither is a privileged owner, and each must fulfil the same duties in respect to the other. These duties arise out of, and are attached to, the ownership of the estate. In the owning of title to land, a municipal corporation exercises not a public, but a private function. It is what every citizen is competent to do, and what binds him to perform the obligations of a proprietor. The idea of the irresponsibility of such a corporation, or their lessees, which was urged by the learned counsel for the defendants, can only be entertained by the courts: where the [258]*258corporation is in the exercise of a purely governmental function; as when it is either declaring a law in a legislative capacity, or in a ministerial one, executing it, without injuriously affecting the property or the rights of particular persons. Wherever it may rightly declare a duty, prohibit an act, or enforce an obligation in a governmental capacity, there the municipal corporation, in respect to the thing done, acts instead of the state, and in a sovereign character, and so may be held to be irresponsible. But in these cases, the municipal body stands above, and is superior to, the citizen. Its relation to him is that of the governor to the subject, and it exercises a function which he cannot assume. It does not descend to his level, nor invade the humble walks of business, nor deal in property or things physical. It ordains law, and exacts obedience. As a lawgiver, a municipal corporation is irresponsible, and the court cannot interfere with its police regulations, which are ordained as laws for the observance of the citizen. But it can enforce the obligation which rests alike upon owners of land, whether corporations or individuals, so to use their property, as that adjacent proprietors shall be rendered secure in the enjoyment of their estates.

The corporation of the city of New-York has no more right to erect and maintain a nuisance on its lands, than a private person possesses.

This brings me to the consideration of the position of the commissioners of emigration, in respect to the proposed use of the north battery. They are to be regarded as lessees of the common council of the city, of the premises in question, and in that character alone, are subject to the same duties and obligations as their lessors, in respect to adjacent proprietors. But it is claimed that they are irresponsible; that they are acting under legal authority; that they have a right, in their discretion, to locate these docks and piers at the north battery, and that in the discharge of this public function, they are not responsible to private persons for their acts. It is true that they exercise functions conferred by law, some of which may be properly regarded as public; and that in respect to the subject of [259]*259complaint in this case, they are authorized by the statute of 11th April, 1848, to lease or purchase suitable docks or piers in the city of New-York, and to erect necessary enclosures thereon, and to appropriate them for the exclusive landing of emigrant alien passengers, first obtaining the approval and consent of the common council of the city. This law does not designate any particular dock as the fittest for the use of the commissioners, but leaves them free to select any suitable one, in any part of the city, in which it must have been known to the legislature, docks could be procured which are far removed from the densely settled portions of the town. The mere legislative license to procure a dock and use it for a particular purpose, when the location of it at one place would be a nuisance, and in another it would not, cannot be construed as an authority to locate the dock at the former place. It is not pretended, that beside the north battery, there is no other suitable place in the city, where emigrant passengers can be landed; ,nor even that that place is more convenient for the purposes of the commissioners than any other; and it seems to me that it cannot be claimed by the commissioners, that either by particular authority of law or by the necessity of the case, they have aright to insist on a location at the place in question, without respect to the rights of the adjacent proprietors.

• The commissioners of emigration, in respect to the possession of docks and the landing of passengers, may also be properly regarded as exercising a private function. The keeping of accommodations for this purpose is no more a governmental act, than the transportation of the same passengers across the sea; and as well might a ship authorized to carry a particular number of emigrant passengers, under statutory regulations, claim to be exempt from all responsibility for running down another ship on her passage, or for landing and exposing passengers in public thoroughfares, who were sick of dangerous and contagious diseases, as the commissioners of emigration in the present case. If the hand of government is to be seen in the employment of a dock by .them, it is that of a goverment engaged in the ordinary transactions of the citizen, owning'land [260]*260and devoting it to the common purpose of business; and its agents are to be held responsible, according to the grade of the function which they execute; rather than irresponsible on account of the supremacy of their principal. C( If a state embark in the business of a trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen.” (Bank of U. S. v. The Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. Rep. 904.)

It seems to me to be competent for this court to interfere for the purpose of preventing such an use of the north battery, by the owners and lessees of it, as would endanger the health, or seriously impair the comfort of the inhabitants of that vicinity; and the remaining question is, whether a case has been presented which demands the interposition of the court by way of injunction 1

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Bluebook (online)
3 Barb. 254, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brower-v-mayor-of-new-york-nysupct-1848.