FILED Mar 12 2024, 8:48 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Alexander N. Moseley JOSEPH TODD WELLS Julie C. Dixon Jonathan R. Deenik Dixon & Moseley, P.C. Deenik Lowe, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana Greenwood, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Brooke Wells, March 12, 2024 Appellant-Intervenor, Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-DR-990 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court Joseph Todd Wells, The Honorable Appellee-Petitioner, Danielle Gaughan, Judge Trial Court Cause No. and 49D15-0904-DR-18395
Kimberly Renay Wells, Appellee-Respondent.
Opinion by Judge Foley Judge Pyle concurs and Judge Tavitas dissents with opinion.
Foley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 1 of 24 [1] Brooke Wells (“Daughter”) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the trial court’s finding that she repudiated her father, Joseph Todd
Wells (“Father”), and therefore Father was relieved of his obligation to pay for
her to attend college. Concluding that the trial court did not clearly err in
finding that Daughter repudiated Father, we affirm the trial court.
Facts and Procedural History [2] Daughter is the child of Father and Kimberly Renay Wells (“Mother”), 1 whose
marriage was dissolved in 2010. Under the dissolution decree, which
incorporated the terms of a marital settlement agreement, Father was obligated
to pay for Daughter to attend college. In July 2021, Father initiated the instant
litigation by filing a petition for the emancipation of Daughter, who turned
eighteen earlier that year. Daughter intervened, filing a motion to enforce the
provisions of the dissolution decree that required Father to pay for her college
education. Father then filed a petition alleging that Daughter had repudiated
him, asking the trial court to either (1) relieve him of the obligation to pay for
Daughter’s college education or (2) modify the dissolution decree.
[3] A fact-finding hearing was held in December 2022. Evidence was presented
that Daughter—who was born on March 5, 2003—was completing her senior
year of high school in the spring of 2021. As of her junior year, Daughter’s plan
was to join the Air Force. Before spring break of her senior year, Daughter had
1 Mother does not participate on appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 2 of 24 taken a physical and received a special assignment. Daughter went on spring
break with her boyfriend, Bryce Bowen, and his family. During the trip, she
confided in Bryce’s mother, telling her she did not want to go into the Air
Force.
[4] Before spring break, Daughter generally had a positive relationship with Father
and his wife (“Stepmother”), with whom Daughter lived. When Daughter
returned from spring break, she informed Father by text message that she no
longer wished to go into the Air Force. Father and Stepmother then attempted
to speak with Daughter about her options. At that point, Father was under the
impression that Daughter had not submitted college applications. However,
Daughter had in fact submitted college applications, but she did not tell Father
because she thought he would be upset due to having other plans for Daughter.
[5] The issue of Daughter’s post-secondary plans resulted in family conflict and the
deterioration of Daughter’s relationships with Father, Stepmother, and
Daughter’s older brother (“Brother”). In May 2021—by which point Daughter
was eighteen years old, but still in high school—Daughter abruptly moved out
of Father’s home and moved in with the Bowens. Daughter did not discuss this
decision with Father. Father wanted Daughter to move back into his home,
where Daughter’s clothing, bedding, and other personal belongings were
available to her. Although Father thought Daughter might move back within a
week or so, Daughter continued living with the Bowens, who purchased
clothing, bedding, and other items for her. When Daughter began attending
community college at Ivy Tech, it was the Bowens who paid the tuition. Since
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 3 of 24 moving out in May 2021, Daughter returned twice to gather personal
belongings. In the ensuing months, Father and Stepmother invited Daughter to
attend family events and sit for a family portrait. Daughter did not attend
events where Father was present, and she did not come for the family portrait.
[6] Since May 2021, Father has physically seen Daughter on three occasions: (1)
her high school graduation; (2) an appointment for the extraction of Daughter’s
wisdom teeth, where Father paid for the procedure; and (3) a brief luncheon. In
November 2021, Father became seriously ill and was hospitalized. Daughter
did not visit Father, and she engaged in only minimal communications about
his health. As Daughter attended community college and later enrolled at
Indiana University, Daughter did not provide Father with specific information
regarding the costs of attendance, the classes she was taking, or her grades.
