Brooks v. CDOC

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 12, 2024
• Docket: 23CA2077
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA2077 Brooks v CDOC 12-12-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA2077 Logan County District Court No. 22CV46 Honorable Stephanie M.G. Gagliano, Judge

Keith Clayton Brooks, Jr.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections, and Warden of Sterling Correctional Facility,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Dunn and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 12, 2024

Keith Clayton Brooks, Jr., Pro Se

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rachel Lieb, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Plaintiff, Keith Clayton Brooks, Jr., appeals the district court’s

judgment affirming his prison disciplinary conviction for Fighting

Class I. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Brooks is an inmate at the Sterling Correctional Facility

operated by the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC). While

at that facility, Brooks was served with a Notice of Charge for

Fighting Class I in violation of the Code of Penal Discipline for an

altercation in the facility. According to the notice, several inmates,

including Brooks, “were engaged in a physical altercation hitting

each other with closed fists,” and the inmates ignored directives to

stop fighting until prison staff used pepper spray on them.

¶3 At the disciplinary hearing, the hearing officer received an

incident report, video footage of the incident, screenshots of that

video footage, and anatomical examination reports of the inmates

involved in the altercation.

¶4 The hearing officer also heard testimony from Brooks, who

pleaded not guilty and asserted that he was acting in self-defense or

defense of others. Brooks didn’t deny that the altercation took

place or that he was part of it. Instead, he testified that he “applied

1 force” to fellow inmate Johnny Moreno when he saw Moreno holding

another inmate in a chokehold. He said Moreno then released the

chokehold, and he followed Moreno asking, “Are you good?” to

which Moreno answered, “Yeah, I’m good.” Brooks explained,

I’m not trying to downplay what I did, but I believe in that moment I acted in self-defense. I feel that the force was reasonable, that it was successful . . . . [A]s for the pursuit part of it, I just wanted to make sure that [Moreno] was clear on not engaging again.

¶5 The hearing officer found Brooks guilty of Fighting Class 1.

Brooks filed an administrative appeal, and the Administrative Head

upheld the decision.

¶6 Brooks filed a complaint in the district court for review of his

conviction under C.R.C.P. 106.5. Brooks also filed a motion

requesting a copy of the video footage of the altercation. The court

denied that motion and later, in a detailed written opinion, it

affirmed Brooks’s disciplinary conviction.

¶7 In this appeal, Brooks challenges the denial of his request for

access to the video footage, the sufficiency of the evidence to

support his conviction, and the hearing officer’s alleged bias. We

address each issue in turn, construing Brooks’s arguments

2 liberally, as we must, given his self-represented status. See

Minshall v. Johnston, 2018 COA 44, ¶ 21.

II. Due Process

¶8 We first address — and reject — Brooks’s contention that the

denial of access to the video footage violates his due process rights.1

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶9 Due process challenges to a disciplinary hearing procedure are

challenges to the CDOC’s quasi-judicial action. Garcia v. Harms,

2014 COA 154, ¶ 10. Our review of such challenges under C.R.C.P

106.5 “is limited to whether prison officials exceeded their

jurisdiction or abused their discretion.” Marymee v. Exec. Dir. of

Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 2014 COA 44, ¶ 5.

¶ 10 An inmate in a disciplinary hearing enjoys only the most basic

due process rights. Boles v. Bartruff, 228 P.3d 183, 186 (Colo. App.

2009). Those rights are (1) advance written notice of the claimed

1 We disagree with the CDOC’s assertion that Brooks waived his

due process argument because he didn’t raise it before the district court. While Brooks didn’t request the video footage or reference due process in his complaint, he filed a motion with the district court requesting a copy of the video and arguing that without it, he would “be prejudiced by the lack of an ability to cite the record,” creating “a hardship that violates due process.”

3 violation; (2) the ability to call witnesses and present documentary

evidence when it isn’t unduly hazardous to institutional safety or

correctional goals; and (3) a written statement of the evidence relied

upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Id.; see also Wolff

v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974).

