Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen (Now Known as United Transportation Union) v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company
This text of 458 F.2d 1077 (Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen (Now Known as United Transportation Union) v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This matter grew out of a Complaint filed by plaintiff-appellee, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen (now known as United Transportation Union), seeking, inter alia, injunction against defendant-appellant, Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company, in which the Union asserted that Indiana Harbor violated an “understanding” between the parties, commonly called the “Home Terminal Agreement”, by transferring ten firemen from one terminal to another.
The District Judge, being of the opinion that this was not, as the Union con *1078 tended, a major dispute, but a minor dispute (properly a subject for a special adjustment board pursuant to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, Title 45 U.S.C. § 153 second) removed the cause from his calendar with leave to the Union to reinstate it, if appropriate, at a later time.
The Union and Indiana Harbor agreed to submit their dispute to binding arbitration under the Act. Special Board of Arbitration No. 128 was formed and it received written statements from both sides, after which it issued its ruling “Award No. 1.” 2 When the Union *1079 sought interpretation of that Award, the Board replied that it was “clear.” 3 The award seems clear and unambiguous to this Court. However, the Union moved to reinstate and to amend its Complaint to include a petition to enforce or review the Award. Other motions and affidavits were filed by both parties, which we need not detail here. The Union ultimately moved for summary judgment to enforce the Award.
The “Home Terminal Agreement” which was embodied in a “Memorandum of Understanding” 4 effective August 1, *1080 1965, which was a supplement to the collective bargaining agreement in force between the Union and Indiana Harbor, allowed each engineer and firemen qualified to work as an engineer to designate one of the Indiana Harbor terminals as *1081 a “home” terminal to which he would report to begin and end his tour of duty. This understanding provided that where there were insufficient engineers or firemen qualified as engineers to fill vacancies at a particular terminal, others so qualified would be added by promotions at the terminal where the vacancies arose, and if there were no such qualified personnel at that terminal, then the junior available qualified personnel at another terminal would be required to work when and where needed.
It was further specifically provided that operation of this understanding was not to result in additional expense to Indiana Harbor. Yet in May, 1967, according to the affidavit of Indiana Harbor’s Assistant General Manager, there were about three 8-hour switching assignments at the Norpaul terminal where a majority of the firemen assignments averaged 12 hours per day, while the Blue Island terminal had about twenty-five 8-hour assignments, many of which were not filled. Because of overtime payments to firemen at Norpaul, Indiana Harbor incurred substantial additional operating expense.
Accordingly, on May 29, and May 30, 1967, Indiana Harbor transferred the ten firemen here involved, from Norpaul to Blue Island by abolishing ten firemen assignments at Norpaul and ordering the ten men to Blue Island. Shortly afterward, the Union filed this action.
The dispute presented to the Special Adjustment Board (as quoted in the Interpretation Award No. 1, paragraph 2 3) makes no reference to damages, although the Union’s written statement to the Board included affidavits respecting money damages, consisting principally of increased cost of travel to Blue Island as compared to Norpaul and decreased total earnings there. Some claims for additional amounts were presented administratively to Indiana Harbor, on an allegation that the Home Terminal Agreement had been violated, but these were not carried further, and, under the provisions of the time limit in the Claims Agreement between the parties, it was Indiana Harbor’s position that these claims were not before the Board for adjudication. The Award does not refer to them.
After issuance of Award No. 1 and Interpretation Award No. 1, Indiana Harbor abolished six firemen jobs at Norpaul and allowed the six firemen affected to exercised their seniority at the other terminals, subsequently abolishing another six such jobs and allowing those firemen affected to do the same.
The District Court granted that part of the Union’s motion for summary judgment relating to Indiana Harbor’s right to transfer firemen from one terminal to another and ordered the affected employees restored. The District Judge denied that motion insofar as it sought damages, on the theory that these should be determined in an adversary proceeding.
The District Judge agreed with the Union that the Award directed Indiana Harbor to adhere to the Home Terminal Agreement in its assignment of engineers and firemen qualified to work as engineers. He also interpreted the Award to hold that Indiana Harbor could not abolish the jobs of those men and thus do by indirection what the Court saw as not permitted to be done directly. We do not so read the Award.
Indiana Harbor urges us to review not only the injunctive portion of the District Court’s Order, on the ground that compliance therewith will result in irreparable damage to Indiana Harbor, but also the prior interlocutory orders denying Indiana Harbor’s motion to remand to the Board and to strike the Union’s affidavit filed in support of its motion for summary judgment, and further asks us to consider the issue of the propriety of the District Court’s jurisdiction to determine damages. With the exception of the injunctive question, we reach none of these issues.
As we read it, Award No. 1, after setting out the statement of claim presented to it, holds (1) that the firemen at Norpaul were subject to the provisions of the earlier Award of Arbitration *1082 Board 282, (2) that there is only one seniority district including all the terminals here involved, and (3) that the ten men affected were not the most junior men on that single seniority roster.
The Award goes on specifically to approve and agree with Indiana Harbor’s position on its right to determine which jobs to abolish, but adds that Indiana Harbor may not disregard the seniority rules by selecting a particular man at random and transferring him without regard to his seniority.
Then, the Award sets out the Union’s position, but says nothing about agreeing with it. On the contrary the Board sustains the protest on a different ground: that Indiana Harbor, without negotiation and agreement, unilaterally assigned firemen from one terminal to another without reference to their standing on the seniority roster.
Accordingly, it is the conclusion of this Court that the Summary Judgment entered in favor of the Union must be reversed and this cause remanded to the District Court to enter judgment for Indiana Harbor.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
458 F.2d 1077, 79 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3020, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 10331, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brotherhood-of-locomotive-firemen-enginemen-now-known-as-united-ca7-1972.