UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
THERESA BROOKS,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 23-cv-00447 (CRC)
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
In June 2018, Theresa Brooks, a correspondence analyst in Custom and Border
Protection (“CBP”)’s Business Operations Center, submitted a reasonable accommodation
request to the agency. She reported that she had Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and
requested, among other accommodations, full-time telework. This request was not resolved until
a year later, when it was granted in part and denied in part. In the meantime, Brooks’s
relationships with her supervisors deteriorated. Brooks accused them of harassment and
bullying, which she alleged exacerbated her PTSD. She subsequently made another reasonable
accommodation request for full-time telework and reassignment within CBP, which was denied.
Brooks filed three Equal Employment Opportunity complaints with CBP based on the
delay in resolving her first reasonable accommodation request and her conflicts with
management. After those complaints were resolved in CBP’s favor, first by the agency and then
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), Brooks brought this pro se
employment discrimination lawsuit against the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security, Alejandro Mayorkas, in his official capacity. The government now moves to dismiss
Brooks’s complaint for failure to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 10(b)
and failure to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). Mindful of Brooks’s pro se status, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part. The Court will dismiss, under Rule
12(b)(6), Brooks’s amended complaint to the extent it attempts to raise hostile work
environment, retaliation, and race and sex discrimination claims. Brooks has, however,
adequately pled failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act, so the Court will deny the
government’s motion as to that part of her amended complaint.
I. Background
The Court draws the following background from Brooks’s allegations, contained in her
amended complaint and briefing papers, and facts gleaned from over 200 pages of exhibits that
she attached to her opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss. The Court must accept
these allegations and facts as true at this early stage of the case. See Ho v. Garland, 106 F.4th
47, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
A. Factual Background
During the period relevant to her allegations, Ms. Brooks was a correspondence analyst
in CBP’s Business Operations Center. See ECF No. 2 (Am. Compl.) at 2–3 (page numbers
designated by CM/ECF); ECF No. 9 (Mot. Dismiss) at 3–4. Her primary responsibilities in this
role were receiving, processing, and routing congressional correspondence and reports. See ECF
No. 12 (Opp’n), Ex. 14, at 117 (December 2018 email from Brooks describing her job
responsibilities). As early as February 2018, Brooks was permitted to telework on days she had
therapy appointments. See id., Ex. 10, at 101–04 (February 2018 telework program agreement).
In June 2018, Brooks submitted a reasonable accommodation request. Id., Ex. 2, at 29
(June 2018 reasonable accommodation request). She reported that she had PTSD and requested,
among other things, full-time telework, a flexible work schedule that would allow her to work
more than eight hours one day and less than eight hours another, and permission to call her
2 therapist from a quiet space in the office during the workday should a triggering situation arise.
See id.; id., Ex. 11, at 108 (letter from Mary Beth Williams, Ph.D., LCSW, supplementing June
2018 reasonable accommodation request). In July 2018, Brooks provided CBP with additional
documentation from her psychiatrist, Dr. Wesley Dickerson, to support this request. See id., Ex.
6, at 80 (July 2018 letter from Dr. Dickerson in support of Brooks’s reasonable accommodation
request); id., Ex. 7, at 83–85 (June 2019 response to June 2018 reasonable accommodation
request acknowledging July 2018 receipt of Dr. Dickerson’s letter).
Brooks’s reasonable accommodation request was not resolved for a year. See id., Ex. 7,
at 83–85. While it remained pending, Brooks, her union chapter president, and her therapist
repeatedly contacted CBP management about its status. See, e.g., id., Ex. 3, at 34 (June 2018
letter from union chapter president); id., Ex. 6, at 57–59 (February 2019 emails from Brooks to
her first-line supervisor and reasonable accommodation coordinator); id., Ex. 16, at 81 (March
2019 letter from Williams). In this correspondence, management acknowledged CBP’s general
policy of resolving accommodation requests within fifteen days. See id., Ex. 3, at 34 (June 2018
response from Brooks’s former supervisor to union chapter president stating that “[she]
believe[d] [she] ha[d] 15 days”); id., Ex. 5, at 50 (July 2018 email from former supervisor to
CBP Reasonable Accommodation Coordinator asking for guidance on next steps because “[w]e
are way past the 15 day requirement”); id., Ex. 9, at 92–93 (CBP Reasonable Accommodation
Procedures).
