1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 AUNTRELL BROOKS, Case No. 18-cv-04578-DMR
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. AMEND AND REMANDING CASE TO ALAMEDA COUNTY SUPERIOR 10 THE GEO GROUP, INC., COURT 11 Defendant. Re: Dkt. No. 38
12 Plaintiff Auntrell Brooks moves for leave to file a first amended complaint (“FAC”) 13 adding two new defendants, and to remand this action in the event the court grants him leave to 14 amend. [Docket No. 38.] The court held a hearing on July 31, 2019, and ordered Brooks to file a 15 new proposed FAC that includes citizenship allegations for the two proposed defendants, which 16 Brooks timely filed. [Docket Nos. 55, 57 (Proposed FAC).] For the following reasons, the motion 17 is granted and this matter is remanded to Alameda County Superior Court. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Brooks, a citizen of California (see Docket No. 57), filed this action against Defendant The 20 Geo Group, Inc. dba GEO California, Inc. (“GEO”) and Does 1-60 in Alameda County Superior 21 Court on June 20, 2018, alleging claims for premises liability and negligence. Brooks alleges that 22 on June 25, 2016 he was injured at a residential facility in Oakland, California operated by GEO 23 (“the premises”). See generally Compl. GEO, which is headquartered in Florida, removed the 24 action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 25 At the time he filed the complaint, Brooks did not know the names of the GEO employees 26 and/or agents responsible for overseeing and maintaining the premises on the date of the incident. 27 [Docket No. 38 (Vaysberg Decl., May 24, 2019) ¶ 4.] Therefore, he named several Doe 1 Brooks’s counsel learned the names of the two GEO agents that Brooks contends were negligent. 2 Vaysberg Decl. ¶ 5. Both individuals, Matthew Lange and Reginald Peterson, are citizens of 3 California. [See Docket No. 57; Proposed FAC ¶¶ 5, 6.] Brooks alleges that on the date of the 4 incident, Lange was the Facility Director and Peterson was responsible for maintenance and 5 cleaning at the premises. Proposed FAC ¶¶ 8, 9. 6 Brooks moves to join Lange and Peterson as defendants for his negligence claim. He 7 argues that Lange and Peterson are necessary parties under Rule 19(a) “as they are joint tortfeasors 8 who were active participants in the allegations that are critical to the disposition of the important issues of this case.” Mot. 5. In the event that the court grants Brooks’s motion for leave to amend 9 the complaint to add Lange and Peterson, he also moves to remand this action on the ground that 10 diversity jurisdiction no longer exists due to the joinder of Lange and Peterson. 11 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the 13 district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or 14 other defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing 15 the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A district court has diversity 16 jurisdiction where the parties are “citizens of different States” and “the matter in controversy 17 exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 18 If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would 19 destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court has discretion to deny joinder, or permit joinder and 20 remand the case to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e); Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 21 691 (9th Cir. 1998). When determining whether to permit joinder under Section 1447(e), courts 22 generally consider the following six factors: 1) whether the party plaintiff seeks to join is needed 23 for just adjudication and would be subject to joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a); 24 2) whether the statute of limitations would preclude an action against the new defendants in state 25 court if the court denied joinder; 3) whether there has been unexplained delay in seeking joinder; 26 4) whether joinder is sought solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction; 5) whether the claim(s) against 27 1 Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 2 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citations omitted). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 GEO argues that the court should deny joinder of Lange and Peterson because they are not 5 necessary for just adjudication of the case. It also argues that Brooks seeks to join the two 6 individuals as defendants solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction. 7 A. Joinder Under Rule 19(a) 8 Rule 19(a) governs joinder of necessary parties. It requires joinder of persons whose 9 absence would preclude the grant of complete relief, impede their ability to protect their interests, 10 or subject a party to the danger of inconsistent obligations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). “Although 11 courts consider whether a party would meet [Rule] 19’s standard for a necessary party, 12 amendment under § 1447(e) is a less restrictive standard than for joinder under [Rule] 19.” IBC, 13 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1011-12. “Courts disallow joinder of non-diverse defendants where those 14 defendants are only tangentially related to the cause of action or would not prevent complete 15 relief.” Id. 16 Here, Brooks alleges that Lange “was responsible for overseeing the Premises and 17 protecting residents from dangerous conditions,” and that Peterson “was responsible for 18 maintenance of and overseeing cleaning of the location of the incident on the Premises at the time 19 of the incident.” Proposed FAC ¶¶ 8, 9. He alleges that Lange, Peterson, and GEO, “had a legal 20 duty of care to Plaintiff to keep the Premises safe for entry and/or use by Plaintiff, to give 21 adequate warning of hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on said Premises to 22 Plaintiff at the time of entry or use of said Premises, and to avoid causing injury or harm to 23 Plaintiff as herein alleged.” Id. at ¶ 17. Brooks alleges that “Defendants created an unsafe 24 condition by washing carpet where the incident occurred,” because “[t]he metal nosing at the top 25 landing [of the stairway at issue] was slippery when wet and was wet at the time of the incident” 26 and “[t]he handrail did not extend to or beyond the top riser” in violation of the applicable 27 building code. Id. at ¶ 19. Further, Defendants did not adequately cordon off the area or use 1 more than “tangentially related” to the negligence claim. 