1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 BROOK MANCINELLI, Case No. 25-cv-08246-JST
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 9 v. REMAND
10 MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Re: ECF No. 13 Defendant. 11
12 13 Before the Court is Plaintiff Brook Mancinelli’s motion to remand. ECF No. 13. The 14 Court will deny the motion. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 Mancinelli, individually and on behalf of a putative class, brings this action against 17 Defendant Marriott International, Inc. (“Marriott”) for allegedly misleading pricing practices. 18 ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 1. He alleges that California residents who used their Marriott Bonvoy points to 19 book hotel accommodations are initially shown one total hotel cost that does not include a “resort” 20 or “destination” fee at the beginning of the reservation process. Id. ¶ 4. Only at the end of the 21 booking process, “after a consumer has invested time, effort and cognitive energy in the buying 22 process,” is the customer shown the mandatory resort fee, a practice Mancinelli calls “drip 23 pricing.” Id. ¶ 4–5. “Marriot thus creates a misleading impression that loyalty members can 24 complete their reservation using points alone, without paying additional charges.” Id. ¶ 7. 25 Mancinelli alleges that this practice violates California’s Honest Pricing Law. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8, 38. He 26 asserts claims for violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civil 27 Code §§ 1750 et seq.; and California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 1 Mancinelli filed his complaint in Contra Costa County Superior Court on August 25, 2025. 2 Marriott removed the case to this Court on September 26, 2025. ECF No. 1. Mancinelli moved to 3 remand the case on October 9, 2025. ECF No. 13. Marriott filed an opposition on October 29, 4 2025, attaching certain declarations, ECF Nos. 20, 20-3, which Mancinelli moved to exclude, ECF 5 No. 26 at 10. After further motion practice, Marriott was permitted to file two additional 6 declarations, and Mancinelli was permitted to file a surreply, ECF No. 37, which he did on March 7 2, 2026, ECF No. 40. 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446, a defendant may remove a civil action from state to federal court 10 if the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The Ninth Circuit “strictly 11 construe[s] the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be 12 rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 13 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992); Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 14 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008); see 28 U.S.C. § 1441. “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal 15 jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is 16 proper.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (citing Nishimoto v. Federman–Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 17 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988)). 18 The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), “gives federal courts 19 jurisdiction over certain class actions, defined in § 1332(d)(1), if the class has more than 100 20 members, the parties are minimally diverse, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 21 million.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 at 84–85 (2014) (citing 22 § 1332(d)(2), (5)(B)). “The amount in controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount in 23 dispute, not a prospective assessment of defendant’s liability.” Arias v. Residence Inn by 24 Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). “In that sense, the amount in 25 controversy reflects the maximum recovery the plaintiff could reasonably recover.” Arias, 936 26 F.3d at 927; see also Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 2018) 27 (holding that the that the amount in controversy includes all amounts “‘at stake’ in the litigation, 1 In a CAFA case, “a defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation 2 that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 3 89. If, however, “a defendant’s assertion of the amount in controversy is challenged,” then “both 4 sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount- 5 in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 6 1195 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 82). The parties may rely on “evidence 7 outside the complaint, including affidavits or declarations, or other ‘summary-judgment-type 8 evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.’” Id. at 1197 (quoting 9 Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)). CAFA thus requires 10 a court to determine the amount in controversy based on “consideration of real evidence and the 11 reality of what is at stake in the litigation, using reasonable assumptions underlying the 12 defendant’s theory of damages exposure.” Id. at 1198. Accordingly, “when the defendant relies 13 on a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions to satisfy its burden of proof, the chain of 14 reasoning and its underlying assumptions must be reasonable ones.” LaCross v. Knight Transp. 15 Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2015). “Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, if 16 the evidence submitted by both sides is balanced, in equipoise, the scales tip against federal[] court 17 jurisdiction.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199. 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 Mancinelli moves to remand this action to state court, arguing that Marriott has failed to 20 establish federal jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. §§1332(a) or 1332(d). Mancinelli does not 21 dispute that the proposed class has more than 100 members and that the parties are minimally 22 diverse. Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 84. He argues, however, that Marriott has not shown that the 23 amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. ECF No. 13 at 6. 24 In estimating the amount in controversy, the Ninth Circuit directs the parties to include the 25 amount of damages at issue, as well as attorney’s fees through the date of judgment if the 26 underlying statute authorizes an award of attorney’s fees. Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 27 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1998); Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 2018). 1 controversy exceeds $5,000,000 is “offered without any data, periodization, transaction counts, fee 2 amounts, or calculations.” ECF No. 13 at 6. Mancinelli misunderstands the burden on a removing 3 defendant. A notice of removal need only “contain[] a short and plain statement of the grounds for 4 removal,” 28 U.S.C.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 BROOK MANCINELLI, Case No. 25-cv-08246-JST