During that same period, Brooks complained to the agency about her first-line supervisor,
Carol Gladden. She reported that she and Ms. Gladden were having communication issues, and
that the animosity between them triggered her PTSD. See, e.g., id., Ex. 14, at 116–20
(December 2018 email exchanges between Brooks and various CBP Deputy Executive
3 Directors). Brooks further asserted that Gladden was interfering with her existing telework
arrangement. Id. at 120. For example, Gladden asked Brooks to clock in and out while
teleworking, even though this reporting was not generally required. See id., Ex. 22, at 157–61
(January 2020 emails between Gladden and Brooks). Brooks and management discussed the
possibility of her lateral transfer. Id., Ex. 14, at 116–18.
Brooks’s reasonable accommodation request was finally resolved in June 2019. Id., Ex.
7, at 83–85. CBP granted some of her requested accommodations, including telework on
Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays, but denied others, including telework on Mondays and
Fridays and the ability to “flex” hours between days of the week. Id. at 84. CBP explained that
Brooks was the sole correspondence analyst in her office, and certain of her job responsibilities
required her to be onsite at specific times. Id. at 83–84.
In July 2019, Brooks filed her first Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint
with CBP (Case No. 12190-2019), in which she alleged discrimination based on race, color, age,
and disability, as well as retaliation for her prior EEO activity. Id., Ex. 18, at 133–40 (Case No.
12190-2019 EEO counselor’s report). She grounded these claims on the delay in resolving her
June 2018 reasonable accommodation request, as well as Gladden’s alleged harassment. See id.
She requested a lateral transfer and other forms of relief. Id. at 136.
In January 2020, Brooks submitted another reasonable accommodation request seeking
full-time telework and reassignment within CBP. Id., Ex. 20, at 145 (January 2020 reasonable
accommodation request). That month, Brooks received an email from Daniel Mattina, a higher-
up in her chain of command, offering her a lateral reassignment “with the understanding” that, in
exchange, she would “drop [her] [2019] EEO complaint regarding alleged harassment for which
4 [her] sought remedy [was] reassignment.” Id., Ex. 23, at 180. By February, this position was no
longer available. See id., Ex. 23, at 168 (February 2020 email to Brooks from EEO counselor).
In March, Brooks’s January 2020 reasonable accommodation request was denied. Id.,
Ex. 20, at 147–49 (March 2020 response to January 2020 reasonable accommodation request).
That same month, Brooks and Mattina had a conversation during which Mattina allegedly spoke
to Brooks “aggressively,” causing her to feel “bullied and disrespected.” Am. Compl. at 2–3.
She told Mattina that she wanted to set up a meeting with his boss, Vernon Foret. See id.
Mattina told her he would schedule the appointment but did not follow up. Id. Brooks
proceeded to contact Foret’s executive assistant directly. Id.
Gladden subsequently sent Brooks an official letter of reprimand, in which she criticized
Brooks’s “failure to properly request leave and . . . to follow the chain of command.” Opp’n, Ex.
21, at 151–53. The letter admonished Brooks for taking sick leave for a recurring medical
appointment without requesting it in advance (as she had been instructed to do). Id. at 151. It
also described, as “disrespectful and unprofessional,” her contacting Foret’s assistant “to
schedule a meeting with higher-level management without adhering to the chain of command”
after Mattina told her Foret was “unavailable due to mission priorities.” Id.
