Brooks v. Poinsett County Detention Center

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedFebruary 2, 2021
Docket3:20-cv-00372
StatusUnknown

This text of Brooks v. Poinsett County Detention Center (Brooks v. Poinsett County Detention Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brooks v. Poinsett County Detention Center, (E.D. Ark. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS NORTHERN DIVISION

JEREMIE BROOKS PLAINTIFF ADC #660149

v. Case No. 3:20-cv-00372-KGB

POINSETT COUNTY DETENTION DEFENDANTS CENTER, et al.

ORDER

Plaintiff Jeremie Brooks, who was an inmate at the Poinsett County Detention Center at the time, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Poinsett County Detention Center, T Guard Bail Bonds, and the Trumann Police Department (Dkt. No. 2). He alleges he is being unlawfully detained (Id.). Before the Court is his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 1). I. In Forma Pauperis Application

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner who is permitted to file a civil action in forma pauperis still must pay the full statutory filing fee of $402.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The only question is whether a prisoner will pay the entire filing fee at the initiation of the proceeding or in installments over a period of time. Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 716 (8th Cir. 1998). Even if a prisoner is without assets and unable to pay an initial filing fee, he will be allowed to proceed with his § 1983 claims, and the filing fee will be collected by the Court in installments from the prisoner’s inmate trust account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). If the prisoner’s case is subsequently dismissed for any reason, including a determination that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief, the full amount of the $402.00 filing fee will be collected, and no portion of this filing fee will be refunded to the prisoner. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (“Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.”); see also Jackson v. N.P. Dodge Realty Co., 173 F. Supp. 2d 951, 952 (D. Neb. 2001) (“The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) makes prisoners responsible for their filing fees the moment the prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal. Thus, when an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) is filed in

such a case, ‘the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan.’”) (citations omitted) (quoting Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir.1997)). Mr. Brooks has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Dkt. No. 1). Accordingly, Mr. Brook’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. Based on the information contained in Mr. Brooks’s account information sheet, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.66. After paying the initial filing fee, Mr. Brooks will be obligated to make monthly payments in the amount of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to Mr. Brook’s prison trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00

until the $402.00 filing fee is fully paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). II. Background Mr. Brooks claims the Trumann Police Department and Poinsett County Detention Center are unlawfully detaining him on the false charge of failure to register as a sex offender (Dkt. No. 2 at 3). According to Mr. Brooks, he in fact registered as a level two sex offender in Trumann, Arkansas, on March 7, 2020 (Id., at 3-4). Mr. Brooks asserts T Guard Bail Bonds refuses to bond him out based on the nature of his charges (Id.). Mr. Brooks seeks damages, among other relief, for the alleged violation of his rights (Id., at 6).

Public records show Mr. Brooks has been charged with failure to register as a sex offender, along with other charges. See Arkansas Judiciary Website, Docket Search, http://caseinfo.arcourts.gov; State v. Brooks, 56CR-20-402.1 Mr. Brooks currently is awaiting trial on these charges. III. Screening The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires federal courts to screen prisoner

complaints seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are legally frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (c) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b). The in forma pauperis statute also imposes these standards for dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An action is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In reviewing the sufficiency of a pro se complaint under the Court’s screening function, the Court must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The Court also must weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).

1 The Court can take judicial notice the proceedings in Mr. Brooks’s state case because the proceedings are directly related to his federal claims. Conforti v. United States, 74 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 1996).

3 Although pro se complaints are to be liberally construed, the complaint must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). IV. Discussion In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that federal courts should abstain from interfering in ongoing state-court proceedings. The Court explained the

rationale for such abstention as follows: [The concept of federalism] represent[s] . . . a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.

Id.

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Related

Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Tony Alamo Christian Ministries v. Selig
664 F.3d 1245 (Eighth Circuit, 2012)
Aaron v. Target Corporation
357 F.3d 768 (Eighth Circuit, 2004)
Jackson v. N.P. Dodge Realty Co.
173 F. Supp. 2d 951 (D. Nebraska, 2001)
Night Clubs, Inc. v. City of Fort Smith
163 F.3d 475 (Eighth Circuit, 1998)
Martin v. Sargent
780 F.2d 1334 (Eighth Circuit, 1985)

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Bluebook (online)
Brooks v. Poinsett County Detention Center, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brooks-v-poinsett-county-detention-center-ared-2021.