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 9 v. REMAND
10 MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Re: ECF No. 13 Defendant. 11
12 13 Before the Court is Plaintiff Brook Mancinelli’s motion to remand. ECF No. 13. The 14 Court will deny the motion. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 Mancinelli, individually and on behalf of a putative class, brings this action against 17 Defendant Marriott International, Inc. (“Marriott”) for allegedly misleading pricing practices. 18 ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 1. He alleges that California residents who used their Marriott Bonvoy points to 19 book hotel accommodations are initially shown one total hotel cost that does not include a “resort” 20 or “destination” fee at the beginning of the reservation process. Id. ¶ 4. Only at the end of the 21 booking process, “after a consumer has invested time, effort and cognitive energy in the buying 22 process,” is the customer shown the mandatory resort fee, a practice Mancinelli calls “drip 23 pricing.” Id. ¶ 4–5. “Marriot thus creates a misleading impression that loyalty members can 24 complete their reservation using points alone, without paying additional charges.” Id. ¶ 7. 25 Mancinelli alleges that this practice violates California’s Honest Pricing Law. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8, 38. He 26 asserts claims for violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civil 27 Code §§ 1750 et seq.; and California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 1 Mancinelli filed his complaint in Contra Costa County Superior Court on August 25, 2025. 2 Marriott removed the case to this Court on September 26, 2025. ECF No. 1. Mancinelli moved to 3 remand the case on October 9, 2025. ECF No. 13. Marriott filed an opposition on October 29, 4 2025, attaching certain declarations, ECF Nos. 20, 20-3, which Mancinelli moved to exclude, ECF 5 No. 26 at 10. After further motion practice, Marriott was permitted to file two additional 6 declarations, and Mancinelli was permitted to file a surreply, ECF No. 37, which he did on March 7 2, 2026, ECF No. 40. 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446, a defendant may remove a civil action from state to federal court 10 if the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The Ninth Circuit “strictly 11 construe[s] the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be 12 rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 13 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992); Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 14 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008); see 28 U.S.C. § 1441. “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal 15 jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is 16 proper.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (citing Nishimoto v. Federman–Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 17 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988)). 18 The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), “gives federal courts 19 jurisdiction over certain class actions, defined in § 1332(d)(1), if the class has more than 100 20 members, the parties are minimally diverse, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 21 million.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 at 84–85 (2014) (citing 22 § 1332(d)(2), (5)(B)). “The amount in controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount in 23 dispute, not a prospective assessment of defendant’s liability.” Arias v. Residence Inn by 24 Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). “In that sense, the amount in 25 controversy reflects the maximum recovery the plaintiff could reasonably recover.” Arias, 936 26 F.3d at 927; see also Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 2018) 27 (holding that the that the amount in controversy includes all amounts “‘at stake’ in the litigation, 1 In a CAFA case, “a defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation 2 that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 3 89. If, however, “a defendant’s assertion of the amount in controversy is challenged,” then “both 4 sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount- 5 in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 6 1195 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 82). The parties may rely on “evidence 7 outside the complaint, including affidavits or declarations, or other ‘summary-judgment-type 8 evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.’” Id. at 1197 (quoting 9 Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)). CAFA thus requires 10 a court to determine the amount in controversy based on “consideration of real evidence and the 11 reality of what is at stake in the litigation, using reasonable assumptions underlying the 12 defendant’s theory of damages exposure.” Id. at 1198. Accordingly, “when the defendant relies 13 on a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions to satisfy its burden of proof, the chain of 14 reasoning and its underlying assumptions must be reasonable ones.” LaCross v. Knight Transp. 15 Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2015). “Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, if 16 the evidence submitted by both sides is balanced, in equipoise, the scales tip against federal[] court 17 jurisdiction.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199. 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 Mancinelli moves to remand this action to state court, arguing that Marriott has failed to 20 establish federal jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. §§1332(a) or 1332(d). Mancinelli does not 21 dispute that the proposed class has more than 100 members and that the parties are minimally 22 diverse. Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 84. He argues, however, that Marriott has not shown that the 23 amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. ECF No. 13 at 6. 24 In estimating the amount in controversy, the Ninth Circuit directs the parties to include the 25 amount of damages at issue, as well as attorney’s fees through the date of judgment if the 26 underlying statute authorizes an award of attorney’s fees. Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 27 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1998); Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 2018). 