Brooks went on leave from April to June 2020. Id. at 13. In May 2020, she filed a
second EEO complaint (Case No. 520-2020), alleging disability discrimination and harassment,
as well as retaliation for prior EEO activity. See Mot. Dismiss, Ex. B, at 31–32 (EEOC decision
affirming CBP’s conclusion). She supported this claim with the letter of reprimand, as well as
the fact that she had not been transferred to another supervisor or given the temporary duty
assignment she requested. Id. at 32.
5 Brooks returned to work that summer and accepted a lateral transfer in September 2020.
See Am. Compl. at 2. She then made a third EEO complaint (Case No. 2202-2020) based on an
email interaction she had with Dennis McKenzie, a Deputy Executive Director outside her chain
of command. See Opp’n, Ex. 27, at 193–96. After Brooks sent Mr. McKenzie instructions to
reformat a letter on official letterhead, McKenzie replied to Brooks (and others within CBP):
I must say in my career I have never seen anything like this. Where a GS-15 DXD is tasked to cut and paste an electronic word document onto an electronic word document containing letter head. Especially when the sender forwards both documents to the DXD. I seriously had to take a drive I was so mad. Something is seriously broken when it takes a GS-15 to close out a document. This has gone beyond ridiculous.
Am. Compl. at 4. Brooks alleged that McKenzie responded this way “because she is an
older African-American female and he is a white male.” Opp’n, Ex. 27, at 194.
Brooks’s three EEO complaints were all resolved in the agency’s favor and
affirmed by the EEOC on appeal. See Mot. Dismiss, Ex. A, at 25–29 (EEOC Decision in
Case No. 1219-2019); Ex. B, at 31–36 (EEOC Decision in Case No. 520-2020); Ex. C, at
38–42 (EEOC Decision in Case No. 2202-2020).
B. Procedural Background
In February 2023, Brooks filed this lawsuit, which she framed as an “appeal” of
the three EEOC decisions. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.). She subsequently filed an amended
complaint seeking reasonable accommodation, lost wages, and damages for emotional
distress. See Am. Compl. The government now moves to dismiss, arguing that Brooks’s
amended complaint fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 10(b)
or state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Mot. Dismiss. at 9–21. Brooks submitted an
opposition and attached over 200 pages of exhibits. See Opp’n.
6 II. Legal Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a complaint to “contain . . . a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). “The purpose of the rule is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit
the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer[] [and] prepare an adequate
defense[.]” Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 10(b) requires that a complaint “state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs,
each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b), so that
“[a] defendant tasked with answering the [c]omplaint” can “know where to begin” in response,
Lacy v. Tenn. Civ. Rule 15g Third Party, No. CV 22-3537 (JMC), 2022 WL 17735643, at *2
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2022).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
complaint must present “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face if it “pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court “assumes
the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and construes reasonable
inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor but is not required to accept the
plaintiff’s legal conclusions as correct.” Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 760 F.3d
1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
“[T]he pleadings of pro se parties are to be ‘liberally construed’ and ‘held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]’” Tyson v. Brennan, 277 F.
Supp. 3d 28, 35 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), aff’d, No.
7 18-5033, 2018 WL 5927921 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 7, 2018). A pro se litigant’s complaint must be
evaluated “in light of all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss, which here
includes [plaintiff’s] opposition to the motion to dismiss and attached exhibits.” Ho, 106 F.4th at
50 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152
(D.C. Cir. 2015)).
III. Analysis
As a threshold matter, though Brooks frames her amended complaint as an “appeal[]”
from the three EEOC decisions, those decisions are not the subject of review here. Am. Compl.
at 1–3. The Court does not have appellate jurisdiction over EEOC decisions. Instead, the Court
will consider the EEOC decisions only to the extent they bear on whether Brooks has plausibly
stated a claim for relief.
A. Rules 8(a) and 10(b)
The government first argues that Brooks’s amended complaint should be dismissed for
failure to comply with Rules 8(a) and 10(b). Mot. Dismiss at 9–11. It contends that, because
Brooks has not advanced “a short and plain statement of legal violations and plausible claims,” it
cannot “offer a coherent response.” Id. at 10.