Although Father would periodically send Daughter text messages, and
Daughter would sometimes respond—at times expressing well-wishes and
telling Father she loved and missed him—Father testified that Daughter’s
actions belied her words. Father ultimately testified that he believes Daughter
“doesn’t have the desire to have a relationship” with him. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 14.
[7] The trial court took the matter under advisement. It later entered sua sponte
findings and conclusions, writing that Daughter “repudiated her relationship
with Father and Father is therefore relieved of his obligation to contribute to
[Daughter’s] college expenses.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 27. Daughter
moved to correct error, claiming the judgment was “contrary to relevant case
law on repudiation and post-secondary educational support orders.” Id. at 131.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 4 of 24 Daughter challenged several of the court’s findings, and she sought relief due to
the alleged “misinterpretation of relevant case law, or a mistake having been
made[.]” Id. at 147. The trial court denied the motion. Daughter now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [8] Daughter appeals the denial of her motion to correct error. That motion
challenged the trial court’s determination that Daughter repudiated Father and,
therefore, Father was relieved of his obligation to pay for her college expenses.
We review the denial of a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion.
Berg v. Berg, 170 N.E.3d 224, 227 (Ind. 2021). Under this standard, we “only
reverse ‘where the trial court’s judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances before it or where the trial court errs on a matter of
law.’” Id. (quoting Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 767 (Ind. 2021)).
However, to the extent the ruling turns on a question of law, our review is de
novo. Id. Furthermore, where—as here—the trial court entered sua sponte
findings, those findings control only “the issues or matters covered thereby[.]”
Ind. Trial Rule 52(D). As to other issues, “the judgment or general finding . . .
shall control[.]” Id. Under Trial Rule 52(A), we “shall not set aside the
findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” A
finding is clearly erroneous only if the record contains no facts to support the
finding, either directly or by inference. Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262
(Ind. 1997). “A judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong legal
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 5 of 24 standard to properly found facts.” Id. We ultimately look to whether the
evidence supports the findings and the findings support the judgment. Id. In
doing so, “we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of
witnesses, but consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment.”
Staresnick v. Staresnick, 830 N.E.2d 127, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
We will affirm unless our review leaves us “with the firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” Yanoff, 688 N.E.2d at 1262.
[9] “[W]here a child, as an adult over eighteen years of age, repudiates a parent,
that parent must be allowed to dictate what effect this will have on his or her
contribution to college expenses for that child.” Lovold v. Ellis, 988 N.E.2d
1144, 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting McKay v. McKay, 644 N.E.2d 164, 168
(Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). Repudiation is the “complete refusal to participate in a
relationship with the parent” after the child turns eighteen. Lovold, 988 N.E.2d
at 1150. In relieving a parent of the obligation to pay for college expenses upon
the child’s repudiation, we emphasized that, “[b]y college age, children of
divorced parents must be expected to begin to come to terms with the reality of
their family’s situation. They must begin to realize that their attitude and
actions are their individual responsibilities.” Messner v. Messner, 118 N.E.3d 64,
68–69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting McKay, 644 N.E.2d at 166), trans. denied.
Thus, “[w]hatever their biases and resentments”—even if “one can understand
how they got that way”—“when they become adults it is no longer appropriate
to allow them to stay that way without consequence.” Id. (emphasis removed).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 6 of 24 [10] Although not raised by the parties, the dissent would hold that the doctrine of
repudiation is not available to Father because Father’s obligation to contribute
to Daughter’s educational expenses was included in a marital settlement
agreement. Critically, however, a parent’s obligation to contribute to the
educational expenses of a child is not found at common law but, instead, arises
solely from our dissolution of marriage statutes. See I.C. § 31-16-6-2. And,
similar to a child support order, an educational support order is subject to
modification. See generally Svenstrup v. Svenstrup, 981 N.E.2d 138, 145 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012) (“Generally, provisions for the payment of educational expenses are
. . . modifiable because educational expenses are in the nature of child
support.”); see also Panfil v. Fell, 19 N.E.3d 772, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)
(involving circumstances where “the dissolution decree incorporated an
agreement of the parties” requiring one parent to pay “one-third of [the child’s]
expenses for . . . college education,” and the trial court “later modified its order
to condition [the] support obligation” on, among other things, the maintenance
of a certain GPA), trans. denied. We find no proper basis to limit the doctrine of
repudiation to instances where the provision of educational expenses was a
contested matter—particularly in this instance, where more than ten years have
passed since the original agreed entry. 2 We therefore proceed to address
Daughter’s challenges to the trial court’s findings and judgment.
