Bronzaft v. Caporali

162 Misc. 2d 281
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 24, 1994
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 162 Misc. 2d 281 (Bronzaft v. Caporali) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bronzaft v. Caporali, 162 Misc. 2d 281 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1994).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Herman Cahn, J.

Motion sequence numbers 001, 002 and 003 of action bearing index No. 120435/93 and motion sequence numbers 001, 002 and 003 of action bearing index No. 117218/93 are consolidated for disposition.

These two shareholder derivative actions are brought against the Grumman Corporation (Grumman) and certain of its current and former directors and officers. Briefly stated, the plaintiffs allege intentional and negligent breach of fiduciary duty by defendants resulting from their failure to prevent certain illegal conduct, including bribery and padded billing in the procurement of certain United States Government contracts. Plaintiffs assert that such activity has already resulted in substantial penalties to Grumman and the possible future loss of significant business.

The corporate and individual defendants have moved to dismiss the complaints pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (3) and (7) as well as Business Corporation Law § 626 based upon plaintiff’s failure to make a demand upon the Grumman board of directors before commencing suit.

At oral argument on the motions, the court was advised that the Northrop Corporation had offered to purchase all the stock of Grumman in order to accomplish a "cash-out” merger. The court then directed counsel to address the issue of what effect, if any, such a merger would have on plaintiff’s standing to maintain these actions.

The threshold issue is whether pursuant to New York law a derivative action can be maintained by a (former) shareholder, after a cash-out merger.

[283]*283Pursuant to the merger agreement with Grumman, the stock of every Grumman shareholder was to be acquired by Northrop for cash or converted into the right to receive a fixed sum in cash from the surviving corporation upon tender of Grumman stock to Northrop. Alternatively, any shareholder may participate in an appraisal proceeding pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 623.

Following completion of the tender offer Grumman will be merged into a wholly owned subsidiary of Northrop known as Northrop Acquisition, Inc. and the surviving corporation will itself be a wholly owned subsidiary of Northrop. The court believes that the merger has been consummated on the said terms.

Defendants maintain that the cash-out merger divests the plaintiffs, who are now former shareholders, of all rights (other than to collect the sum agreed upon for purchase of their stock), including standing to maintain a derivative action on behalf of Grumman or the surviving corporation. Plaintiffs maintain that a shareholder’s standing to assert a derivative claim subsequent to a cash-out merger survives, and is preserved by Business Corporation Law § 906 (b) (3).

Business Corporation Law § 626 in addressing shareholder status in derivative actions provides in relevant part:

"(a) An action may be brought in the right of a domestic * * * corporation to procure a judgment in its favor, by a holder of shares * * * of the corporation * * *
"(b) In any such action it shall be made to appear that the plaintiff is such a holder [of shares] at the time of bringing the action and that he was such a holder [of shares] at the time of the transaction of which he complains.”

This section has been interpreted as requiring a plaintiff in a shareholder derivative action to not only have been a shareholder at the time of the transaction complained of as well as at the time of the commencement of the action, but also that the plaintiff maintain its shareholder status throughout the pendency of the action without interruption. (Independent Investor Protection League v Time, Inc., 50 NY2d 259; Karfunkel v USLIFE Corp., 116 Misc 2d 841, affd 98 AD2d 628; Sorin v Shahmoon Indus., 30 Misc 2d 408; Snyder v Pleasant Val. Fishing Co., 756 F Supp 725 [SD NY 1990].) If the plaintiff’s shares are disposed of during pendency of the action, the action abates (supra; see also, Amella v Consolidated Edison Co., 73 NYS2d 263, affd 273 App Div 755; [284]*284Hayman v Morris, 46 NYS2d 482). Furthermore, New York courts have generally held that the pursuit of an appraisal proceeding constitutes a dissenting shareholder’s exclusive remedy (Business Corporation Law § 623 [c]; Alpert v 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 NY2d 557, 567) unless the merger itself is challenged (see, Miller v Steinbach, 268 F Supp 255 [SD NY 1967]).

Various courts outside this jurisdiction, particularly courts interpreting Delaware’s similar statute, have applied this rule and dismissed the cause of action where the stock of plaintiff shareholders had been acquired through a cash-out merger. (Scattergood v Perelman, 945 F2d 618, 626 [3d Cir 1991]; Blasband v Rales, 971 F2d 1034, 1041 [3d Cir 1992]; Friedman v Mohasco Corp., 929 F2d 77, 79 [2d Cir 1991]; Lewis v Anderson, 477 A2d 1040, 1044, n 3.) The rationale applied in these cases is that a plaintiff who ceases to be a shareholder by reason of merger has no rights in the surviving corporation predating the merger, and, therefore, has no standing to assert derivative claims on behalf of the surviving corporation.

Both parties rely heavily on Rubinstein v Catacosinos (91 AD2d 445, affd 60 NY2d 890). In Rubinstein, Applied Digital Data Systems (ADDS) was acquired through a cash-out merger several months after plaintiff therein had initiated a derivative action on behalf of ADDS. Pursuant to the terms of the merger, the surviving corporation became a wholly owned subsidiary of NCR Corporation (NCR) and each share of the acquired corporation’s stock was converted into the right to receive cash or to have the stock valued at a statutory appraisal proceeding pursuant to Delaware law (91 AD2d, at 445-446). The defendants in Rubinstein moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that the merger divested the plaintiff of her shareholder status and, therefore, precluded plaintiff from maintaining a derivative action on behalf of the acquiring corporation.

The Appellate Division stated in relevant part:

"It is settled law that a plaintiff stockholder in a stockholder’s derivative action loses his right to continue to prosecute the action if he ceases to be a stockholder. (Tenney v Rosenthal, 6 NY2d 204, 210; Bernstein v Polo Fashions, 55 AD2d 530.) This rule has been applied where the stockholder ceases to be a stockholder by reason of his tendering shares to secure statutory appraisal. (Pikor v Cinerama Prods. Corp., 25 FRD 92 [SDNY].)
[285]*285"It makes particular sense to apply this rule to the present case where as a result of the merger plaintiff is entitled only to a specified amount of money, thus becoming more like a creditor than a stockholder * * * ADDS’ sole stockholder is NCR and it has not indicated any desire to prosecute the case; nor has any stockholder of NCR. Plaintiff will get no benefit from the judgment. There is no reason to permit plaintiff, who has no interest in the case, to force upon ADDS and its stockholders, direct or indirect, a lawsuit for their supported benefit in which they are not interested.

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Bluebook (online)
162 Misc. 2d 281, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bronzaft-v-caporali-nysupct-1994.