Brooks v. Skagit County Public Health

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 FAWN BROOKS, CASE NO. 2:23-cv-01708-LK 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING 12 v. COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE 13 SKAGIT COUNTY PUBLIC HEALTH et TO FILE AN AMENDED al., COMPLAINT 14 Defendants. 15 16 This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. On November 9, 2023, United States 17 Magistrate Judge Brian A. Tsuchida granted pro se Plaintiff Fawn Brooks’ application to proceed 18 in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and her complaint was posted on the docket. Dkt Nos. 4, 5. Summons 19 have not yet been issued. Having reviewed the complaint, the record, and the applicable law, the 20 Court declines to issue summons and, for the reasons set forth below, dismisses Ms. Brooks’ 21 complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), with leave to file an amended 22 complaint. 23 24 2 Ms. Brooks initiated this action seeking money damages and an injunction as a result of 3 Defendants’ apparent denial of an application for emergency housing assistance. Dkt. No. 5 at 1– 4 4; see id. at 4 (“Brooks 100% qualifies, however, [Defendants] denied [her] application. White

5 Americans were excluded . . . . Brooks[’] attempts went unsuccessful at accessing any eviction 6 prevention services from Skagit and [she] has been in constant emotional distress since August 7 2022.”); id. at 11 (alleging that she “is now in a position of losing [her] home and becoming 8 homeless”).1 She invokes Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., the 9 Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Section 4.96.020 of the Revised Code of 10 Washington, and asserts causes of action for discriminatory intent, negligent infliction of 11 emotional distress, assumption of duty, and “defense waived.” Dkt. No. 5 at 5–10. 13 The Court must dismiss a case where the plaintiff is proceeding IFP “at any time” if it 14 determines that the complaint is frivolous, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or

15 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 16 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). Section 1915(e) applies to all IFP proceedings, not just those filed by 17 prisoners. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The standard for 18 determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Section 1915(e) is the same as the 19 standard applied under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 20 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either the lack of a 21 22

23 1 Ms. Brooks names the following Defendants: (1) Skagit County Public Health; (2) Community Action of Skagit County; (3) Washington Department of Commerce; (4) Geocko, Inc. D.B.A. Livestories, Inc.; and (5) Allysen 24 Yamauchi. Dkt. No. 5 at 2–3. 1 cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. 2 Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). 3 In this case, Ms. Brooks’ complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 4 even when liberally construed. See Bernhardt v. Los Angeles Cnty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir.

5 2003). As an initial matter, her complaint lacks the who, what, where, when and why needed for 6 the Court and Defendants to understand what is being alleged. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Ashcroft 7 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (a complaint must contain factual content sufficient to allow 8 the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” 9 and Rule 8’s pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- 10 harmed-me accusation”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (a complaint must 11 give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the facts on which it rests, and “[f]actual allegations 12 must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”). Although the alleged harm 13 Ms. Brooks faces related to her housing is not something the Court takes lightly, she fails to fill in 14 the blanks beyond conclusory assertions. As a result, Defendants—and the Court—would be left

15 to guess what specific acts Defendants are supposed to have committed and how such acts give 16 rise to her alleged claims. In sum, Ms. Brooks may have a viable claim against one or more of the 17 named Defendants, but the allegations contained in the complaint are too vague and conclusory to 18 give rise to an inference of unlawful conduct or to allow Defendants to effectively respond. 19 Moreover, to the extent Ms. Brooks seeks relief from a state agency for constitutional 20 violations, see Dkt. No. 5 at 3, 7 (naming the Washington Department of Commerce as a 21 Defendant), the Court notes that such defendants are not considered “persons” under Section 1983 22 and are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Washington, 46 F. 23 Supp. 3d 1110, 1115–17 (W.D. Wash. 2014).

24 1 Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a summons in this matter, dismisses this complaint 2 without prejudice, and grants Ms. Brooks an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified herein. 3 See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A district court should not dismiss a 4 pro se complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the

5 complaint could not be cured by amendment.” (cleaned up)). 7 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Ms. Brooks’ complaint without prejudice 8 and with leave to amend by December 15, 2023. Ms. Brooks’ amended complaint must provide a 9 short and plain statement of the factual basis for each of the claims as required by Federal Rule of 10 Civil Procedure 8. A timely filed amended complaint operates as a complete substitute for an 11 original pleading. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). For that reason, 12 any amended complaint must clearly identify the defendant(s), the claim(s) asserted, the specific 13 facts that Ms. Brooks believes support each claim, and the specific relief requested. In other words, 14 the amended complaint must include all relevant allegations rather than merely supplementing the

15 original complaint. If Ms. Brooks does not file a proper amended complaint by December 15, 16 2023, this action will be dismissed with prejudice. 17 18 Dated this 15th day of November, 2023. 19 A 20 Lauren King United States District Judge 21 22 23 24