2 GEO argues that Lange and Peterson are not necessary parties, asserting that Brooks can 3 obtain complete relief without them. It asserts that “[c]laims of premises liability and negligence 4 are routinely brought against private corporations, and an individual is not needed,” and that 5 “GEO is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees[.]” Opp’n 1, 3.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 AUNTRELL BROOKS, Case No. 18-cv-04578-DMR
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. AMEND AND REMANDING CASE TO ALAMEDA COUNTY SUPERIOR 10 THE GEO GROUP, INC., COURT 11 Defendant. Re: Dkt. No. 38
12 Plaintiff Auntrell Brooks moves for leave to file a first amended complaint (“FAC”) 13 adding two new defendants, and to remand this action in the event the court grants him leave to 14 amend. [Docket No. 38.] The court held a hearing on July 31, 2019, and ordered Brooks to file a 15 new proposed FAC that includes citizenship allegations for the two proposed defendants, which 16 Brooks timely filed. [Docket Nos. 55, 57 (Proposed FAC).] For the following reasons, the motion 17 is granted and this matter is remanded to Alameda County Superior Court. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Brooks, a citizen of California (see Docket No. 57), filed this action against Defendant The 20 Geo Group, Inc. dba GEO California, Inc. (“GEO”) and Does 1-60 in Alameda County Superior 21 Court on June 20, 2018, alleging claims for premises liability and negligence. Brooks alleges that 22 on June 25, 2016 he was injured at a residential facility in Oakland, California operated by GEO 23 (“the premises”). See generally Compl. GEO, which is headquartered in Florida, removed the 24 action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 25 At the time he filed the complaint, Brooks did not know the names of the GEO employees 26 and/or agents responsible for overseeing and maintaining the premises on the date of the incident. 27 [Docket No. 38 (Vaysberg Decl., May 24, 2019) ¶ 4.] Therefore, he named several Doe 1 Brooks’s counsel learned the names of the two GEO agents that Brooks contends were negligent. 2 Vaysberg Decl. ¶ 5. Both individuals, Matthew Lange and Reginald Peterson, are citizens of 3 California. [See Docket No. 57; Proposed FAC ¶¶ 5, 6.] Brooks alleges that on the date of the 4 incident, Lange was the Facility Director and Peterson was responsible for maintenance and 5 cleaning at the premises. Proposed FAC ¶¶ 8, 9. 6 Brooks moves to join Lange and Peterson as defendants for his negligence claim. He 7 argues that Lange and Peterson are necessary parties under Rule 19(a) “as they are joint tortfeasors 8 who were active participants in the allegations that are critical to the disposition of the important issues of this case.” Mot. 5. In the event that the court grants Brooks’s motion for leave to amend 9 the complaint to add Lange and Peterson, he also moves to remand this action on the ground that 10 diversity jurisdiction no longer exists due to the joinder of Lange and Peterson. 11 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the 13 district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or 14 other defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing 15 the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A district court has diversity 16 jurisdiction where the parties are “citizens of different States” and “the matter in controversy 17 exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 18 If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would 19 destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court has discretion to deny joinder, or permit joinder and 20 remand the case to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e); Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 21 691 (9th Cir. 1998). When determining whether to permit joinder under Section 1447(e), courts 22 generally consider the following six factors: 1) whether the party plaintiff seeks to join is needed 23 for just adjudication and would be subject to joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a); 24 2) whether the statute of limitations would preclude an action against the new defendants in state 25 court if the court denied joinder; 3) whether there has been unexplained delay in seeking joinder; 26 4) whether joinder is sought solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction; 5) whether the claim(s) against 27 1 Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 2 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citations omitted). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 GEO argues that the court should deny joinder of Lange and Peterson because they are not 5 necessary for just adjudication of the case. It also argues that Brooks seeks to join the two 6 individuals as defendants solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction. 