¶ 11 An inmate’s due process right to present documentary

evidence may be violated if officials unjustifiably refuse the inmate’s

request to produce and review relevant video footage. Howard v.

U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 814-15 (10th Cir. 2007). To

that end, inmates have a qualified right to access such videos.

Lennear v. Wilson, 937 F.3d 257, 269-70 (4th Cir. 2019); see also

Whitmore v. Parker, 525 F. App’x 865, 866 (10th Cir. 2013).

However, the inmate’s right must give way if the government

establishes that disclosing the video in a particular case would be

unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.

Lennear, 937 F.3d at 269-70; see also Howard, 487 F.3d at 814;

Crosby v. Fox, 757 F. App’x 673, 678 (10th Cir. 2018).

B. Application

¶ 12 CDOC officials determined the video footage at issue was

“security-sensitive.” They explained,

4 While the [inmates] are aware of the presence of security cameras within the facility, they do not know the exact angles of the cameras or their zoom/pan/tilt capabilities. If the footage were to be presented to the [inmate] population, it would divulge information on camera angles within the facility as well as the quality of the recordings.

¶ 13 Accordingly, the CDOC denied Brooks access to the video. The

district court on review also denied Brooks’s request to access the

video, similarly reasoning that its disclosure “would disclose the

location of security cameras which is deemed a security risk.”

¶ 14 Brooks argues that denying him access to the video violated

his due process right to present documentary evidence in his

defense.

¶ 15 But the CDOC provided legitimate reasons for overcoming

Brooks’s right to the video: concerns about institutional safety if

inmates were to learn the exact angles and zoom, pan, and tilt

capabilities of the cameras in the facility. See Lennear, 937 F.3d at

269-70; Howard, 487 F.3d at 814; Crosby, 757 F. App’x at 678.

Brooks doesn’t present any evidence or argument challenging

CDOC’s reasoning.

5 ¶ 16 And while a blanket rule barring inmate access to video

evidence in all cases likely wouldn’t pass constitutional muster, see

Lennear, 937 F.3d at 270-71 (inmate rights to access videos must

be assessed on an individualized basis, and categorical or absolute

prohibitions don’t satisfy due process), we discern no due process

violation in this case. The CDOC provided Brooks with access to

screen shots from the video. The hearing officer also watched the

video in Brooks’s presence during the hearing, summarizing exactly

what he saw, and Brooks didn’t at any point challenge the hearing

officer’s observations about what happened. Indeed, Brooks

essentially admitted to the incident as it was described, arguing

only that his involvement was in self-defense or defense of others.

¶ 17 Accordingly, we conclude that Brooks’s lack of access to the

video footage of the altercation didn’t violate his due process rights.

¶ 18 To the extent that Brooks challenges the district court’s

rejection of his request to supplement the record with evidence from

the disciplinary hearings of the other inmates involved in the

altercation, we again discern no due process violation. Brooks

doesn’t explain how those hearing records have any bearing on his

6 conviction — which, as discussed below, was based on substantial

evidence regarding his own involvement in the incident.

¶ 19 Finally, to the extent that Brooks suggests the rejection of his

assertion of self-defense constitutes a violation of due process, we

aren’t persuaded. Rejection of Brooks’s asserted defense isn’t a due

process issue but, instead, is a question regarding the sufficiency of

the evidence.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 20 We now consider Brooks’s contention that insufficient

evidence supported his disciplinary conviction for Fighting Class I.

Specifically, he asserts that the evidence doesn’t support either (1) a

conviction for that offense or (2) the rejection of his defense of self-

defense. We disagree.

¶ 21 Again, our review is limited to whether the hearing officer

exceeded his jurisdiction or abused his discretion in entering a

disciplinary conviction against Brooks. See Marymee, ¶ 5.

¶ 22 When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence

supporting a prison disciplinary decision, we must “uphold the

decision if it is supported by ‘some evidence’ in the record.” Burns

7 v. Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 183 P.3d 695, 697 (Colo. App.

