Brooklyn Ferry Co. v. United States

122 F. 696, 1903 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 296
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedApril 8, 1903
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 122 F. 696 (Brooklyn Ferry Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brooklyn Ferry Co. v. United States, 122 F. 696, 1903 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 296 (E.D.N.Y. 1903).

Opinion

THOMAS, District Judge.

About 6:16 a. m., August 1, 1899, in the East river, opposite South Second or South Third streets, Brooklyn, and at a point about 300 feet from the easterly shore, the stem of the United States steamship Dolphin struck the port side of the ferryboat New York about 20 feet aft the bow. Hence the above actions. The weather was clear, and the tide had been running ebb for an hour and a half. The Dolphin was going up the river, and the New York was bound from Twenty-Third street, Manhattan, to the foot of Broadway, Brooklyn. The Dolphin was in general charge of Lieutenant Commander Southerland, and under the immediate direction of Hudson, a licensed Hell Gate and Sound pilot. The bridge is 90 feet from the stem, and on it is the pilot house, in which were Jenkins, in actual charge of the wheel, and Sabelstrom, chief quartermaster and watch. On the bridge, near the starboard outboard rail, was Lieut. Snowden, known as the executive officer, whose duty it was to supervise the execution of the orders [697]*697given by the commanding officer, and also to look out. He did not report anything between the time of sighting the Priscilla to the time of the collision. On the extreme outboard port side of the bridge was located Lieut. Kittelle, whose duty it was to act as lookout, and also to observe the engine-room dial! The commander stood on the port side of the pilot house, varying his position slightly as occasion demanded, while Hudson, the pilot, was on the starboard side, and, as he says, “dodging around backwards and forwards, two or three feet, five or six feet, where I could see.” He states that one of the causes of his dodging around might have been the foremast or something forward on the forecastle deck. The evidence shows quite plainly that, while the foremast and other objects forward would intercept the view of a person standing at a particular point on the bridge, yet there was all requisite opportunity for seeing, and the New York was seen at a sufficiently early time, and continued in constant view. The commander testified that, under the conditions existing on that morning, it was not the custom to keep a lookout on the forecastle deck, as he would interrupt somewhat the view of those on the bridge, and that there was no lookout there at the time. In one respect he was in error, for Koterski had been placed on the forecastle deck as the vessel was coming up the bay, and had not been withdrawn at the time in question. When there was expectation of a collision, several other persons in the neighborhood appeared on the forecastle deck, but their presence did not embarrass seriously the view from the bridge. Koterski states that he reported the New York. On the whole evidence, it it concluded that an efficient and proper lookout was kept on the Dolphin.

The ferryboat New York was in charge of Longstreet, who acted generally as master, particularly as wheelsman and pilot, and practically as lookout, inasmuch as his attendant, Peterson, was there, to use the master’s words, to “watch for me to keep alive. That is about all.” And Curtis, the deckhand forward on the main deck, testified, “My duties was to look out ahead—in case there was any collision, report it to the pilot, for instance, if I know he didn’t see it.” It is quite evident that the New York had no systematic, efficient lookout, and that such duty centered upon the master, who was also occupied with his other duties. If Peterson acted as a lookout, it is evident that Longstreet ignored him, and Curtis seems to have had no comprehension of the duties of a lookout. That the absence of a helpful lookout contributed to the accident is quite probable.

The case presents a strange misapprehension of signals under favorable conditions. The evidence shows that the Dolphin at the earliest opportunity took her position close to the Brooklyn shore; that after passing the bridge she was forced to mid-stream by opposite vessels; that thereupon her course was lined across to the Williamsburg shore; that “when only about halfway across” she sighted the Pall River boat Priscilla coming down the stream, and exchanged a single whistle with her, and, as the lieutenant commander testified, “at this time * * * the helm of the Dolphin was very slightly astarboard, so as to bring her in on the Williamsburg side without [698]*698running into the shore.” Probably the Dolphin’s swing to port in adjusting herself to a course parallel to the face of the piers may have given her some appearance of an intended course to port. Her evidence quite satisfactorily shows that she blew three distinct single whistles to the New York, and that the last alone was answered by the New York with two whistles. The master of the New York states that he heard two single whistles from the Dolphin, but it is evident that he did not hear the Dolphin’s first whistle. His failure to hear the first may have arisen from the fact that it was blown by the Dolphin shortly after the latter had exchanged a starboard whistle with the Priscilla, and before the Dolphin had passed that vessel. The master of the New York states that he answered the starboard whistle with a similar signal, and that after an interval, which enabled the New York to cover a third or a quarter of the distance that separated the vessels, the Dolphin sounded two whistles, which he answered with a single blast. The evidence on the part of the Dolphin is that none of her signals were answered until, when the vessels were near each other, her starboard whistle was answered by a port whistle from the New York, which the Dolphin, in turn, answered; that immediately the New York sounded a single whistle, which the Dolphin also answered.

The first question, then, is, did the New York answer the Dolphin’s starboard whistle with a like signal, or did she, rather, answer by a port signal, which the Dolphin answered, or did the Dolphin initiate the port signal after she had already given the starboard signals? This is a mere question of fact, and the fact to be ascertained is which vessel first gave the port whistle. Considering the discipline, the number and quality of the persons on strict duty on the Dolphin, the probable individual intelligence of the witnesses, the opportunity and duty to see and hear, it is concluded that the Dolphin is correct in her contention that the New York initiated the port signal. This conclusion is helped by the fact that a motive is ascribable to the New York in giving a port signal, inasmuch as she desired to head to port, and, indeed, she claims she was heading to port, for the purpose of making her slip, which was at Broadway. There was no motive whatever for the Dolphin going to port, and a port signal initiated by her after her two starboard signals would be unaccountable folly. The evidence shows beyond any rational doubt that the vessels, when they sighted each other, were on each other’s port hand, so that in the night the port light on each vessel would have been seen by the other. This continued until the time of the collision, except that shortly before the collision the New York probably for a short time showed her starboard light, whereupon she ported, showing her red light again. She was never on the starboard side of the Dolphin. Therefore the proper signal was the starboard whistle. The relation of the vessels to each other precluded the propriety óf the New York initiating the port signal, and she was negligent for so doing.

The next important inquiry is, was the Dolphin negligent in immediately answering the signal, considering the proximity of the vessels and the contracted space for operation, or should she have stopped and backed under an alarm signal when her starboard signal

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Bluebook (online)
122 F. 696, 1903 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 296, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brooklyn-ferry-co-v-united-states-nyed-1903.