2 To the extent the dissent expresses concerns about the repudiation doctrine itself—suggesting that this doctrine “opens the door to damaging parent-child relationships,” infra p. 24—those types of public policy
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 7 of 24 [11] Daughter challenges the trial court’s ultimate determination that “[Daughter]
has repudiated her relationship with Father[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 27.
She specifically challenges four underlying findings, including the finding that
she “failed to attend a counseling session on May 17, 2021, as the parties had
agreed to in a Partial Mediated Agreed Entry that was approved by the Court
on September 28, 2022.” Id. at 26. Daughter points out that she could not have
been subject to an agreed entry in May 2021, which was well before the
litigation commenced. Regardless, it is well-settled that “[s]pecial findings,
even if erroneous, do not warrant reversal if they amount to mere surplusage
and add nothing to the trial court’s decision.” Bell v. Clark, 653 N.E.2d 483, 489
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995), expressly adopted, Bell v. Clark, 670 N.E.1290, 1294 (Ind.
1996). Here, we conclude that this challenged finding amounts to surplusage.
We focus on specific findings regarding Daughter’s relationship with Father.
[12] Daughter challenges the following finding regarding whether Daughter was
meaningfully engaged with the family after moving out of Father’s residence:
The communication between Father and [Daughter] has been by Facebook Messenger and text. [Daughter] was invited to several family celebrations by Father and Stepmother and was included in an invitation for a family portrait. [Daughter] failed to show up for any family celebrations and did not respond to the invitations. [Daughter] stated she intended to show up for the
concerns are best addressed by our legislature. Moreover, restricting the repudiation doctrine implicates other policy issues in that, if repudiation did not apply whenever a parent initially agreed to educational support, parents might be dissuaded from including this type of support in their settlement agreements.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 8 of 24 family portrait but concedes that she did not because she ‘lost track of time.’
Id. at 26. According to Daughter, “[t]his finding is clearly erroneous to the
extent that it states Daughter did not show up for any family celebrations or
respond to the invitations.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. Daughter points out that she
attended at least some “family events during the relevant time period,” and she
“did respond to Father when he would invite her” to certain events. Id.
Daughter is correct in that there is, for example, evidence that she attended a
Christmas gathering with Mother. At the same time, the evidence indicates
that Daughter left early without explanation. In any case, the essence of the
challenged finding was that Daughter lacked meaningful engagement with the
family, and Father in particular. And there is ample evidence that Daughter
withdrew from Father after she moved out, declining to attend family events
where he was present. Indeed, there was evidence that Father’s door was open
to her, but she saw him in person on just three occasions in the eighteen months
between the date she moved in with the Bowens and the evidentiary hearing.
[13] Daughter also challenges the trial court’s finding that she “failed to include
either of her parents in her college choices or provide either of them with
meaningful information regarding costs, classes, or grades.” Id. Daughter
directs us to evidence that she alerted Father when she was accepted to Indiana
University, that she and Father briefly discussed student loans, and she “was
sending information to Father as early as April of 2021 regarding schools she
would like to attend, as well as attempting to discuss financial information.” Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 9 of 24 at 14. In challenging the foregoing finding, Daughter focuses on the evidence
favorable to her. However, she omits evidence indicating that Father was
concerned that Daughter was making a rash decision about post-secondary
plans, after suddenly abandoning her plans to go into the Air Force. Father
testified that, although Daughter “changed her mind overnight,” he was
ultimately supportive of Daughter’s decision to go to college. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 91.