2008). Determining the credibility and weight of a witness’s

testimony are matters committed to the hearing officer’s discretion.

Martinez v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Hous. Auth., 992 P.2d 692, 696 (Colo.

App. 1999).

¶ 23 An inmate commits Fighting Class I when they “engage in a

physical altercation including, but not limited to: exchange of

punches, strikes, shoves, kicks, or any offensive physical contact

with another offender that . . . causes bodily injury requiring

medical treatment or requires a use of force to gain compliance.”

DOC Admin. Reg. 150-01(IV)(D)(6). Fighting Class II, by contrast,

involves the same conduct but doesn’t involve bodily injury

requiring medical treatment or the use of force to gain compliance.

DOC Admin. Reg. 150-01(IV)(E)(4).

¶ 24 Self-defense may be a defense to a disciplinary charge of

fighting. DOC Admin. Reg. 150-01(IV)(D)(6), (E)(4). In regard to

self-defense, the CDOC Code of Penal Discipline provides,

A person is justified to defend themselves from what they reasonably believe to be the use or imminent use of physical force. Continuing to fight beyond what is reasonable to defend oneself, or re-engaging once the combatants

8 have separated[,] can make the claim of self- defense invalid.

DOC Admin. Reg. 150-01(III)(BB).2

¶ 25 The evidence from the disciplinary hearing supports the

hearing officer’s finding that Brooks engaged in Fighting Class I and

his rejection of Brooks’s defense of self-defense. This includes the

following evidence:

• an incident report from an officer stating that after

reviewing the video footage of the altercation, she

positively identified Brooks and other inmates “engaging

in a physical altercation,” after which they were escorted

to the medical area for anatomical evaluations;

• video footage of the incident, showing that Brooks

inserted himself into the ongoing altercation between

other inmates, struck Moreno in the face, and then

continued to follow Moreno around even after Moreno

disengaged with the other inmates;

2 This provision is now in subsection (CC), but it was in subsection

(BB) at the time of the offense.

9 • screenshots from the video showing the inmates involved

in the altercation, including Brooks;

• Brooks’s testimony that he “applied force” to Moreno and

continued to follow him around to “make sure that he

was clear on not engaging again”;

• anatomical examination reports showing that at least one

of the inmates (not Moreno but another inmate) involved

in the incident sustained injuries; and

• video footage showing inmates continuing to engage in

the altercation after Brooks and Moreno were out of the

video frame, ignoring directives to stop, and being pepper

sprayed by prison staff to gain compliance.

¶ 26 This constitutes “some evidence” to support the hearing

officer’s finding that Brooks engaged in Fighting Class I. Burns,

183 P.3d at 697. Brooks argues that, at most, he engaged in

Fighting Class II because there was no evidence that he caused

Moreno or anyone else any bodily injury requiring medical

treatment or that officers had to use the pepper spray or any other

show of force to gain his compliance. See DOC Admin. Reg. 150-

01(IV)(D)(6), (E)(4). But there was evidence suggesting that Brooks

10 may have continued to pursue and attempt to engage Moreno until

prison staff were able to stop the entire altercation with a show of

force that included using pepper spray on some inmates. Thus,

there was some evidence that Brooks may have engaged in a

physical altercation that required the use of force to gain

compliance. And even if he didn’t himself cause any injuries or

require force to comply with prison staff’s instructions, he could be

responsible for the offense based on his participation in the group

altercation that both caused injuries and ended only after a show of

force. Cf. Grissom v. People, 115 P.3d 1280, 1284 (Colo. 2005) (“In

. . . ‘common enterprise’ cases, where both parties are acting in

concert to commit a threshold crime, but the principal ultimately

commits a more serious crime than the complicitor initially

intended, the complicitor can be held liable for the crime committed

by the principal.”).

