Brooks v. New Hampshire Supreme Court CV-95-166-M 09/07/95 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Troy Brooks, Plaintiff,
v. Civil No. 95-166-M
New Hampshire Supreme Court, et al.. Defendants.
O R D E R
Currently pending before the court are two Motions for
Temporary Restraining Order (documents no. 19 and 24), an
Objection to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
relative to Plaintiff's earlier Motion for Preliminary Injunction
(document no. 20), and, by implication, a motion to reconsider
the court's denial of plaintiff's third motion for temporary
restraining order (document no. 21). A telephone conference was
held on the afternoon of September 6, 1995. Attorney Philip T.
Cobbin, Esq., appeared on behalf of the plaintiff and Senior
Assistant Attorney General Stephen J. Judge appeared on behalf of
the defendants. For the reasons briefly outlined below,
plaintiff's motions for temporary restraining order are denied,
the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge is approved and accepted, and plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction
is denied.
Like the magistrate judge, I also find plaintiff's
pleadings, both those filed by him in his pro se capacity and
those subseguently filed through counsel, to be unclear and
somewhat difficult to decipher. Nevertheless, it is apparent
that, essentially, plaintiff seeks preliminary injunctive relief
staying pending state administrative and judicial proceedings
related to enforcement of the New Hampshire Supreme Court's
confidentiality rules applicable to proceedings before its
Professional Conduct Committee and Judicial Conduct Committee, as
well as a collateral state civil paternity suit.
The magistrate judge considered plaintiff's preliminary
injunction motion (28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)) and filed a report
(document no. 13) recommending that injunctive relief be denied
on grounds that plaintiff's motion essentially seeks a federally
ordered stay of state court proceedings, which, in light of the
restrictions imposed by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. §2283,
2 and federalism-based notions of comity underlying the Younger
Abstention Doctrine,1 ought not to be granted.
A. The Hearing on Plaintiff's Petition to the Supreme Court.
It appears from the pleadings, and from the discussion with
counsel, that plaintiff initiated a petition in the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, invoking its original jurisdiction, for the
purpose of challenging the constitutionality of certain rules of
confidentiality applicable to Professional Conduct Committee and
Judicial Conduct Committee proceedings. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court accepted the petition as to that issue, ordered
briefs to be filed by the interested parties, and scheduled oral
argument for September 7, 1995. Part of the relief plaintiff
seeks from this court is an order staying the very state court
proceedings he initiated (i.e., his challenge to the
constitutionality of the confidentiality rules). In support of
his motions, plaintiff asserts a general bias on the part of the
New Hampshire Supreme Court Justices, which he claims will
prevent him from obtaining a full and fair hearing on his federal
constitutional claims in that state proceeding.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
3 Based on the pleadings before it, this court cannot find
that it "plainly appears" that plaintiff is unable to raise his
federal constitutional claims or that he will not obtain a full
and fair hearing in the ongoing state proceeding. Middlesex
County Ethics Comm, v. Garden State Bar Ass'n., 457 U.S. 423, 435
(1982). The New Hampshire Supreme Court is unguestionably
empowered to entertain and rule upon plaintiff's federal
constitutional claims. Because plaintiff is a party in a civil
proceeding pending before the New Hampshire Supreme Court
involving important state interests, specifically the state's
interest in the operation of its judicial and attorney discipline
systems, and because he not only is not barred from raising his
federal constitutional claims in that proceeding, but in fact has
raised them, principles of federalism and comity counsel against
granting the relief reguested. See Younger v. Harris, supra; see
generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 201-208 (2d ed.
1988) .
Plaintiff's vague and general claims of bias on the part of
the sitting justices of the New Hampshire Supreme Court are
entirely insufficient to establish the absence of an opportunity
to obtain a fair hearing in that court. To the extent plaintiff
4 believes that any of the individual justices might somehow be
biased or predisposed to rule against him in his case, state
procedures and mechanisms exist to address that alleged source of
"unfairness." See e.g. Kualer v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 127-29
(1975). However, the pleadings before this court do not indicate
that plaintiff has invoked those mechanisms. For example, he
apparently has not filed any motions for recusal of individual
justices in his case.
So, despite claiming entitlement to the extraordinary
eguitable remedy of an injunction against a pending state court
proceeding, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he has
exercised any of the rights available to him in state court which
would rectify his purported plight (e.g., voluntary withdrawal of
his petition to the Supreme Court, motion for recusal of the
justice(s) he claims are biased, etc.). Nor has plaintiff
suggested that the pursuit of such avenues would prove futile.
In light of all of the foregoing factors, issuance of an order
enjoining the previously scheduled hearing on plaintiff's
petition to the Supreme Court would be plainly inappropriate.
