Broussard v. Romero

607 So. 2d 979, 1992 WL 312835
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 29, 1992
Docket92-1278
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 607 So. 2d 979 (Broussard v. Romero) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Broussard v. Romero, 607 So. 2d 979, 1992 WL 312835 (La. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinion

607 So.2d 979 (1992)

Michael BROUSSARD
v.
Craig F. ROMERO.

No. 92-1278.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

October 29, 1992.

*980 Anthony Fazzio, Lafayette, for plaintiff/appellant.

Henry C. Perret, Lafayette, for defendant/appellee.

EN BANC.

This is an election contest. The plaintiff, Michael Broussard, filed this suit to disqualify the defendant, Craig Romero, as a candidate for election to the Louisiana State Senate, District 22, alleging that Mr. Romero had not been domiciled in the district for one year preceding the qualification date for the state senate race as required by Article 3, Section 4, Louisiana Constitution of 1974. The trial court ruled that Mr. Romero was an eligible candidate and the plaintiff has perfected this appeal.

The sole issue on appeal is whether Craig Romero has the domiciliary qualification necessary. In a similar election suit, Messer v. London, 438 So.2d 546 (La.1983), the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth the applicable law as follows:

LAW
Article 3, Section 4, Louisiana Constitution of 1974, requires that a candidate for the legislature must have been "actually domiciled for the preceding year" in the district from which he or she seeks election. LSA-R.S. 33:1225 provides that police jurors shall possess the same qualifications as members of the House of Representatives.
The general definition of domicile is contained in LSA-C.C. art. 38:
"The domicile of each citizen is in the parish wherein he has his principal establishment.
"The principal establishment is that in which he makes his habitual residence; if he resides alternately in several places, and nearly as much in one as in another, and has not declared his intention in the manner hereafter prescribed, any one of the said places where he resides may be considered as his principal establishment, at the option of the persons whose interests are thereby affected."
LSA-C.C. art. 41 deals with change of domicile:
"A change of domicile from one parish to another is produced by the act of residing in another parish, combined with the intention of making one's principal establishment there."
LSA-C.C. arts. 42 and 43 govern "proof of intent" to change domicile and state:

Article 42: "This intention is proved by an express declaration of it before the recorders of the parishes, from which and to which he shall intend to remove. "This declaration is made in writing, is signed by the party making it, and registered by the recorder."

Article 43: "In case this declaration is not made, the proof of this intention shall depend upon circumstances."

* * * * * *
Residence and domicile are not synonymous terms. A person can have several residences but only one domicile. Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 248 La. 246, 178 So.2d 238 (1965). Domicile is a person's principal domestic establishment,1 as contrasted to a business establishment. A man and wife are presumed to have the same domicile. Robinson v. Standard Oil Company of Louisiana, 194 La. 904, 195 So. 351 (1940).
A change in domicile occurs when there is a change in actual residence accompanied by an intention to make a new principal establishment or home. Succession of Rhea, 227 La. 214, 78 So.2d 838 (1955). There is a presumption against change of domicile. In Re Adoption of Rials, 220 La. 484, 56 So.2d 844 (1952).

The phrase "actually domiciled" in the Constitution of 1974 requires that one holding legislative office have a real rather than fictitious domicile in the area represented. However, the question of "intention", the crux of the preceding *981 codal articles, remains viable. See 5 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts 328.

When a person holds public office, the law presumes that his domicile continues in the place where he exercises his public functions. Oakey v. Eastin, 4 La. 69 (1832). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing a candidate to run for public office. Slocum v. DeWitt, 374 So.2d 755 (La.App. 3 Cir.1979). The burden of proof is on the party contesting candidacy.

The trial testimony showed that Craig Romero and his wife moved into a home in Coteau in 1984. This home was in District 22 and is located on property owned by his family's estate. This estate consists of one hundred acres mainly utilized to raise cattle. In 1986, Mrs. Romero built a home with her separate funds on property owned by her parents near Spanish Lake. This home is outside of District 22. The home is located within a few hundred yards of the home of Mrs. Romero's parents. According to the testimony of Mr. & Mrs. Romero, Mr. Romero chose to live at the Coteau home the majority of his time. According to Mrs. Romero's testimony, she and the children spent about one-half of their time at each residence, but that her husband spent most of his time at the Coteau home.

In the latter part of 1990 and the spring of 1991, Mr. Romero began to develop the property next to the Coteau home with the intention to ultimately build another home on this property. He tore fences down, put up electric fences, planted trees and grass, and graded the grounds.

In the summer of 1991, the Romeros had an argument as to whether to build an addition onto the Spanish Lake residence or continue developing the Coteau estate for their future home. The testimony revealed that Mrs. Romero desired to build the addition on the Spanish Lake home in order to remain close to her aging parents who had recently retired. The Romeros at that time had five children and the family was not comfortable living in the 1300 square foot home at Spanish Lake. Mr. Romero finally agreed to put the construction of the new home temporarily on hold, and the addition was built on the Spanish Lake home. During the construction of the addition the family lived at the Coteau home.

Other evidence introduced at trial showed that prior to the election of October 3, 1992, Mr. Romero voted in precincts which were outside of the Coteau home area. On July 15, 1992, Mr. Romero transferred his voting registration to his Coteau address. Mr. Romero's driver's license contained the Coteau address. Mr. Romero listed his Spanish Lake address as his domicile on the qualifying form which he presented at the time he qualified for the parish president election on July 17, 1987.

The trial court found that some of the evidence did cast suspicion as to Romero's Coteau domicile, but determined the preponderance of the evidence revealed the Coteau home to be his real domicile. The trial court found the testimony of the Romeros to be credible and supported by other evidence. (The trial court's reasons for judgment are attached to this opinion).

The law is clear and in this case the only question is a factual inquiry to determine what was Mr. Romero's intent. Although evidence was introduced to show his intent to change domicile in 1986, evidence was also introduced to negate such an intent. The trial court resolved the factual issue of intent in favor of Craig Romero. Unless a finding of fact by the trial court is manifestly erroneous, that finding of fact will not be disturbed on appeal. In this case, Mr. Broussard has not shown that the trial court's finding of fact is manifestly erroneous. All costs are assessed to appellant.

AFFIRMED.

ATTACHMENT

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Bluebook (online)
607 So. 2d 979, 1992 WL 312835, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/broussard-v-romero-lactapp-1992.