Though it is quite tempted, mindful of the liberal-construction standard afforded to pro se
litigants, the Court declines to dismiss Brooks’s amended complaint for failure to comply with
Rules 8(a) or 10(b). True, her amended complaint is far from a “model of clarity.” Id. at 2. It is
not organized according to specific claims, and many of its supporting factual allegations are
scattered throughout the 200-plus pages of exhibits attached to Brooks’s opposition. The Court,
however, has dutifully heeded the Circuit’s admonition in Ho to consider Brooks’s amended
complaint “in light of all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss, which here
8 includes [Brooks’s] opposition to the motion to dismiss and attached exhibits.” 106 F.4th at 50
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown, 789 F.3d at 152). Viewed in this context, the
amended complaint attempts to allege failure-to-accommodate, hostile work environment,
retaliation, and discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act; indeed, that is how the government characterized her claims in moving to dismiss.
See Mot. Dismiss at 11–21. The Court will therefore proceed to evaluate whether she has met
the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading requirement for these claims, rather than dismiss on Rule 8(a) or
10(b) grounds.
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
1. Failure to Accommodate
Brooks first asserts that she is “an American disabled veteran, protected by the
American[s] with Disabilities Act and [her] agency failed to comply with that policy.” Am.
Compl. at 1. The Rehabilitation Act, not the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), protects
federal employees from disability discrimination. See Ward v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 24, 28 (D.C.
Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the Court construes Brooks’s claim as if it were brought under the
Rehabilitation Act, which “incorporates the standards applied under the . . . ADA.” Id.
(parentheses omitted); cf. Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381–82 (2003) (“Federal courts
sometimes will . . . recharacterize . . . [a pro se litigant’s] motion . . . to create a better
correspondence between the substance of a pro se motion’s claim and its underlying legal
basis[.]”).
“One form of prohibited discrimination” under the Rehabilitation Act “is to ‘not mak[e]
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability[.]’” Ali v. Regan, 111 F.4th 1264, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2024)
9 (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). To make out a failure-to-
accommodate claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a federal employee must allege that “(1) [s]he
is disabled, (2) [her] employer had notice of the disability, and (3) the employer denied [her]
request for a reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 1269. Brooks has plausibly alleged that she has
a disability, and that CBP knew of and failed to accommodate this disability. The Court will
therefore deny the government’s motion to dismiss that claim.
a. Disability
An individual is disabled under the Rehabilitation Act if he or she (1) has “a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual;”
(2) has “a record of such an impairment;” or (3) is “regarded as having such an impairment[.]”
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (ADA definition of disability incorporated in the Rehabilitation Act).
Brooks has presented a colorable argument that she is disabled within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act.
In her amended complaint, Brooks states that she is “disabled” and has experienced
“anxiety and depression.” Am. Compl. at 1–2. In her opposition to the government’s motion to
dismiss, Brooks clarifies that she “has a documented history of a mental disability,” “PTSD.”
Opp’n at 8 (parentheses omitted). EEOC regulations specifically list PTSD as an impairment
that “substantially limit[s] brain function” and thus “should easily” meet the requirements for a
disability under the statute. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). And several exhibits Brooks and the
government reference discuss her PTSD and its impact on her functioning. See, e.g., Opp’n, Ex.
2, at 29 (June 2018 reasonable accommodation request describing her medical accommodation
requiring accommodation as PTSD); id., Ex. 11, at 108 (letter from Williams stating that
“Theresa Brooks has been meeting with me in PTSD-related counseling for approximately two
10 years” and “[d]uring that time she has had several incidents while on the job that have led to an
exacerbation of her PTSD symptoms”); id., Ex. 19, at 143 (November 2019 letter from Dr.
Dickerson describing Brooks’s “worsening anxiety, lack of sleep, physical fatigue, reduced
concentration and impaired work performance”); id., Ex. 11, at 106 (Department of Veterans
Affairs benefits letter reporting that Brooks’s PTSD was 50% disabling as of 2015 and 100%
disabling as of October 2022); ECF No. 16 (Reply) at 2–3 (discussing letters from Williams and
the VA). Consequently, Brooks has plausibly pled that she is disabled.
