Broullire v. Ingle

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: February 27, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-1403
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PATRICIA M. BROULLIRE,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 25-1403 (TJK)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Patricia Broullire alleges she was struck and injured by a car driven by Peter Ingle, a staffer

for Congressman Brendan Boyle. She also alleges that Ingle was distracted at the time of the

accident by Congressman Boyle, who was sitting in the front passenger seat. Broullire sued the

two for several forms of negligence in D.C. Superior Court. The Attorney General’s delegate then

certified that the two were acting within the scope of their employment when the accident

happened. So under the Westfall Act, the United States substituted itself as the sole defendant,

removed the case here, and maintains that the suit should proceed as if brought against it under the

Federal Tort Claims Act.

The United States now moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because

Broullire failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before suing. Broullire, for her part, moves

to remand, arguing that Ingle and Congressman Boyle were not acting within the scope of their

employment, and so the case should proceed where and against whom she originally filed it. The

Court concludes that Ingle and Congressman Boyle were acting within the scope of their

employment at the time of the accident, and that Broullire has not shown that jurisdictional

discovery on the question is warranted. Thus, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction because Broullire failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. I. Background

Broullire, a 68-year-old woman, alleges that in the early afternoon of March 1, 2023, she

was walking with her coworker in Georgetown. ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 6–7, 9, 11–12. At the same time,

Ingle, a staffer for Congressman Boyle, was allegedly parked in a “no parking zone” at Boyle’s

direction on the same street. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. As Broullire and her coworker walked behind the car,

Ingle backed into them, allegedly distracted because of a conversation with Congressman Boyle,

who was riding in the passenger seat. Id. ¶ 12. Ingle’s car hit both Broullire and her coworker and

allegedly did not stop until the coworker “began hitting the trunk of the vehicle and yelling for Mr.

Ingle to stop the vehicle.” Id. ¶ 15. Broullire alleges that she “was slammed to the pavement and

knocked unconscious” and suffered “multiple physical, cognitive, and permanent injuries,

including a crushed tibial plateau” and “a concussion.” Id. ¶¶ 16–17.

In March 2025, Broullire sued Ingle and Congressman Boyle in D.C. Superior Court. See

ECF No. 1-1 at 1, 12. She brought three claims: for negligence, gross negligence, and willful and

wanton negligence. Id. ¶¶ 36–56. The Attorney General’s delegate then certified that Ingle and

Boyle were acting within the scope of their federal employment at the time of the event, so it

substituted itself as the defendant for all claims against Ingle and Congressman Boyle, see ECF

No. 2, and removed the case here. ECF No. 1 ¶ 4 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2)). The United

States now moves to dismiss because Broullire did not exhaust her administrative remedies by

presenting her claims to the House of Representatives before suing, as required by the Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA”). ECF No. 3. Broullire moves to remand, arguing that Ingle and

Congressman Boyle were not acting within the scope of their employment. ECF No. 10.

II. Legal Standard

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power authorized

by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v.

2 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). Under Rule 12(b)(1)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court’s

jurisdiction when it is contested. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006).

In evaluating such a motion, the Court must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in

the complaint and . . . grant [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the

facts alleged.” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).

Whether a claim is barred by sovereign immunity is a question that goes to a court’s limited subject

matter jurisdiction, making it appropriate to raise in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. See, e.g., Schindler

Elevator Corp. v. WMATA, 16 F.4th 294, 296 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

III. Analysis

The parties appear to agree that both motions before the Court turn on the same question:

whether Ingle and Congressman Boyle were acting within the scope of their employment when

the accident happened. If they were, then Broullire’s negligence claims are governed by the FTCA.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). And in that case, she is out of luck. The FTCA bars all negligence

claims against the United States—in other words, it does not act as a waiver of sovereign

immunity—“unless the [plaintiff] shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal

agency,” in this case, the House of Representatives. § 2675(a). Broullire never claims she did.

See ECF No. 3-1; ECF No. 10 (failing to dispute the United States’s exhaustion argument). So the

Court would have to dismiss the case of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See McNeil v. United

States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). On the other hand, if Ingle and Congressman Boyle were not

acting within the scope of their employment, remand would be proper, and the case could proceed

against Ingle and Congressman Boyle. As explained below, the Court sides with the United States

so it will dismiss the case.

Under an amendment to the FTCA passed in 1988 known as the “Westfall Act,” “[t]he

3 Attorney General” is required to “defend any civil action or proceeding brought in any court

against any employee of the [Federal] Government . . . for any such damage or injury.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2679(c). So when a plaintiff sues a federal employee, the employee “shall deliver . . . all process

served upon him” to the Attorney General, id., whose delegate may then issue a “certification

. . . that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the

time of the incident out of which the claim arose,” id. § 2679(d)(2). Upon certification, the United

States steps into the employee’s shoes and “shall be substituted as the party defendant.” Id.

A plaintiff may contest the scope-of-employment certification before a district court.

Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 420, (1995). So the certification “does not

conclusively establish as correct the substitution of the United States as defendant.” Council on

Am. Islamic Rels. v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). “But it

does constitute prima facie evidence that the employee was acting within the scope of his

employment.” Id. “To rebut the certification and obtain discovery, a plaintiff must ‘alleg[e]

sufficient facts that, taken as true, would establish that the defendant[’s] actions exceeded the scope

of [his] employment.’” Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Stokes

v. Cross, 327 F.3d 1210, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). “If a plaintiff meets this pleading burden, he

may, if necessary, attain ‘limited discovery’ to resolve any factual disputes over jurisdiction.” Id.

(quoting Stokes, 327 F.3d at 1214, 1216). “Not every complaint will warrant further inquiry into

the scope-of-employment issue.” Stokes, 327 F.3d at 1216. But if the plaintiff cannot satisfy her

burden, then the substitution is taken as correct, and the suit “is governed by the Federal Tort

Claims Act.” Ballenger, 444 F.3d at 662.

The scope-of-employment analysis under the Westfall Act “is governed by District of

Columbia law.” Stokes, 327 F.3d at 1215. That law defines an employee’s conduct as within the

scope of his employment “if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it

4 occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; [and] (c) it is actuated, at least in

part, by a purpose to serve the master.”1 Moseley v. Second New St. Paul Baptist Church, 534

A.2d 346, 348 n.4 (D.C. 1987) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228(1) (1957)). The

D.C. Court of Appeals has construed this test “very expansively,” with even “seriously criminal

and violent conduct,” “including sexual harassment, a shooting, armed assault, and rape” being

held to “fall within the scope of a defendant’s employment under D.C. law.” Harbury v. Hayden,

522 F.3d 413, 422 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (collecting D.C. Court of Appeals cases). For this

reason, in the District of Columbia, “tort claims against federal government employees often

proceed against the Government itself under the FTCA.” Id. at 422 n.4.

In this case, the Attorney General’s delegate has certified that Ingle and Congressman

Boyle were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the accident. ECF No. 1-2.

Thus, to rebut the certification and obtain discovery, Broullire has the burden to allege specific

facts which, taken as true, would establish that the two were acting outside the scope of their

employment. She has not done so.

Broullire’s alleged facts fall into several different categories. First, she tries to rely merely

on distance—both temporal and physical—between the accident and some of the Congressman’s

formal duties at the U.S. Capitol. She alleges that the “the accident occurred in Georgetown during

the middle of the day.” ECF No. 10 at 9. And she points out that the Budget Committee, of which

Congressman Boyle was a member, did not meet that day, and the House of Representatives held

its last vote that day before noon. See ECF No. 16 at 5. Thus, she argues, the two could not have

been acting within the scope of their employment. Hardly. After all, the accident occurred in

1 The law also requires that “if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.” Moseley, 534 A.2d at 348 n.4. But Broullire does not allege that Ingle or Congressman Boyle injured her intentionally.

5 Washington, D.C. on a day the House of Representatives was in session. Common sense dictates

that a congressman’s duties are not as tightly constrained as Broullire suggests, as reflected by the

Congressional Handbook’s express acknowledgment that “official travel” can “include[] local

travel” within the District of Columbia. See ECF No. 12 at 5. In the end, nothing about Ingle and

Congressman Boyle’s presence in Georgetown around lunchtime that day establishes or even

supports an inference that they were acting outside “the authorized time and space limits” that they

were “employed to perform” and “actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve [the United

States].” Moseley, 534 A.2d at 348 n.4.

Second, Broullire attaches Federal Election Commission reports showing that

Congressman Boyle’s campaign committee received a few thousand dollars from four contributors

on March 1, 2023. See ECF No. 16 at 6; ECF No. 16-2. She asks the Court to infer from these

reports that Congressman Boyle was in Georgetown on that date to attend a campaign fundraiser.

That is not a plausible inference flowing from the specific facts that she alleges. Even the handful

of cherry-picked pages she attaches show that nothing about that date stands out; as reflected in

just those pages, Congressman Boyle’s committee also received contributions on eight other days

around that time. Broullire also points out that one of the four contributors—others listed addresses

in Illinois and New York—is an individual who listed a mailing address in the District of Columbia

and who is also linked to another address in Georgetown. See ECF No. 16 at 6. This is grasping

at straws. Nothing about the specific facts she alleges establishes or even supports an inference

that Ingle and Congressman Boyle were in Georgetown that day for fundraising or campaigning

reasons. And for what it is worth, the United States denies that such an event took place. ECF

No. 12 at 6.