He “wanted the best for [Daughter]” and, by the end of May 2021, “was trying
to figure out how [the family could] get [Daughter] to college,” but Daughter
would not participate in a “deliberate, thoughtful” planning process or abide by
Father’s basic rules for living in his home as a college-bound adult. Id. at 94.
[14] Daughter also challenges the following finding:
[Daughter] has repudiated her relationship with Father and has rejected Father’s efforts to reconcile their relationship. There is no question that [Daughter] could have returned to Father’s home at any time after she left on May 12, 2021, in the final semester of her senior year of high school. Unlike the fact patterns in case law regarding repudiation where the child is usually in the home of the custodial parent and is alleged to have repudiated the non-custodial parent, [Daughter] has repudiated both of her parents and even separated herself from her older brother, to whom she was once close.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 26. As to this finding—and other related findings
that Daughter has repudiated her relationship with Father—Daughter seems to
acknowledge that the parent-child relationship was severely strained. However,
she maintains that there is insufficient evidence that she completely refused to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 10 of 24 participate in the relationship so as to support a finding of repudiation. She
asserts that, “from a practical standpoint, it is understandable why Daughter
would not want to move back in with Father while there was pending litigation
between [them], as it surely would have created a tense situation.” Appellant’s
Br. p. 16. She asserts that “[a]n adult child’s decision to move out of [her]
parent’s home cannot lead to an inference that [she] no longer wants a
relationship with that parent.” Id. Daughter generally directs us to the
evidence most favorable to her position, focusing on evidence that she loved
Father and “desir[ed] to have a relationship” with him. Id. at 21. Daughter
ultimately claims that “the testimony presented at the final hearing[] prohibits a
finding that Daughter repudiated her relationship” with Father. Id.
[15] Daughter characterizes the strain in the parent-child relationship as merely a
“rough patch,” id. at 22, and she directs us to Redd v. Redd, 901 N.E.2d 545, 552
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009), where this Court reversed a finding of repudiation. We
note, however, that family law cases involving the alleged repudiation of a
parent-child relationship are especially fact-intensive, and we are not at liberty
to reweigh the evidence. Furthermore, since Redd was decided, our Supreme
Court has repeatedly “expressed the importance of appellate deference in family
law matters[.]” D.C. v. J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 956 (Ind. 2012). Critically, the
trial court has the “unique” opportunity to have “direct interactions with the
parties”—often “over an extended period of time.” Id. (quoting Best v. Best, 941
N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011)). But “appellate courts ‘are in a poor position to
look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 11 of 24 saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as
it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of
the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)).
[16] Here, there is evidence that, although Daughter periodically corresponded with
Father through written messages, she was at times “manipulative” and her
engagement was insincere. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 84. Father emphasized that “actions
speak louder than words.” Id. at 90. He pointed to Daughter’s lack of
meaningful communication when he was hospitalized on multiple occasions. It
was ultimately Father’s position that Daughter wanted him to pay for college,
but without collaborating with him to form a thoughtful plan for her career.
[17] Whereas the dissent concludes that “nothing in the record supports a finding
that Daughter ha[d] completely rejected a relationship with Father,” in light of
the foregoing evidence, we respectfully disagree. Infra p. 24. All in all, the
doctrine of repudiation contemplates intervening acts of the child to sever the
parent’s duty to contribute to educational expenses, and this case involved
conflicting evidence regarding the status and prognosis of the parent-child
relationship. Under the circumstances, we must adhere to our standard of
review and defer to the trial court, which was in the best position to assess
witness credibility and make a factual determination regarding Daughter’s
intended relationship with Father. Cf. D.C. v. J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 956 (Ind.
2012) (emphasizing “the importance of appellate deference in family law
matters”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 12 of 24 [18] As we have recognized, “[b]y college age, children of divorced parents must be
expected to begin to come to terms with the reality of their family’s situation.
