Broussard v. Lemons

186 F.R.D. 396, 44 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 745, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8373, 1999 WL 359771
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedFebruary 26, 1999
DocketNo. Civ.A. 98-0261
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 186 F.R.D. 396 (Broussard v. Lemons) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Broussard v. Lemons, 186 F.R.D. 396, 44 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 745, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8373, 1999 WL 359771 (W.D. La. 1999).

Opinion

DISCOVERY RULING

TYNES, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the court for determination in this personal-injury diversity action is a Motion for Contempt filed by Colonial Penn Insurance Company (“Colonial Penn”),1 which seeks compliance with a medical rec[397]*397ords subpoena which Colonial Penn served on January 15,1999 on The Louisiana Clinic, a medical facility and non-party to this action, and further seeks court ordered sanctions of $750.00 based on the Clinic’s failure to respond to the subpoena.2 Colonial Penn’s subpoena seeks production of color copies of eleven pain diagrams completed by the plaintiff while a patient at The Louisiana Clinic at no cost to Colonial Penn. Colonial Penn seeks production of these color copies at no cost to Colonial Penn contending, without citation of supporting authority, that no payment is required where medical records are made the subject of a federal subpoena. The Louisiana Clinic responded to the subpoena by faxing a letter to Colonial Penn’s counsel on January 28, 1999 advising that it would respond to the subpoena upon receipt of payment for the color copies in the amount of $110.00, citing as a basis for the advance payment, the fact that defense counsel’s law firm owes The Louisiana Clinic $1,098.06 for past unrelated copy costs, and $900,00 for the November 25,1998 deposition of Dr. Stephen Flood of The Louisiana Clinic taken relative to this action. The Louisiana Clinic further cites La.R.S. 40:1299.96 as a legal basis for the advance payment request. This Louisiana statute creates a right to obtain a patient’s medical records from a health care provider upon presentation of a patient signed authorization and payment of a reasonable copying fee, handling charge and actual postage.

Federal Procedural Law Governs Discovery Disputes in Diversity Actions

At the outset, the issue arises whether federal or state law governs this dispute. Clearly, federal law governs this discovery dispute as federal courts sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the state providing the law of decision while following federal procedural law. Bartley v. Euclid, Inc., 158 F.3d 261, 280 (5th Cir.1998), citing Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 2219, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996). Thus, Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which defines subpoena practice in federal courts, governs here.

Contempt Sanction Not Available Where Person Subpoenaed Timely Objects To Document Subpoena

Despite the fact that Colonial Penn has labeled it’s motion as one for contempt, the terms of F.R.C.P. 45(c)(2)(B) establish that no contempt is available where a subpoenaed person has timely objected to a document subpoena. F.R.C.P. 45(c)(2)(B); In re The Exxon Valdez, 142 F.R.D. 380, 384 (D.D.C.Cir.1992), citing Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 708 F.2d 492, 494 (9th Cir.1983). Rule 45(c)(2)(B) provides that a person who is served with a subpoena for production or inspection of documents then has fourteen days or before the time specified for compliance, whichever is greater, to serve the party seeking the documents with written objections. If written objections are served, the party seeking documents is not entitled to inspect or copy the materials, except pursuant to an order of the court from which the subpoena was issued. The letter which The Louisiana Clinic faxed to Colonial Penn on January 28, 1999 seeking advance payment for the subpoenaed documents constituted timely objections to the subpoena served on January 15, 1999, for purposes of Rule 45. Following receipt of The Louisiana Clinic’s objection letter, the obligation to seek a court order regarding the subpoena shifted to Colonial Penn. See David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary C4521, 28 U.S.C.A., Fed.R.Civ.P. 45 (“The servee can shift the burden of making a court application to the party who issued the subpoena, merely by serving written objections on that party.... By serving written objections, the servee suspends its obligation to comply until after the court rules on the seeking party’s motion, which would normally be a motion to compel.”) Under the circumstances, the motion for contempt is deemed a motion to compel.3

[398]*398 Rule 45(c)(2)(B) Requires Court To Protect Non-Parties From. Significant Expense of Inspection and Copying Commanded

Rule 45(c)(2)(B) states that “an order to compel production shall protect any person who is not a party or an officer of a party from significant expense resulting from the inspection and copying commanded.” Thus, because The Louisiana Clinic is not a party to the underlying lawsuit and has asserted timely objection to the subpoena, the court concludes that it must protect The Louisiana Clinic from significant expense. Although the expense of the eleven color copies subpoenaed here would not likely pose an undue burden to The Louisiana Clinic, the court concludes that it is appropriate to require the seeking party, Colonial Penn, to pay the reasonable costs and expenses of complying with the subpoena. Courts addressing the issue of how the costs of subpoena compliance should be allocated have consistently emphasized that non-parties who have no interest in a litigation should not be required to subsidize the costs of a litigation. See United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 666 F.2d 364, 371 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118, 102 S.Ct. 2929, 73 L.Ed.2d 1329 (1982); Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 183 F.R.D. 314 (D.D.C.Cir.1998) (“In addition to keeping nonparties from ‘being forced to subsidize an unreasonable share of the costs of litigation to which they were not a party’ United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., supra, Rule I5’s mandatory cost-shifting provisions promote the most efficient use of resources in the discovery process. When nonparties are forced to pay the costs of discovery, the requesting party has no incentive to deter it from engaging in fishing expeditions for marginally relevant material. Requesters forced to internalize the costs of discovery will be more inclined to make narrowly-tailored requests reflecting a reasonable balance between the likely relevance of the evidence that will be discovered and the costs of compliance. ”); In re Letters Rogatory, 144 F.R.D. 272, 278 (E.D.Pa.1992) (“... a mtnesses’ nonparty status is an important factor to be considered in determining whether to allocate discovery costs on the demanding or the producing party. ”).

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Bluebook (online)
186 F.R.D. 396, 44 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 745, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8373, 1999 WL 359771, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/broussard-v-lemons-lawd-1999.