The government nonetheless contends that Brooks has offered no evidence that she meets
the legal requirements for a person with a disability. See Mot. Dismiss at 12. First, it urges the
Court to “take judicial notice that in Plaintiff’s first administrative appeal, the EEOC found that
Plaintiff was not disabled.” Id. To the extent the government asks the Court to adopt the
EEOC’s disability determination as its own, the Court rejects this request. Putting aside the
Court’s responsibility to make such findings for itself, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the issue is
not whether Brooks is in fact disabled; it is whether her complaint contains sufficient factual
matter to plausibly support a finding that she is disabled.
Next, the government points to the July 2018 letter Dr. Dickerson submitted in support of
Brooks’s June 2018 reasonable accommodation request. Reply at 3; id., Ex. 3, at 10–11; see also
Opp’n, Ex. 6, at 80 (same letter). The letter states that “Brooks does not have any medical
restriction with regards to her ability to perform the requirements of her job,” and while her
“condition can moderately impair her sleep,” “[i]t is otherwise not clear that her impairment
would limit a major life activity.” Reply, Ex. 3, at 10. But that same letter also documented that
Brooks “report[ed] periods of distress when triggered” and had a “[c]hronic impairment,” her
PTSD. Id.
11 This letter ultimately might weigh against finding that Brooks is disabled within the
meaning of the statute. But, again, making such a finding is not the Court’s job at the motion-to-
dismiss stage. Instead, it is tasked only with assessing whether Brooks’s filings, considered as a
whole and in light of her pro se status, sufficiently allege that she is disabled under the
Rehabilitation Act. They do.
b. Notice
Brooks has also plausibly pled that CBP knew of her alleged disability. Most relevant,
the June 2019 letter resolving Brooks’s June 2018 reasonable accommodation request, which she
referenced in her amended complaint and opposition and attached as an exhibit to her opposition,
acknowledged that Brooks “stated that . . . [she] experience[d] symptoms of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, which inhibit[ed] [her] ability to concentrate and cause[d] [her] anxiety.”
Opp’n, Ex. 7, at 83. And the government does not appear to contest that it knew of Brooks’s
alleged disability.
c. Denial of Reasonable Accommodation Request
Finally, Brooks avers that she was denied a reasonable accommodation because CBP did
not resolve her reasonable accommodation request for a year and because CBP denied her
request for a transfer. See Am. Compl. at 1; Opp’n at 2–6. Brooks ultimately applied for and
received a transfer in September 2020, see Am. Compl. at 2, so the Court understands both these
contentions as variations of a delay argument.
“Under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, an employee’s notification that she has a
disability and request for an accommodation triggers an ‘interactive process’—a ‘flexible give-
and-take between employer and employee so that together they can determine what
accommodation would enable the employee to continue working.’” Matos v. DeVos, 317 F.
12 Supp. 3d 489, 496–97 (D.D.C. 2018) (Cooper, J.) (quoting Ward, 762 F.3d at 32), aff’d, No. 18-
5281, 2019 WL 2563721 (D.C. Cir. June 3, 2019). “To determine whether the employer held up
its end of th[is] bargain, courts look to factors such as whether the employer ‘obstructs or delays
the interactive process’ or ‘fails to communicate, by way of initiation or response.’” Id. (quoting
Ward, 762 F.3d at 32).
“[T]here are certainly circumstances in which a ‘long-delayed accommodation could be
considered’ unreasonable and hence ‘actionable[.]’” Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162,
1168 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “In determining whether a particular delay is
unreasonable, courts look to factors such as ‘the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay,
whether the employer has offered any alternative accommodations while evaluating a particular
request, and whether the employer has acted in good faith.’” Matos, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 499
(quoting Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1262–63 (10th Cir. 2001)).