They must begin to realize that their attitude and actions are their individual
responsibilities.” Messner, 118 N.E.3d at 68–69. Indeed, “[w]hatever their
biases and resentments”—even if “one can understand how they got that
way”—“when they become adults it is no longer appropriate to allow them to
stay that way without consequence.” Id. (emphasis removed). And “where a
child, as an adult over eighteen years of age, repudiates a parent, that parent
must be allowed to dictate what effect this will have on his or her contribution
to college expenses for that child.” Lovold, 988 N.E.2d at 1150 (quoting McKay,
644 N.E.2d at 168). In this case, the record discloses clear and convincing
evidence that Daughter repudiated Father thereby relieving Father of the
obligation to pay for college. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 3 p. 14 (involving testimony that
Daughter “doesn’t have the desire to have a relationship” with Father).
Declining to reweigh the evidence, we affirm the trial court.
[19] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., concurs.
Tavitas, J., dissents with opinion
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 13 of 24 Tavitas, Judge, dissenting.
[20] I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s
determination that Father is not required to pay for Daughter’s college expenses
because she repudiated her relationship with Father. First, the repudiation
doctrine should not even apply to Father because he agreed to pay for all of
Daughter’s college expenses in the settlement agreement between Father and
Mother during the dissolution of their marriage. And, even if the repudiation
doctrine could apply in such situations, the evidence does not support the trial
court’s determination that Daughter completely repudiated her relationship
with Father.
I. Repudiation Should Not Apply to Settlement Agreements
[21] When Father and Mother divorced, they entered into a settlement agreement.
In this agreement, Father agreed to pay for 100 percent of Daughter’s college
expenses. Because Father agreed to pay for Daughter’s college expenses, I am
not convinced that the doctrine of repudiation should even apply.
[22] The doctrine that a child’s repudiation of a parent could relieve that parent of
the obligation to pay for college expenses was first adopted by this Court in
McKay v. McKay, 644 N.E.2d 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). In that case, we noted
the general rule that “there is no absolute legal duty on the part of parents to
provide a college education for their children.” Id. at 166 (citing Neudecker v.
Neudecker, 577 N.E.2d 960, 962 (Ind. 1991)). We then observed:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 14 of 24 However, the statutory authorization for the divorce court to order either or both parents to pay sums toward their child’s college education constitutes a reasonable manner in which to enforce the expectation that most families would encourage their qualified children to pursue a college education consistent with individual family values. In determining whether to order either or both parents to pay sums toward their child’s college education, the court must consider whether and to what extent the parents, if still married, would have contributed to the child’s college expenses.
Id. (citations omitted). Thus, a court may require parents to contribute to their
child’s college expenses if, had the parents remained married, they would have
contributed to such expenses. Importantly, however, the McKay Court also
held, “[t]he expectation that a parent would ordinarily be inclined to contribute
toward his child’s college education (which may be enforced under our laws of
dissolution) does not continue, and should not be enforced where an adult child
has repudiated his relationship with his parent.” Id. at 168.
[23] Although our Supreme Court has never addressed the repudiation doctrine, this
Court has repeatedly done so. A review of these cases reveals that a vast
majority dealt with situations in which a parent was ordered to pay for their
child’s college expenses, not where the parent had already agreed to do so. See
Cunningham v. Barton, 139 N.E.3d 1081, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (trial court
granted petition to require parent to pay for college expenses); Duncan v.
Duncan, 81 N.E.3d 219, 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (same); In re Paternity of
Pickett, 44 N.E.3d 756, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (same); Staresnick v. Staresnick,
830 N.E.2d 127, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (same); Loden v. Loden, 740 N.E.2d
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 15 of 24 865, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (same); Thacker v. Thacker, 710 N.E.2d 942, 946
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (same); McKay, 644 N.E.2d 164 (same); see also Messner v.
Messner, 118 N.E.3d 64, 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (trial court denied petition to
require parent to pay for college expenses); Lovold v. Ellis, 988 N.E.2d 1144,
1146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (same); Lechien v. Wren, 950 N.E.2d 838, 841 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2011) (same); Redd v. Redd, 901 N.E.2d 545, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)
(same); Scales v. Scales, 891 N.E.2d 1116, 1118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (same).