7 A. Joinder Under Rule 19(a) 8 Rule 19(a) governs joinder of necessary parties. It requires joinder of persons whose 9 absence would preclude the grant of complete relief, impede their ability to protect their interests, 10 or subject a party to the danger of inconsistent obligations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). “Although 11 courts consider whether a party would meet [Rule] 19’s standard for a necessary party, 12 amendment under § 1447(e) is a less restrictive standard than for joinder under [Rule] 19.” IBC, 13 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1011-12. “Courts disallow joinder of non-diverse defendants where those 14 defendants are only tangentially related to the cause of action or would not prevent complete 15 relief.” Id. 16 Here, Brooks alleges that Lange “was responsible for overseeing the Premises and 17 protecting residents from dangerous conditions,” and that Peterson “was responsible for 18 maintenance of and overseeing cleaning of the location of the incident on the Premises at the time 19 of the incident.” Proposed FAC ¶¶ 8, 9. He alleges that Lange, Peterson, and GEO, “had a legal 20 duty of care to Plaintiff to keep the Premises safe for entry and/or use by Plaintiff, to give 21 adequate warning of hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on said Premises to 22 Plaintiff at the time of entry or use of said Premises, and to avoid causing injury or harm to 23 Plaintiff as herein alleged.” Id. at ¶ 17. Brooks alleges that “Defendants created an unsafe 24 condition by washing carpet where the incident occurred,” because “[t]he metal nosing at the top 25 landing [of the stairway at issue] was slippery when wet and was wet at the time of the incident” 26 and “[t]he handrail did not extend to or beyond the top riser” in violation of the applicable 27 building code. Id. at ¶ 19. Further, Defendants did not adequately cordon off the area or use 1 more than “tangentially related” to the negligence claim. 2 GEO argues that Lange and Peterson are not necessary parties, asserting that Brooks can 3 obtain complete relief without them. It asserts that “[c]laims of premises liability and negligence 4 are routinely brought against private corporations, and an individual is not needed,” and that 5 “GEO is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees[.]” Opp’n 1, 3. 6 “Under the California doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held liable for 7 the tortious acts of its employees when they are acting within the scope of their employment.” 8 Randolph v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 97 F.3d 319, 327 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). “An 9 employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment if either one of two conditions is 10 met: (1) the act performed was either required or incident to her duties, or (2) the employee's 11 misconduct could be reasonably foreseen by the employer.” Id. (citations omitted). Here, 12 notwithstanding GEO’s conclusory statement that it is vicariously liable for its employees’ torts, 13 GEO offers no concession or stipulation that Lange and Peterson satisfy either prong of the test for 14 respondeat superior liability. Accordingly, Brooks’s negligence claims against Lange and 15 Peterson are not foreclosed as a matter of law at this point in the litigation. Further, Brooks seeks 16 to join the individuals whose conduct may impose liability on GEO for negligence. Denying 17 joinder and forcing Brooks to file a separate action against Lange and Peterson would be 18 redundant and could lead to inconsistent results and obligations. Accordingly, this factor weighs 19 in favor of joinder. 20 B. Statute of Limitations 21 Neither party addresses whether the statute of limitations would preclude a separate action 22 against Lange and Peterson. Accordingly, this factor is neutral. 23 C. The Remaining Factors 24 The court finds that the remaining factors weigh in favor of joinder of Lange and Peterson. 25 First, as to any delay in moving for joinder, Brooks asserts that he did not know Lange’s identity 26 until he began undertaking investigatory efforts to prepare for his initial disclosures. He did not 27 learn Peterson’s name until Lange’s deposition on April 25, 2019. Vaysberg Decl. ¶ 5. He filed 1 undue delay in moving to join Lange and Peterson as defendants. 2 As to Brooks’s motive in seeking joinder, GEO contends that Brooks’s amendment is an 3 “attempt to ruin diversity and require a remand.” Opp’n 1, 3. GEO offers no support for this 4 || contention, and the court finds nothing in the record indicating that Brooks seeks to join Lange 5 and Peterson for an improper purpose. Next, the negligence claims against Lange and Peterson 6 appear valid, and GEO does not argue that the proposed FAC fails to state a claim for negligence 7 against either proposed defendant. Finally, denying joinder would prejudice Brooks, as it would 8 force him to choose between forgoing claims for negligence against Lange and Peterson or pursue 9 || redundant litigation arising out of the same facts in state court, risking inconsistent results. 10 Weighing the six factors, the court concludes that joinder of Lange and Peterson is 11 warranted. 12 || Iv. CONCLUSION
13 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Brooks’s motion to amend the complaint
v 14 || and remands this action to Alameda County Superior Court. Counsel’s motion to withdraw as © 15 counsel (Docket No. 59) is denied as moot. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
16 DIST, IT IS SO ORDERED. SS CS 7, 18 || Dated: September 12, 2019 D □ 19 1s ~ M. Ryu 20 Tnited Zz AM. BY 21 O\ V4 sdee Done © ANS □ 22 oe □□ Lay KG 23 . DIsSTRICS 24 25 26 27 28