Here, Brooks has pled that she was denied resolution of her reasonable accommodation
for a year despite her repeated attempts to follow up on its status and a CBP policy of generally
resolving accommodation requests within fifteen days. See Opp’n at 2–6. That is sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss because the Court cannot conclude on the evidence before it that this
delay was reasonable as a matter of law. To survive a summary judgment motion, however,
Brooks would need to offer more evidence that the delay was “unreasonable” based on the
factors laid out in Matos. See 317 F. Supp. 3d at 49. For example, the Court sees nothing in
Brooks’s filings to suggest that CBP failed to engage in the interactive process in good faith.
Therefore, at this stage, the Court holds only that Brooks has offered sufficient factual evidence
that her reasonable accommodation was subject to a long delay, which may effectively constitute
denial.
13 In sum, Brooks has adequately pled disability, notice, and denial of a reasonable
accommodation. Accordingly, she has stated a plausible failure-to-accommodate claim, so the
Court will deny the government’s motion to dismiss on this ground.
2. Hostile Work Environment
Brooks next alleges that she “was literally working in a hostile work environment.” Am.
Compl. at 1–2. To make out a hostile work environment claim under the Rehabilitation Act or
Title VII, “a plaintiff must show that his employer subjected him to ‘discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d
1191, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). “To
determine whether a hostile work environment exists, the court looks to the totality of the
circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its
offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. A plaintiff
advancing a hostile work environment claim must plead that the complained-of behavior was
based on a protected characteristic. Byrd v. Vilsack, 931 F. Supp. 2d 27, 45 (D.D.C. 2013)
(citing Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1123 (D.C. Cir 2002)).
Brooks’s hostile work environment claim centers on her relationships with Carol
Gladden, who was her first-line supervisor; Daniel Mattina, a higher-up in her chain of
command; and Dennis McKenzie, who was outside her chain of command. Brooks claims that
she and Gladden generally struggled to communicate, and that Gladden “[spoke] down to her,
demean[ed] her[,] and cut[] her off.” Opp’n at 10. As to Mattina, Brooks contends that he
“bullied and discriminated against” her, was “rude” to her, and spoke to her “aggressively.” Am.
Compl. at 2–3.
14 Brooks also offers a few specific instances of alleged harassment. She suggests that
Gladden attempted to interfere with her telework accommodation by unnecessarily requiring her
to check in and out via email while teleworking. Opp’n at 12. And she points to the email she
received from McKenzie where he said he had “never seen anything like” her request that he
reformat a letter and “seriously had to take a drive [he] was so mad.” Am. Compl. at 4. Brooks
asserts that the email led her to believe that McKenzie “had a personal issue with [her], women,
or African Americans.” Id. Brooks further alleges that McKenzie sent the email to make it
appear as if she was not doing her job properly while, in reality, he wanted to target her because
of her disability. Id. at 4–5. As support for this contention, she relies on McKenzie’s affidavit in
one of her EEO proceedings, see id., where he described her medical condition as “anxiety and
possible paranoia,” see Opp’n at 13.
Brooks’s general allegations about her conflicts with Gladden and Mattina do not amount
to a hostile work environment claim. Even if Gladden and Mattina were “impolite, rude, and
insensitive” to Brooks, she has not shown that their treatment of her rose to “the level of severe
and pervasive harassment necessary to maintain a claim for a hostile work environment under
Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act.” Porter v. Jackson, 668 F. Supp. 2d 222, 236 (D.D.C. 2009),
aff’d, 410 F. App’x 348 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Nor, more significantly, has she alleged that Gladden
and Mattina engaged in any of this complained-of behavior on the basis of a protected
characteristic. As to McKenzie’s email, nothing about it indicates discriminatory animus; to the
contrary, McKenzie appears to have been upset about Brooks’s job performance. Therefore,
Brooks has not adequately pled that she was subjected to a hostile work environment.