[24] In contrast, I have found only three cases in which we addressed a claim of
repudiation of a parent where the parent had agreed to pay for college expenses.
See Himes v. Himes, 57 N.E.3d 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (mediated agreement);
Norris v. Pethe, 833 N.E.2d 1024, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (settlement
agreement); Cure v. Cure, 767 N.E.2d 997, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (settlement
agreement).
[25] Only in Norris did we hold that the daughter’s complete repudiation of her
father relieved the father of his agreed-to obligation to pay for college expenses.
833 N.E.2d at 1034–35. In Cure, we held that the child did not repudiate her
relationship with her father and did not directly address whether such
repudiation, if found, could relieve the father of his obligation to pay for college
expenses. 767 N.E.2d at 1002–03. And in Himes, the father moved to modify
the mediated agreement in which he agreed to contribute to his daughter’s
college expenses. 57 N.E.3d at 828. The trial court denied this motion, and we
affirmed. Id. We concluded that the father did not demonstrate “a change[] in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 16 of 24 circumstances as substantial and continuing as to make Father’s agreed
contribution unreasonable.” Id. at 829. We noted, however,
Indiana’s policy is to encourage parents to settle their own affairs. Reno v. Haler, 734 N.E.2d 1095, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. We have previously pointed out that a child support order and an educational support order are separate and distinct because an educational support order can be terminated if a child repudiates a parent. Lovold[, 988 N.E.2d at 1152]. We do not have that here. What we do have here are two parents that properly executed a mediated agreement, which stated that they both gave up any “right to revoke their signature or the effectiveness of this Mediated Agreement.” There is no evidence in the record of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, or manifest inequities. See Pond v. Pond, 700 N.E.2d 1130, 1136 (Ind. 1998). As a result, even if there was evidence to support a modification, it is likely that the trial court would still have been bound to enforce the terms of the parties’ Mediated Agreement. However, we do not reach that conclusion today.
Hines, 57 N.E.3d at 829 n.1 (record citation omitted).
[26] Here too, the trial court did not enter an education support order. Instead,
Mother and Father freely entered into a settlement agreement in which Father
agreed to pay 100 percent of Daughter’s college expenses. The only conditions
placed on Father’s obligation to pay for college expenses are that Daughter
remain a full-time student and maintain at least a C grade average. Appellant’s
App. Vol. II p. 36. The settlement agreement also contains an integration
clause and further states that the terms of the agreement could not be modified
except by written agreement of the parties. Id. at 42.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 17 of 24 [27] Given these facts, a parent should not be able to escape their freely-bargained-
for obligation to contribute to their child’s college expenses. McKay and its
progeny only stand for the proposition that, when one parent seeks a court
order requiring the other parent to contribute toward their child’s college
expenses, the latter cannot be required to do so when the child has completely
refused to have a relationship with that parent. This is simply not the case here.
[28] Here, Father agreed to pay 100 percent of Daughter’s college expenses as part
of the settlement agreement. Clearly, Mother and Father negotiated this
financial obligation as part of the overall financial settlement. This term of the
settlement agreement is not conditioned on Father’s desire or ability to pay.
Father agreed to assume all responsibility. Father should be held to his end of
the bargain. See Himes, 57 N.E.3d at 829 n.1.