Third, Broullire tries a different tack, arguing that “it is not [Ingle’s] official responsibility

to chauffeur a member of Congress.” ECF No. 10 at 10. But that Ingle was driving Congressman

6 Boyle in Washington, D.C. that afternoon does not imply that he was acting outside the scope of

his employment. To begin, nothing suggests that Ingle’s official duties or instructions did not

include acting as a driver for his boss when needed. In any case, under D.C. law an employee’s

conduct is within the scope of his employment “if that conduct is either ‘of the same general nature

as’ or ‘incidental to’ the conduct authorized” by the employer. Trump v. Caroll, 292 A.3d 220,

230 (D.C. 2023) (emphases added). Thus, a police officer’s discharge of his service revolver while

off duty at a party was held to be within the officer’s job-related duties because “[t]he weapon was

necessary to his carrying out the mandate of his employer that he be in a constant state of readiness

to take official action,” and “[t]he act of unholstering it”—which caused the discharge—“was

surely conduct incidental to that authorized.” District of Columbia v. Davis, 386 A.2d 1195, 1203

(D.C. 1978). Put another way, any conduct that is an “outgrowth of the employee[’s] instructions

or job assignments” is considered conduct that he is employed to perform. Carroll, 292 A.3d at

231–32. Under that standard, nothing about Ingle’s acting as a driver for Congressman Boyle

suggests that he was not employed to perform that role.

Fourth, Broullire points out that she has alleged that Ingle and Congressman Boyle acted

negligently in several specific ways. For example, she says that Congressman Boyle’s official

duties do not include “distracting Mr. Ingle.” ECF No. 10 at 9–10. And, she claims, “[i]dling in

a parked vehicle illegally . . . surely cannot be a governmental activity.” ECF No. 16 at 5. These

allegations do not help her either. As described above, the scope-of-employment test under D.C.

law is whether the type of conduct at issue is an outgrowth of the person’s job duties, regardless

of whether some specific aspect of that conduct is alleged to have been negligent or tortious. Thus,

when a congressman was sued for making allegedly defamatory statements during a phone call

with a reporter, the D.C. Circuit, applying D.C. law, clarified that “[t]he appropriate question . . . is

whether that telephone conversation—not the allegedly defamatory sentence—was the kind of

7 conduct [the congressman] was employed to perform.” Ballenger, 444 F.3d at 664.

Understood at the proper level of generality under the relevant test, Broullire’s allegations

of specific negligent conduct do not establish that Ingle and Congressman Boyle were acting

outside the scope of their employment, or even create such an inference. They do not suggest that

the type of conduct at issue for Congressman Boyle—speaking to his staffer—was outside the

scope of his official duties. Nor do they show, for reasons already explained, that Ingle’s “idling

in a parked vehicle” while driving Congressman Boyle that day was not, at a minimum, an

outgrowth of his job responsibilities.2

As her last redoubt, Broullire requests that if the Court “believes further facts are needed

to resolve the United States’ motion,” she should first receive “leave to conduct limited

jurisdictional discovery” before her suit is governed by the FTCA. ECF No. 10 at 11. She seeks

“[a]t a minimum . . . all documents that relate to [Ingle and Congressman Boyle’s] activities on

March 1, 2023 including their personal and official calendars, credit card or bank records, and any

personal or official text or email communications for that day.” Id. Her request misunderstands

the impact of the United States’s certification and the weight of the burden she bears at this step.

“[T]here is no right to even ‘limited discovery’ unless a plaintiff has made allegations sufficient to

2 Broullire also points out that “Ingle’s personal insurer (State Farm) accepted liability for the accident in writing” and that this “constitutes a waiver of . . . immunity under the Westfall Act.” ECF No. 16 at 5 & n.1 (citing Salus Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 478 A.2d 1067, 1069–70 (D.C. 1984)). Of course, Ingle’s personal insurer cannot waive sovereign immunity on behalf of the United States. And the Westfall Act is a mandate to “[t]he Attorney General,” who “shall defend any civil action or proceeding brought in any court against any employee of the Government” who acts within the scope of their employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c). The only relevant question at this point is whether Broullire has alleged specific facts which, taken as true, would establish that Ingle was acting outside the scope of his employment. The actions of Ingle’s personal insurer— and indeed, the ultimate wrongfulness of Ingle’s conduct—have nothing to do with that question. Moreover, that Ingle was driving a car registered to his father is insufficient to establish that Ingle was acting outside the scope of his employment as well.

8 rebut the Government’s certification.” Wuterich, 562 F.3d at 386. When, as here, there is an

“absence of such allegations”—and when the “discovery demands appear to be nothing more than

a fishing expedition for fact that might give rise to a viable scope-of-employment claim”—it would

flip the Westfall Act’s burden of proof “on its head” to permit discovery. Id. The Court declines

to do so.3

IV. Conclusion

For all the above reasons, the Court will grant the United States’s Motion to Dismiss, deny

Broullire’s Motion for Remand or in the Alternative, for Jurisdictional Discovery, deny Broullire’s

Motion Requesting Oral Argument, and dismiss the case. A separate order shall issue.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: February 27, 2026

3 Broullire also moves for a hearing on her motion. ECF No. 17. Whether to grant such a request is “within the discretion of the Court.” LCvR 78.1. The Court denies this request because a hearing will not assist the Court’s resolution of the motion, as the parties’ filings sufficiently address the issues presented.