15 3. Retaliation
Brooks further claims she was “retaliated [against] because of [her] previous EEO
activity.” Am. Compl. at 2–3. Both the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII forbid retaliation
against individuals who seek to vindicate their rights under those statutes. See Baloch, 550 F.3d
at 1196. “To prove retaliation, the plaintiff generally must establish that he or she suffered (i) a
materially adverse action (ii) because he or she had brought or threatened to bring a
discrimination claim.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.). An action
is “materially adverse” if “it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S.
53, 68 (2006) (quoting Rochon v. Gonzalez, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
Brooks provides two potential instances of alleged retaliation. First, she points to the
letter of reprimand she received from Gladden based, in part, on Brooks’s attempt to go outside
her chain of command and complain to Vernon Foret that she felt “bullied and disrespected” by
Mattina. Am. Compl. at 2. Second, Brooks cites an email she received from Mattina in which
he offered her a lateral assignment “with the understanding” that she would “drop [her] EEO
complaint regarding alleged harassment for which [her] sought remedy [was] reassignment.”
Opp’n at 12; id., Ex. 23, at 180.
Accepting these allegations as true, they do not state a claim for retaliation. Consider
first the letter of reprimand. Assuming Brooks engaged in protected activity by attempting to
complain about Mattina’s behavior to his superior, she has not pled that she was subjected to a
“materially adverse action” as a result. “Letters of counseling or reprimand are not adverse
actions when they ‘contain[ ] no abusive language, but rather job-related constructive criticism,’
nor when they fail to affect the plaintiff’s salary, bonus, or other benefits.” Spence v. U.S. Dep’t
16 of Veterans Affs., 109 F.4th 531, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (first quoting
Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199; and then quoting Weber v. Battista, 494 F.3d 179, 185 (D.C. Cir.
2007)). Here, Gladden’s description of Brooks’s attempt “to meet[] with higher-level
management without adhering to the chain of command [as] disrespectful and unprofessional,”
Opp’n, Ex. 21, at 151, was not “abusive,” Spence, 109 F.4th at 540. Nor has Brooks alleged that
the letter affected her salary, bonus, or benefits in any way.
Mattina’s offer to reassign Brooks in exchange for dropping her EEO complaint also
cannot support a retaliation claim because Brooks has not plausibly pled that it was an “adverse
personnel action.” Mattina offered Brooks the exact relief she requested in her June 2019 EEO
complaint. See Opp’n, Ex. 18, at 136. Moreover, Brooks has not suggested that she was
ultimately denied the reassignment because she did not agree to drop the complaint. Instead, the
exhibits attached to her opposition indicate that the position simply became unavailable. See id.,
Ex. 23, at 168.
The Court therefore concludes that Brooks has not stated a retaliation claim.
4. Race or Sex Discrimination
Finally, the Court considers whether Brooks has plausibly pled race or sex discrimination
based on her email exchange with McKenzie. Under Title VII, “the two essential elements of a
discrimination claim are that (i) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because
of the plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability.” Baloch, 550 F.3d
at 1196 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(a)).
Brooks asserts that McKenzie sent her the email because he had “a personal issue with
[her], women, or African Americans.” Am. Compl. at 4. But she has not pled any facts to
17 support this conclusory assertion of discriminatory animus. As a result, Brooks has failed to
make out a prima facie case of sex or race discrimination.
***
Unable to discern any colorable allegations of a hostile work environment, retaliation, or
sex or race discrimination, the Court will grant the government’s motion as to these claims. But
because Brooks has plausibly pled that CBP failed to accommodate her disability in violation of
the Rehabilitation Act, the Court will allow that claim to proceed. While Brooks will need to
come forward with stronger evidence to survive summary judgment on this claim, she has done
enough to clear the relatively low pleading bar at this stage of the case.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that [ECF No. 9] Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part
DENIED in part. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant shall file an answer to Brooks’s Rehabilitation Act claim, as
construed by the Court in this Opinion, by October 11, 2024.
SO ORDERED.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge
Date: September 27, 2024