5 B. The Professional Conduct Committee Proceedings.
Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief relative to the
Professional Conduct Committee's docketing of a committee
generated complaint against his counsel. Specifically, the
Conduct Committee, at the reguest of the New Hampshire Supreme
Court, is making inguiry into whether Attorney Cobbin, by filing
certain documents in this court's proceeding, violated a New
Hampshire Supreme Court order directed to plaintiff which
provided that "pending further order of the court, this [state]
proceeding shall remain confidential." Attorney Cobbin is not a
litigant in this court, and does not personally invoke this
court's jurisdiction on his own behalf. Rather, the plaintiff
argues that the proceeding initiated by the Conduct Committee
effectively "chills" his own First Amendment rights in some way
and, therefore, ought to be enjoined.
The Younger Abstention Doctrine applies not only to judicial
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Brooks v. New Hampshire Supreme Court CV-95-166-M 09/07/95 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Troy Brooks, Plaintiff,
v. Civil No. 95-166-M
New Hampshire Supreme Court, et al.. Defendants.
O R D E R
Currently pending before the court are two Motions for
Temporary Restraining Order (documents no. 19 and 24), an
Objection to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
relative to Plaintiff's earlier Motion for Preliminary Injunction
(document no. 20), and, by implication, a motion to reconsider
the court's denial of plaintiff's third motion for temporary
restraining order (document no. 21). A telephone conference was
held on the afternoon of September 6, 1995. Attorney Philip T.
Cobbin, Esq., appeared on behalf of the plaintiff and Senior
Assistant Attorney General Stephen J. Judge appeared on behalf of
the defendants. For the reasons briefly outlined below,
plaintiff's motions for temporary restraining order are denied,
the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge is approved and accepted, and plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction
is denied.
Like the magistrate judge, I also find plaintiff's
pleadings, both those filed by him in his pro se capacity and
those subseguently filed through counsel, to be unclear and
somewhat difficult to decipher. Nevertheless, it is apparent
that, essentially, plaintiff seeks preliminary injunctive relief
staying pending state administrative and judicial proceedings
related to enforcement of the New Hampshire Supreme Court's
confidentiality rules applicable to proceedings before its
Professional Conduct Committee and Judicial Conduct Committee, as
well as a collateral state civil paternity suit.
The magistrate judge considered plaintiff's preliminary
injunction motion (28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)) and filed a report
(document no. 13) recommending that injunctive relief be denied
on grounds that plaintiff's motion essentially seeks a federally
ordered stay of state court proceedings, which, in light of the
restrictions imposed by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. §2283,
2 and federalism-based notions of comity underlying the Younger
Abstention Doctrine,1 ought not to be granted.
A. The Hearing on Plaintiff's Petition to the Supreme Court.
It appears from the pleadings, and from the discussion with
counsel, that plaintiff initiated a petition in the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, invoking its original jurisdiction, for the
purpose of challenging the constitutionality of certain rules of
confidentiality applicable to Professional Conduct Committee and
Judicial Conduct Committee proceedings. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court accepted the petition as to that issue, ordered
briefs to be filed by the interested parties, and scheduled oral
argument for September 7, 1995. Part of the relief plaintiff
seeks from this court is an order staying the very state court
proceedings he initiated (i.e., his challenge to the
constitutionality of the confidentiality rules). In support of
his motions, plaintiff asserts a general bias on the part of the
New Hampshire Supreme Court Justices, which he claims will
prevent him from obtaining a full and fair hearing on his federal
constitutional claims in that state proceeding.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
3 Based on the pleadings before it, this court cannot find
that it "plainly appears" that plaintiff is unable to raise his
federal constitutional claims or that he will not obtain a full
and fair hearing in the ongoing state proceeding. Middlesex
County Ethics Comm, v. Garden State Bar Ass'n., 457 U.S. 423, 435
(1982). The New Hampshire Supreme Court is unguestionably
empowered to entertain and rule upon plaintiff's federal
constitutional claims. Because plaintiff is a party in a civil
proceeding pending before the New Hampshire Supreme Court
involving important state interests, specifically the state's
interest in the operation of its judicial and attorney discipline
systems, and because he not only is not barred from raising his
federal constitutional claims in that proceeding, but in fact has
raised them, principles of federalism and comity counsel against
granting the relief reguested. See Younger v. Harris, supra; see
generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 201-208 (2d ed.
1988) .
Plaintiff's vague and general claims of bias on the part of
the sitting justices of the New Hampshire Supreme Court are
entirely insufficient to establish the absence of an opportunity
to obtain a fair hearing in that court. To the extent plaintiff
4 believes that any of the individual justices might somehow be
biased or predisposed to rule against him in his case, state
procedures and mechanisms exist to address that alleged source of
"unfairness." See e.g. Kualer v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 127-29
(1975). However, the pleadings before this court do not indicate
that plaintiff has invoked those mechanisms. For example, he
apparently has not filed any motions for recusal of individual
justices in his case.
