Brookley v. Ranson

376 F. Supp. 195, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8257
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Iowa
DecidedMay 31, 1974
Docket72-C-21-CR
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 376 F. Supp. 195 (Brookley v. Ranson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brookley v. Ranson, 376 F. Supp. 195, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8257 (N.D. Iowa 1974).

Opinion

ORDER

McMANUS, Chief Judge.

This action for alienation of affections and criminal conversation is before the court for decision after trial to the court on February 25, 1974.

Plaintiff Charles Brookley, in Count I, seeks to recover for the alleged alienation of affection of his wife by defendant and, in Count II, seeks to recover for alleged criminal conversation between his wife and defendant. Plaintiff Craig Brookley, in Count III, seeks to recover for the alleged alienation of affection of his mother by defendant.

From the evidence presented at trial, the following facts appear: Plaintiff and his wife were married in 1957. Several times during the marriage the relationship became strained, with the final breakdown occurring in March of 1971 when plaintiff discovered that defendant, a Methodist minister, and plaintiff’s wife were having a relationship, as evidenced by several letters written by defendant to plaintiff’s wife. 1 Plaintiff’s wife moved out of the family home in May of 1971 to live with her parents in Kaiser, West Virginia. Defendant moved to Cedar Rapids, Iowa in August, 1971 to join the faculty at Mt. Mercy College, where he is presently Dean of Students and working on his Ph.D. at the University of Iowa. His wife and children still live in Frostburg, Maryland. Plaintiff’s wife moved to Cedar Rapids in August of 1971 and worked at Collins Radio for several months before returning to West Virginia in December of 1971. During her stay in Cedar Rapids she saw defendant several times a week and did general housework for him. The relationship between defendant and plaintiff’s wife terminated in December of 1971 and she has resided in Kaiser, West Virginia with her parents since that time.

Jurisdiction

Defendant has challenged plaintiffs’ allegation of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Plaintiffs, at all times material, have been citizens of Maryland. A dispute exists, however, with regard to the citizenship of defendant at the time of the filing of this lawsuit on May 10, 1972. Plaintiffs contend that defendant was a citizen of Iowa on that date whereas defendant contends that he was still a citizen of Maryland.

In a diversity action, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish the court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by a preponderance of the evidence. The requisites for establishing the domicile or citizenship of a party are physical presence in the alleged domicile plus an intention by such party to make the domicile his home indefinitely or an absence of an intention to make his home elsewhere. Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1120 (6th Cir. 1973); Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300-1301 (3rd Cir. 1972).

Admittedly, defendant retained numerous contacts with the state of Maryland after he came to Iowa in Au *198 gust of 1971. 2 Nevertheless the letters which he wrote plaintiff’s wife indicating that Cedar Rapids would be their new home and the indefinite nature of his job and stay in Iowa evidence both his intent to make Cedar Rapids, Iowa his domicile and the absence of any intent to make his home elsewhere. Defendant testified that he presently has no intent to leave his job at Mt. Mercy and that after he obtains his Ph.D. he has no specific plans or jobs in mind. Defendant also testified that it is uncertain as to when and whether his family will join him although it is a possibility, as evidenced by the fact that his wife has recently sought employment in Cedar Rapids. Accordingly, from reviewing the evidence presented at trial, it is the court’s view that defendant, at the time of the filing of this lawsuit in May of 1972, was a citizen of Iowa and this court thus has diversity subject matter jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Krasnov v. Dinan, supra, 1302-1303.

Count I — Alienation of Affection— Charles Brookley

Although it appears from the evidence that defendant alienated whatever affection plaintiff’s wife had for him, the basic question presented is whether Iowa law or Maryland law governs plaintiff Charles Brookley’s claim for alienation of affection since Iowa recognizes such a cause of action whereas Maryland has statutorily abolished such actions. Article 75C § 2, Annotated Code of Maryland (1957).

Federal courts in diversity cases are required to apply the forum’s choice of law rules in resolving conflicts of laws questions. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). Thus, this court must look to Iowa’s conflicts law to determine whether Iowa or Maryland law governs plaintiff’s claim for alienation of affections. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 107-112, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945).

The Iowa Supreme Court has adopted “the most significant relationships rule” for determining the substantive law to be applied in litigation involving a torts-confliet question. Berg-hammer v. Smith, 185 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Iowa 1971); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 1968). “The basic premise of the most significant relationships theory is that the court of the forum should apply the policy of the state with the most interest in the litigants and the outcome of the litigation.” Fuerste v. Bemis, supra, at 834. In actions for loss of consortium and similar matters involving the marital relationship, the Iowa court has held that “the law of the marital domicile ordinarily prevails.” Berghammer v. Smith, supra, 185 N.W.2d at 232. See Rank v. Kuhn, 236 Iowa 854, 20 N.W.2d 72, 74-75 (1945).

Applying Iowa’s conflicts law to the facts of this case, it is the court’s view that the law of the marital domicile, Maryland, should be applied. Although some acts of alienation may have occurred in Iowa, the majority of such acts occurred in Maryland at a time when all parties were still residents of Maryland since the alienation was essentially completed by May of 1971 when plaintiff’s wife moved out of the family home.

In view of Maryland’s statutory abolition of the cause of action for alienation of affection, Count I of the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P.

Count II — Criminal Conversation

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
376 F. Supp. 195, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8257, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brookley-v-ranson-iand-1974.