[29] Furthermore, I am concerned about the potential for damage to parent-child
relationships if we allow a parent to cause the very conflict that results in the
alleged “repudiation” by exploiting child’s desire to go to college knowing her
parents had agreed to this at the time of their divorce. Children are greatly
affected by divorce, and to allow a parent to “repudiate” an agreed-upon term
of their settlement agreement that was negotiated for a child gives the parent the
ability to renege on their obligations. Here, the source of the conflict between
Father and Daughter is Father’s refusal to pay for Daughter’s college expenses,
despite his agreement to do so. By permitting Daughter’s understandable
frustration at this refusal to form the basis of a “repudiation” finding allows
Father to benefit from his obstinance.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 18 of 24 II. Insufficient Evidence of Repudiation
[30] Even if I agreed with the majority that the repudiation doctrine could apply in
situations where a parent has entered into an agreement to pay for college
expenses, the evidence does not support the trial court’s determination that
Daughter repudiated her relationship with Father. As the majority notes,
“[r]epudiation of a parent is ‘a complete refusal to participate in a relationship
with his or her parent.’” Redd, 901 N.E.2d at 550 (quoting Norris, 833 N.E.2d
at 1033) (emphasis added); see also McKay, 644 N.E.2d at 165 (holding that trial
court erred by ordering father to pay for son’s college expenses even though the
son had “steadfastly refused to have any relationship with [f]ather despite
[f]ather’s on-going efforts to reconcile their relationship”). In fact, the word
“repudiate” is defined to mean “[t]o disown (a child, for example),” and “[t]o
refuse to have any dealings with.” Repudiate, American Heritage Dictionary
(5th ed. 2022); see also Repudiate, Dictionary.com (defining “repudiate” as “to
cast off or disown.”).
[31] In the present case, the facts most favorable to the trial court’s judgment show
that Daughter’s relationship with Father became strained after, contrary to her
earlier plans, Daughter decided not to enlist in the United States Air Force—a
decision with which Father vehemently disagreed. This culminated in her
moving out of Father’s home and into the home of her boyfriend’s parents.
Thereafter, Daughter’s in-person communications with Father were minimal.
[32] Undisputed evidence in the record, however, shows that Father and Daughter
still had significant communication during this period. Indeed, in his brief, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 19 of 24 Father “concedes that there was a significant amount of communication as
demonstrated by the exhibits presented to the trial court.” Appellee’s Br. p. 9.
Father claims, however, that this evidence also shows that, although he sent
daughter hundreds of messages, she responded to only approximately forty
percent of his messages. At a minimum, however, this demonstrates that
Father and Daughter still had significant communication after she moved out.
[33] Moreover, in these messages, Daughter repeatedly stated that she loved Father
and wanted a relationship with him. See, e.g., Ex. Vol. II pp. 10 (Daughter
messaging Father, “Happy birthday dad. I love you. � I just want you to
know that I haven't stopped loving and I never will. I hope one day we can
have a close relationship. I hope you have a great day. Love you.”); id. at 14
(“Dad I never wanted to do any of this. I love you so much and the family. I
miss everyone so much. . . . [Y]ou’re crazy if you think I abandoned the family
and that I wanted to leave. I did what I had to in order for me to have a future.
I’m doing this because it was already an agreement and I deserve to get what
[brother] got. . . . I love you dad and I will never stop.”); id. at 70–71 (“Just
know you will see me again. One day I will prove you wrong and make
something out of myself. I hope you . . . can find it in your heart to come to my
grad party.”) (errors in originals).
[34] I do not deny that the parties’ relationship is strained and that the
communication between the parties is not entirely amicable. I simply do not
find, however, that Daughter’s actions evidence a “complete refusal” to
participate in a relationship with Father. Redd, 901 N.E.2d at 550. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 20 of 24 [35] Although the parental-repudiation determination is necessarily fact sensitive, a
review of cases in which we affirmed a finding of parental repudiation shows
that those cases were quite different than the present case. For example, in
Lovold, we held that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s
determination of parental repudiation. 988 N.E.2d at 1151. There, when the
son was younger, he did not see his father for eight years and did not contact
father in any way. Id. This behavior continued after son was eighteen years of
age. Although the son claimed during an in-camera interview that he was
interested in having a relationship with his father, the trial court determined
that this statement was not worthy of credit. Id. The son still refused to meet
with his father after receiving his father’s contact information. Accordingly, we
held that the evidence supported a finding that the son refused to participate in
a relationship with his father. Id.
[36] In Norris, the daughter rejected her father’s birthday gifts and returned them to
him; she also only communicated with her father to tell him that she did not
want to have a relationship with him. 833 N.E.2d at 1034. When the father
went to one of his daughter’s school events, she told him to leave. Id. The
daughter also stated that she did not want her father to attend her graduation.