¶ 27 As to the theory of self-defense, the hearing officer

acknowledged that Brooks believed he had acted in self-defense or

defense of another, but rejected that theory, explaining,

[F]or whatever reason, [Brooks] chose to come from the other side of the pod and inserted [himself] into the altercation by striking . . .

11 Moreno in the face and engaging [himself] into the offensive aspect of the altercation, which then [he] ended up pursuing the offender back across the pod. As another offender struck Moreno, [he] proceeded to stay within positioning of that offender and then follow them completely off camera.

¶ 28 The record supports the hearing officer’s rejection of Brooks’s

self-defense theory. While Brooks cites evidence that might have

supported a finding in his favor on that defense, we are required to

uphold the decision where, as here, there is “‘some evidence’ in the

record” to support it. Burns, 183 P.3d at 697.

¶ 29 Brooks certainly didn’t act to defend himself. And even

assuming that defending others falls within the CDOC’s self-defense

definition — something that isn’t clear from the Code of Penal

Discipline or from any of the authorities Brooks cites — the record

supports a finding that Brooks didn’t reasonably act in defending

others. It’s not clear that Brooks reasonably believed he needed to

intervene to protect any of the inmates initially involved in the

altercation; yet he willfully inserted himself into that altercation by

striking Moreno in the face. See DOC Admin. Reg. 150-01(III)(BB).

Brooks also may have continued to fight beyond what was

reasonable, or may have unreasonably attempted to re-engage

12 Moreno, particularly when he continued to follow Moreno around

the room even after Moreno had disengaged. See id. At a

minimum, the evidence may have been ambiguous, and it was

within the hearing officer’s purview to resolve it and determine

whether any self-defense or defense of others was reasonable. See

Sanchez v. People, 820 P.2d 1103, 1108 (Colo. 1991) (“[T]he fact

finder must weigh all relevant circumstances to determine whether

a person asserting the defense of self-defense has acted as a

reasonable person would act in similar circumstances.”).

IV. Bias

¶ 30 Finally, we turn to Brooks’s contention that the hearing officer

acted with actual bias by characterizing him as an aggressor and

rejecting his self-defense theory. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 31 An administrative hearing officer is presumed to be impartial,

and the party challenging the officer’s action has the burden of

proving otherwise. Washington v. Atherton, 6 P.3d 346, 347 (Colo.

App. 2000). Actual bias is bias that “in all probability will prevent

[a hearing officer] from dealing fairly with a party.” People in

13 Interest of A.G., 262 P.3d 646, 650 (Colo. 2011) (quoting People v.

Julien, 47 P.3d 1194, 1197 (Colo. 2002)).

¶ 32 To support a claim of bias or partiality on the part of a hearing

officer, “an inmate must offer evidence of, or the record must

indicate, some impropriety.” Washington, 6 P.3d at 347. Adverse

legal rulings may be proper grounds for an appeal but are unlikely

to provide grounds for a claim of bias or partiality. People in

Interest of A.P., 2022 CO 24, ¶ 32; see also Bocian v. Owners Ins.

Co., 2020 COA 98, ¶ 23 (“[A]dverse legal rulings, standing alone, do

not constitute grounds for claiming prejudice or bias.”);

Washington, 6 P.3d at 347 (rejecting an inmate’s claim of bias

where the inmate “failed to make any showing that the hearing

officer actually prejudged the case or decided it based on anything

other than the evidence presented”).

¶ 33 Nothing in the record indicates that the hearing officer was

biased or partial. Indeed, during Brooks’s testimony, the hearing

officer asked clarifying questions to ensure he fully understood

Brooks’s assertion of self-defense. And afterward the hearing officer

explained his decision in detail. The mere fact that the hearing

14 officer rejected Brooks’s defense — a decision we agree is supported

by the evidence — doesn’t indicate bias. See A.P., ¶ 32; Bocian,

¶ 23; Washington, 6 P.3d at 347.

¶ 34 Therefore, we reject Brooks’s bias claim.

V. Disposition

¶ 35 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.