Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Cashmore

21 Misc. 2d 126, 194 N.Y.S.2d 298, 1958 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2780
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 27, 1958
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 21 Misc. 2d 126 (Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Cashmore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Cashmore, 21 Misc. 2d 126, 194 N.Y.S.2d 298, 1958 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2780 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1958).

Opinion

Meier Steinbrink,

Spec. Ref. This is an application, pursuant to article 78 of the Civil Practice Act, for an order directing respondents to issue to petitioner a permit to install a gas regulator with adequate ventilation in a public street as prescribed by an order of the Public Service Commission of the State of New York.

Originally petitioner’s application for an order, peremptory or alternative, was denied and the petition dismissed at Special Term, Part I (154 N. Y. S. 2d 62). On appeal the Appellate Division by a 3-to-2 vote affirmed (4 A D 2d 677). On further appeal the Court of Appeals by a 4-to-3 vote modified the order and directed the issuance of an alternative order under section 1295 of the Civil Practice Act (4 N Y 2d 727). A trial under this alternative order has been had and the matter is now before me for decision.

By stipulation and consent of the parties, and accompanied by counsel for both sides, I spent an entire day viewing gas installations at Van Wyclc Boulevard and 116th Street in Queens; at Vanderbilt Avenue in Brooklyn; and at Clifton, Richmond, Staten Island.

Petitioner is a gas corporation organized in 1895 under the Transportation Corporations Law. In that year it acquired [127]*127the property and franchises of seven gas companies including the Brooklyn Gas Light Company created by chapter 204 of the Laws of 1825. The other companies were incorporated at various times after enactment of the general act (L. 1848, ch. 37) authorizing formation of gas light companies. That act is now in the Transportation Corporations Law (art. 2).

It appears that from 1909 to 1955 permits were issued to petitioner and other gas companies by the authorities of the City of New York for opening of streets and the installation of various gas regulators therein. On June 6, 1955 petitioner applied to the city “ for a permit for the installation of a gas safety regulator in a pit with a vent post as prescribed by the Public Service Commission order dated November 7, 1952 in case 15686.” A particular location was designated. On June 7, 1955 respondent’s chief engineer replied, “ * * * We will issue a permit for the installation of a regulator in a pit but we have been requested by the Bureau of Franchises to withhold permits for the installation of vent poles in the sidewalk area until permission for this has been granted by the Board of Estimate through the Bureau of Franchises ”. Thereafter the city took the position and maintains it here that it would neither issue permits for the installation of the vault, the regulators nor the vent poles without the prior consent of its Bureau of Franchises of the Board of Estimate and the payment of compensation for the privilege of doing so. Caught between the necessity of complying with the concededly reasonable order of the Public Service Commission and the refusal of the city to permit the installations except upon its own terms, this proceeding was begun on June 13, 1955. While it refers to one specific location it is stated to be a test case involving 356 locations in New York City for petitioner and other gas companies.

The basic issue is whether, as petitioner contends, its franchise right “to lay conductors for gas in the streets” includes the right to install gas regulators in vaults in the streets, together with suitable vent poles. The city admits, as indeed it is well established, that by statute and original consents petitioner has a perpetual franchise to the use of city streets for “ conductors for gas ” and that if the installations for which permits are here sought are in that category then the refusal to issue the permits is arbitrary and the petition should be granted. It claims, however, that the regulators are not in the category of conductors and that even if they were, then the vault space in the streets into which they are placed and the vent poles required by State authority are not. Respondent contends that, [128]*128in spite of the fact that it has regularly from 1909 to 1955 raised no objection to these installations and in fact has issued administrative permits therefor, they are not conductors for gas ” embraced in the company’s franchise rights and may not be installed or hereafter maintained without a new franchise or consent of the Board of Estimate. Of course, there can be no right acquired by long usage to the use of parts of the streets in the nature of adverse possession but it seems to me that although not binding it is highly significant that the engineers and administrative assistants of the city have for over 45 years interpreted the franchises of the gas companies as including the right to make such installations, a right which they could only have if the installations were part of the conduction system. In fact, it was only when petitioner sought approval for the installation of sidewalk vent poles which are public safety protective instrumentalities in connection with the regulator installations that the controversy arose even though some vent poles had previously been installed (see, e.g., Exhibit 3, permit for such a vent pole issued August 29, 1952). It is true, of course that respondent has since shifted its position.

Respondent urges that the holding by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Brooklyn Edison Co. v. Davidson (269 N. Y. 48) is controlling and decisive of the present application. That was the view of Special Term and of the majority of the Appellate Division and even of the minority of the Court of Appeals but not of the majority of the Court of Appeals who stated, “ We do not regard Matter of Brooklyn Edison Co. v. Davidson * * * as necessarily decisive.” This last expression of the Court of Appeals is, of course, binding upon me. A comparison of the Davidson case with the present case is necessary. That was an application by an electric corporation to compel the administrative authorities of the city to issue a permit for installation in the city streets of electric transformers of 500 k.v.a. capacity and weighing over five tons, in vaults 16 feet long, as being embraced in their franchise to place in the public streets “ suitable wires or other conductors, with the necessary poles, pipes, and fixtures ” for transmitting electricity. It was there held that the transformers were not embraced in such franchise as their function was not to act as a channel for transmission of electricity. Respondent contends that the gas regulators involved here are similar to the electric transformers in the Davidson case. I cannot agree.

An electric transformer such as was involved in the Davidson case is a device to step up or step down voltage in the fixed [129]*129proportion that the number of windings of the primary coil bears to the number of windings of the secondary coil. It cannot regulate voltage. Alternating electric current entering the transformer on the primary winding creates an alternating magnetic field in the core of the transformer which energizes and activates different md independent electrons in the secondary winding. Thus current which enters the transformer consists of different activated electrons from that which leaves the transformer. The proof before me clearly establishes that an electric transformer interrupts the flow of current in the circuit which then passes from the central or main generator to the primary winding of the transformer and back to the generator.

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Related

Brewer v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co.
33 Misc. 2d 1015 (New York Supreme Court, 1962)

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Bluebook (online)
21 Misc. 2d 126, 194 N.Y.S.2d 298, 1958 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2780, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brooklyn-union-gas-co-v-cashmore-nysupct-1958.