1 controversy exceeds $5,000,000 is “offered without any data, periodization, transaction counts, fee 2 amounts, or calculations.” ECF No. 13 at 6. Mancinelli misunderstands the burden on a removing 3 defendant. A notice of removal need only “contain[] a short and plain statement of the grounds for 4 removal,” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), and “need not contain evidentiary submissions.” Dart Cherokee, 5 574 U.S. at 84. Only upon challenge by the plaintiff of the amount in controversy must “the 6 defendant [] show by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the 7 jurisdictional threshold.” Lopez v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., 777 F.Supp.3d 1100, 1104 (N.D. 8 Cal. 2025). Thus, there is no defect in the notice of removal. 9 In opposition to the motion for remand, Marriott submits the declaration of Luis Foster, 10 Senior Manager of Business Analytics, who calculates that from July 1, 2024 to August 27, 2025, 11 there were 288,019 reservations for a stay at a U.S. resort-fee hotel made via Marriott’s website or 12 app by a consumer who listed a California address purchased through the redemption of Bonvoy 13 points. ECF No. 28-1 at 12–13. Marriott also submits the declaration of its Resort and 14 Destination Fee Administrator, Lisa Simpson, who estimates that there were 480 Marriott resorts 15 in the United States that charged resort or destination fees and that the average resort fee charged 16 by these hotels as of the date of the declaration was $34.80. ECF No. 28-1 at 10. Utilizing these 17 calculations, Marriott estimates the amount in controversy to be $9,887,692.27, not including 18 attorney’s fees. ECF No. 19 at 5. 19 Mancinelli argues that these calculations are “entirely unreasonable and unsupported for 20 three primary reasons.” ECF No. 40 at 2. First, he argues that “no evidence has been offered of 21 the actual resort fees charged by any property” during the class period. Id. But evidence of the 22 fee at each specific property is not required, because use of an average is a “reasonable 23 assumption.” See Mendoza v. OSI Indus., LLC, No. EDCV221202JGBSPX, 2022 WL 4291327, 24 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2022) (approving the use of an average rate of pay); Mortley v. Express 25 Pipe & Supply Co., No. SACV 17-1938-JLS-JDE, 2018 WL 708115, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 26 2018) (holding that the “use of average rates of pay is reasonable”); Alvarez v. Off. Depot, Inc., 27 No. CV177220PSGAFMX, 2017 WL 5952181, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2017) (same) (collecting 1 Mancinelli also challenges the lack of perfect overlap between the dates bounding the 2 Marriott data set and the dates of class period. Id. at 2–3. Given that the dates are very close, and 3 Marriott’s calculates potential liability as being almost twice the CAFA threshold, the Court finds 4 it implausible that this small difference has any material effect. Third, Mancinelli argues that 5 Marriott’s declarant “calculated the arithmetic mean of the resort fees charged by these 480 hotels, 6 yet there is no evidence supporting the implicit assumption that Class Members’ reservations were 7 evenly distributed among these 480 hotels during the Relevant Period.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 8 Again, the Court finds that Marriott’s assumptions in making the calculation were reasonable, and 9 rejects this argument. See Korn v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1204–05 10 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that a removing defendant is not obligated to “research, state, and prove 11 the plaintiff’s claims for damages” (quoting McCraw v. Lyons, 863 F. Supp. 430, 434 (W.D. Ky. 12 1994)). 13 Mancinelli argues that Marriott should be required to determine the actual aggregate resort 14 fees charged for the group of Bonvoy points reservations made during the class period, citing 15 Perez v. Rose Hills Co., 131 F.4th 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2025). ECF No. 40 at 4. Perez is not helpful 16 to Mancinelli. There, the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendant employer had violated 17 the wage and hour laws “at times” and “throughout the statutory period,” but did not provide 18 specifics. 131 F.4th at 806. In its notice of removal, the defendant construed this language in 19 making assumptions about the amount in controversy. Id. at 806–07. The district court sua sponte 20 issued an order to show cause why the case should not be remanded, and ultimately did remand it, 21 finding that the defendant “was required to produce evidence supporting its amount-in-controversy 22 estimate.” Id. at 807 (emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit vacated the remand order, rejecting 23 precisely the kind of “demanding evidentiary burden” that Mancinelli contends is required 24 here. Id. at. 806. The appellate court reiterated that a removing defendant “is permitted to rely on 25 ‘a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions’ to calculate the amount in controversy,” and 26 clarified that “while ‘those assumptions cannot be pulled from thin air,’ they can be ‘founded on 27 the allegations of the complaint’ and do not necessarily need to be supported by evidence.” Id. ] The Court finds no reason here to challenge Marriott’s assumptions or its conclusion 2 || regarding the amount in controversy. Accordingly, the Court finds that Marriott has established 3 || by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the $5,000,000 4 || threshold for CAFA jurisdiction. 5 “Once [the defendant] has explained plausibly how the stakes exceed $5 million, . . . then 6 || the case belongs in federal court unless it is legally impossible for the plaintiff to recover that 7 || much.” Lewis v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 401 (9th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) 8 (quoting Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc., 528 F.3d 982 (7th Cir.2008). Mancinelli argues that if the actual 9 || average resort fee paid was $17, the amount in controversy would be only $4,896,323, ECF No. 10 || 40 at 6 n.4—but there is no evidence that was the average resort fee, although Plaintiff's counsel 11 was able to identify some hotels that currently charge $11 or $12 in resort fees. ECF No. 40 at 6. 12 || In any event, “[a]n assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold is 13 || not defeated merely because it is equally possible that damages might be ‘less than the requisite 14 ...amount.’” Arias, 936 F.3d at 927. And Mancinelli makes no argument that it would be legally 3 15 impossible for Plaintiffs to recover $5,000,000.! a 16 CONCLUSION 17 For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Mancinelli’s motion to remand. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 || Dated: April 15, 2026 . 20 JON S. TIGA 71 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ' In light of this conclusion, the Court need not reach the parties’ arguments concerning diversity jurisdiction.