So, despite claiming entitlement to the extraordinary
eguitable remedy of an injunction against a pending state court
proceeding, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he has
exercised any of the rights available to him in state court which
would rectify his purported plight (e.g., voluntary withdrawal of
his petition to the Supreme Court, motion for recusal of the
justice(s) he claims are biased, etc.). Nor has plaintiff
suggested that the pursuit of such avenues would prove futile.
In light of all of the foregoing factors, issuance of an order
enjoining the previously scheduled hearing on plaintiff's
petition to the Supreme Court would be plainly inappropriate.
5 B. The Professional Conduct Committee Proceedings.
Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief relative to the
Professional Conduct Committee's docketing of a committee
generated complaint against his counsel. Specifically, the
Conduct Committee, at the reguest of the New Hampshire Supreme
Court, is making inguiry into whether Attorney Cobbin, by filing
certain documents in this court's proceeding, violated a New
Hampshire Supreme Court order directed to plaintiff which
provided that "pending further order of the court, this [state]
proceeding shall remain confidential." Attorney Cobbin is not a
litigant in this court, and does not personally invoke this
court's jurisdiction on his own behalf. Rather, the plaintiff
argues that the proceeding initiated by the Conduct Committee
effectively "chills" his own First Amendment rights in some way
and, therefore, ought to be enjoined.
The Younger Abstention Doctrine applies not only to judicial
proceedings, but also to "state administrative proceedings in
which important state interests are vindicated so long as in the
course of those proceedings the federal plaintiff would have a
full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional claim."
Ohio Civil Rights Comm, v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc.,
6 U.S. ___ , 106 S.Ct. 2718, 2723 (1986). Obviously, the
administrative disciplinary proceeding initiated by the
Professional Conduct Committee, like plaintiff's petition to the
state supreme court, involves important state interests (e.g.,
insuring that members of the bar, as officers of the court, fully
comply with the applicable Rules of Professional Conduct and with
court orders) .
A review of the pleadings reveals that the Professional
Conduct Committee has, consistently with its applicable rules,
taken note of facts which might constitute violations of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, and has accordingly instructed
Attorney Cobbin to respond to its inguiry within a specified
time. The inguiry appears to fall within the subject matter
jurisdiction conferred upon the Committee, and the intrusion
associated with its reguiring Attorney Cobbin to respond is
reasonable under the circumstances. Plaintiff's claim that the
Committee's inguiry into his counsel's conduct substantially
interferes with his own federal constitutional rights to free
speech is strained at best and, in any event, plaintiff has made
no showing that Attorney Cobbin (or plaintiff himself, to the
extent they share an identity of interest with regard to that
7 disciplinary matter) will be unable to present federal
constitutional defenses that might be available in that state
administrative proceeding. Of course, review of Professional
Conduct Committee determinations lies with the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, which, again, is fully empowered to consider
Attorney Cobbin's federal constitutional claims and, to the
extent plaintiff might have standing to challenge such a
determination, his claims as well.
The Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge
(document no. 13) regarding plaintiff's motion for preliminary
injunction is approved and accepted, basically for the reasons
set forth therein. However, plaintiff's counsel correctly points
out in his third motion for temporary restraining order (document
no. 24) that, because he invoked the provisions of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in his amended complaint, the Anti-Injunction Act does not
strictly prevent this court from entering an injunction staying
ongoing state court proceedings, because §1983 suits have been
construed to be exempt from the flat bar of §2283. Accordingly,
the court does not adopt that portion of the magistrate's report
and recommendation relying upon the Anti-Injunction Act. The court will treat defendants' motion for temporary
restraining order (document no. 24) as an implicit motion to
reconsider the court's prior denial of his motion for temporary
restraining order (document no. 21) relying on the Anti-
Injunction Act, which motion to reconsider is granted. Having
reconsidered plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order
(document no. 21) the court nevertheless denies the motion based
upon the Younger Abstention Doctrine as discussed above. As
Professor Tribe writes in his authoritative treatise:
If it had not been clear before Pennzoil [107 S.Ct. 1519 (1987)], it is certainly clear now that the most basic underpinning of the Younger Doctrine is not any special eguity concept but, rather, a federalism-based notion of comity. That notion is fully applicable even when a suit is filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thereby escapes the absolute statutory bar of the Anti- Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which for nearly two centuries has barred all but specifically exempted federal court injunctions against state court proceedings. See Michim v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972) (although § 1983 suits are exempt from the flat bar of § 2283, that fact does not "gualify in any way the principles of eguity, comity and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding") (emphasis added).
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 203-204 n.9 (2d ed. 1988) To the extent the court has discretion to grant injunctive
relief under the Anti-Injunction Act, the court declines to
exercise that discretion under the circumstances presented here.
Conclusion
Plaintiff's Motions for Temporary Restraining Order
(documents no. 19, 21 and 24) are denied. Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction (document no. 20) is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge
September 7, 1995
cc: Philip I. Cobbin, Esg. Stephen J. Judge, Esg.