Id. The daughter in Norris even stated that she would not visit her father if he
were dying. Under those circumstances, we affirmed the trial court's
repudiation determination. Id. at 1035.
[37] Lastly, in McKay, 644 N.E.2d at 165, the father voluntarily relinquished his
visitation rights with his son after their relationship soured. Although he did
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 21 of 24 not exercise his visitation, the father did occasionally send his son gifts and
cards. Id. Years later, the father tried to reconcile with his son and attempted
to reinstate his visitation rights. Id. This resulted in court-ordered counseling,
after which the son still refused to have anything to do with his father. Id. The
son testified that he desired no relationship or contact with his father and that
he considered his mother and stepfather to be his parents. Id. at 166. On
appeal from the trial court’s order requiring the father to pay a portion of the
son’s college expenses, we held that the son had repudiated his relationship
with his father and reversed. Id. at 168.
[38] In contrast, in Tew v. Tew, 924 N.E.2d 1262, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), we
affirmed the trial court’s determination that the daughter did not repudiate her
relationship with her father. In that case, the daughter had not had an
overnight visit with her father, but she did participate in group visits that
included her father, grandmother, and brother. Id. She also attended a
birthday dinner with her father. We concluded, therefore, that “the record does
not support a showing that [the daughter] ha[d] exhibited a complete refusal to
engage in a relationship with [her father].” Id.
[39] In Redd, supra, the son’s behavior toward his mother was described by the trial
court as “deplorable and included defiance, physical threats, open scorn and
repudiation of her authority as a mother.” 901 N.E.2d at 552. Despite this, the
son attended the graduation party his mother’s family threw for him. Id. The
mother also spoke with her son on the phone when he would answer. Id. The
son also told both his parents that he wished to have a relationship with his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 22 of 24 mother. Id. Yet the son also stated that he hated his mother and wanted
nothing to do with her and never wanted to see her again. Id. “[D]espite these
statements, [son] called [m]other the night before the hearing and asked if he
could see her,” and when the mother agreed, the son acted like “nothing had
happened.” Id. After this meeting, however, the mother thought that she
would never speak with her son again. Id. Given those facts, we nevertheless
held that the son did not repudiate his relationship with his mother. Id. “While
we certainly d[id] not condone [the son]’s deplorable behavior, [he] ha[d] not
completely rejected a relationship with his [m]other.” Id. We therefore
reversed the trial court’s determination and noted that “repudiation occurs only
when the child completely rejects a relationship with the parent in question.”
Id.
[40] And in Staresnick v. Staresnick, 830 N.E.2d 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), we
affirmed the trial court’s determination that the son had not repudiated his
relationship with his father. In that case, the son expressed a desire to have a
relationship with his father and was even amenable to counseling. The son did
not consult with his father in making decisions regarding his post-secondary
education, nor did he inform his father of his address at college. The son also
had only two telephone conversations with his father during a two-year period
and had told his father more than once that he did not respect him and no
longer wished to see him. Id. at 132–33. Still, we affirmed the trial court’s
finding of non-repudiation because the son indicated a willingness to rebuild his
relationship with his father. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 23 of 24 [41] The facts of this case align more with those in Tew, Redd, and Staresnick than
Lovold, Norris, or McKay. That is, Daughter and Father have a strained
relationship, and some of Daughter’s behavior has been, admittedly,
disrespectful. But nothing in the record supports a finding that Daughter has
completely rejected a relationship with Father.
Conclusion
[42] The repudiation doctrine only applies when a child completely repudiates his or
her relationship with a parent. To hold otherwise incentivizes parents to create
situations that can lead to strained relationships in an effort to avoid a
bargained-for obligation under the guise of repudiation. I fear that the
majority’s holding opens the door to damaging parent-child relationships. The
fragility of teenage relationships with divorced parents has received another
blow with the majority’s holding. Moreover, the evidence does not support a
determination that Daughter has repudiated her relationship with Father here.
[43] For these reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s repudiation determination.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DR-990 | March 12, 2024 Page 24 of 24